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Abstract 
This thesis examines the economic consequences of the adoption of international 
pension accounting standard IAS19 Revised (IAS19R) on pension asset 
allocation decisions by applying a difference-in-differences with propensity score 
matching method. 
The publication of IAS19R in 2011 marked a fundamental change to pension 
reporting in financial statements. In particular, it had a significant impact on 
(1) how sponsor firms recognise net pension assets/liabilities on the balance 
sheet, (2) the calculation and recognition of pension expenses, (3) the 
presentation of re-measurement (actuarial gains and losses), treatment of which 
had been heavily debated by academics and practitioners, and (4) disclosure 
requirements for pension schemes, which had been criticised as “excessive” 
under IAS19. 
This research examines the “real effect” of IAS19R adoption on management 
investment decisions. Using a difference-in-differences with propensity score 
matching method, the results suggest that, on average, UK sponsor firms affected 
by IAS19R have reduced their risk taking in pension investments post-IAS19R, 
both over time and compared with a control sample of unaffected US firms 
(matched by propensity score matching). The results of sensitivity analysis also 
suggest that UK sponsor firms tried to avoid the expensive liquidity costs of asset 
re-allocation by switching their pension plan asset allocations gradually during 
the period around the publication and adoption of IAS19R. Furthermore, the 
outcomes of sensitivity tests suggest a positive relationship between equity 
investment levels, and firms’ leverage and cash flow risk, consistent with the “risk-
shifting” hypothesis documented in the previous literature. 
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The thesis also applies a manual textual analysis on the comment letters sent 
by industrial firms to the IASB to provide their opinions on the IAS19R Exposure 
Draft. The analysis describes and tabulates the arguments raised by these firms 
on three main amendment areas of IAS19: recognition, presentation and 
disclosure. Based on this description, this part aims to motivate the empirical 
research mentioned previously and shed light on the other potential 
consequences of IAS19R adoption. These consequences include: the 
management of funding might be driven by accounting rules rather than 
management rules; the increasing volatility of balance sheet; de-risking in the 
pension plan portfolio following the adoption of IAS19R; the diminishing of 
financial statement “true and fair view” and its usefulness due to the abolition of 
expected rate of return and excessive requirements on pension disclosure. 
Furthermore, the study also suggests that the lobbying behaviour of these firms 
on the standard setting process is consistent with the predictions of Positive 
Accounting Theory. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
“Pension accounting is a term that loosely describes a set of accounting problems 
affecting a range of measurement and reporting issues associated with 
contractual pension commitments made by employers to their employees” 
(Klumpes, 2001, pp.30). These issues may relate to costs borne by employers 
who sponsor (usually defined benefit funded) pension plans for their employees, 
which are disclosed in financial statements, or to financial reports prepared by 
those responsible for managing various types of pension plan arrangements. As 
a result of demographic changes, as the populations of most countries gradually 
age, the social, economic and political significance of pension contracts to the 
operation of both capital and labour markets is likely to grow. Their accounting 
implications should be of concern not only to employees and managers of 
affected organisations, but also more generally to accountants and public policy 
makers. 
Nevertheless, pension accounting standards have been the subject of heated 
debate and have drawn the attention of both academics and practitioners. 
Pension accounting has caused controversy ever since standard setters began 
to regulate the recognition and valuation of pension-related liabilities, assets and 
costs. For instance, in the US, both the Committee on Accounting Procedures of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in the 1950s and its 
successor, the Accounting Principles Board, in the 1960s had to concede that 
“improvements in pension accounting were necessary beyond what was 
considered practical at those times” (FASB, 1985). In the 1970s and 1980s, 
attempts by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to introduce an 
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accounting standard based entirely on the accrual principle again met with strong 
resistance from the corporate sector (Francis, 1987; Saemann, 1995; Klumpes, 
2001). Similarly, the deliberations of the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) on a revised version of IAS19 in the 1990s also proved to be 
contentious (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). Finally, in 2000, when the UK 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) published a new pension accounting 
standard that enforced a strict requirement for companies to recognise their net 
pension liabilities on their balance sheets immediately and fully, this again 
sparked a heated debate, during which critics held the ASB’s standard 
responsible for changes to or termination of corporate pension schemes (Chitty, 
2002; Slater and Copeland, 2005). 
One reason why accounting for corporate pension systems causes so much 
controversy is because changes to pension accounting standards may 
profoundly influence sponsors’ balance sheets and reported earnings, which in 
turn has many economic consequences unforeseen by standard setters (Glaum, 
2009). 
The term “economic consequences”, first used by Zeff (1978), is defined as the 
impact of accounting reports on the decision-making behaviour of businesses, 
governments, unions, investors and creditors (Zeff, 1978). It is argued that the 
resulting behaviour of such groups and individuals may be detrimental to the 
interests of other affected parties, and accounting standard setters must therefore 
take into consideration these allegedly detrimental consequences when deciding 
on accounting questions (Zeff, 1978). 
In June 2011, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) published a 
revised version of International Accounting Standard No.19: Employee Benefits 
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(IAS19R), which was mandated in January 2013. IAS19R made significant 
changes to the recognition, presentation and disclosure requirements for pension 
accounting. In particular, IAS19R had a significant impact on (1) how sponsor 
firms recognise net pension assets/liabilities on the balance sheet, (2) the 
calculation and recognition of pension expenses, (3) the presentation of re-
measurement (actuarial gains and losses- AGL), the various treatments of which 
under IAS19 had been heavily debated by academics and practitioners, and (4) 
the disclosure requirements for pension schemes, which had been criticised as 
“excessive” under IAS19. 
In relation to the first change, the IAS19R requires the sponsor firm to fully 
recognize the net amount of pension assets/liabilities on balance sheet. 
According to Sun (2011) which studied the economic consequence of SFAS 158 
adoption in the US in 2006, she argued that the SFAS 158 requires firms to move 
pension funding status from the footnotes to the balance sheet. This requirement 
would improve the transparency and understandability of pension accounting, 
however it at the same time increases the pension liability recognized and 
decreases the shareholder’s equity reported for firms with underfunded pension 
plans. Sun (2011) then examined the effect of recognition versus disclosure of 
pension related information, looking at the economic consequences in terms of 
market responses. According to her study, analysts interpret disclosed and 
recognised information differently, and recognition increases the market’s 
perceived equity risk and leads to a higher cost of capital. 
The fully requirement of IAS19R is similar to the requirement under SFAS 158 
and it was expected to have a significant one-time impact on the sponsor’s 
balance sheet and subsequently increase the volatility of the balance sheet, 
especially for the firms that had previous applied the “corridor method” and had 
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invested their pension asset plans heavily in risky assets. These impacts, in turn, 
affected the perceptions of investors and therefore change the decision making 
of managers of sponsor firm (Amir, Guan and Oswald, 2010). 
Secondly, the requirement of calculating the pension expense without the 
utilization of expected rate of return would have several implications. Firstly, the 
use of the discount rate instead of the expected rate of return (according to the 
requirement of IAS19R) would not reflect a “true and fair view” of asset allocation 
in the pension plan portfolio. Secondly, the discount rate is the spot rate that might 
be volatile in short period and thus, contribute to the volatility of pension expense 
in the income statement. Thirdly, this abolition of the ERR also removed the 
incentive for managers to “over-invest” in equities because under IAS19, the use 
of ERR in calculating pension expense would allow sponsor firms to recognize 
any premium returns in higher risk asset investments while shield reported net 
income from volatility in actual investment returns since the ERR is a long-term 
return estimated by sponsor firms. Previous literature identifies this as an 
asymmetric recognition of risk and return in the financial statement for risky 
investment in pension plan portfolios. The research of Zion and Carcache (2003, 
2005) and Gold (2005) both documented that pension assets were invested much 
more in equities than predicted by modern financial theory due to this asymmetric 
recognition. Therefore, the removal of the ERR was predicted to have effect on 
investment decision making of sponsor firm. 
Several comment letters sent by sponsor firms from all over the world, responding 
to the Exposure Draft of the IAS19R in 2011, raised some concerns in relation to 
the potential economic consequences of the adoption of IAS19R. For example, 
Air France – KLM feared that, as a consequence of IAS19R, management 
decisions would be driven by accounting rules rather than management rules. 
 5 
Specifically, it argued that this situation would lead to solutions where managers 
would try to avoid fluctuations on the balance sheet and invest pension funds only 
in bonds. Additionally, the Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) predicted 
that the removal of the ERR would also remove the advantage for companies of 
taking greater risk with employee benefit plan assets without recognition of the 
corresponding increase to risk (ACA comment letter on Exposure Draft of IAS19, 
2010). Furthermore, the American Academy of Actuaries also added that this 
removal would allow plan sponsors to base decisions about asset allocation 
purely on economic and risk management grounds, without adversely affecting 
profit and loss (AAA comment letter on Exposure Draft of IAS19, 2010). 
Although the majority of comment letters sent by industrial firms raised similar 
concerns and arguments relating to the abolition of the ERR, previous literature 
has suggested that the motivation of sponsor firms participating in the accounting 
standard setting due process might relate to their self-interest to mitigate the 
adverse effects of accounting standard change on their financial statements, and 
those arguments raised by these firms might be regarded as lobbying behaviours. 
Based on the Positive Accounting Theory of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), these 
previous researches suggested that the perceived costs and benefits of proposed 
new accounting standards likely influence the likelihood of various stakeholders’ 
participation in the standard-setting process by submitting a comment letter on 
the Exposure Draft. 
Positive Accounting Theory tries to make predictions of real world events and 
translate them to accounting transactions. Based on neo-classical economic, 
Positive Accounting Theory suggested that managers of a firm would choose 
accounting procedures to maximize their utility. Specifically, there are three 
hypotheses of Positive Accounting Theory. These are (1) the bonus plan 
 6 
hypothesis where managers choose accounting procedures to increase their 
bonuses for the current year by shifting reported earnings from future periods to 
the current period; (2) the debt covenant hypothesis, which states that the closer 
a firm is to violating accounting-based debt covenants, the more likely the firm 
manager is to select accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from 
future periods to the current period; and (3) the political cost hypothesis, which 
suggests that a manager tries to avoid the political “heat” by deferring reported 
earnings from current to future periods. This thesis focuses on examining the 
economic consequences of IAS19R adoption on the decision making of firms that 
sponsor defined benefit (DB) pension plans using both empirical analysis on UK 
and EU data as well as manual textual analysis on the comment letters sent by 
industrial firms in relation to the IAS19 exposure draft. 
1.2 Summary of the Thesis and Main Findings 
Chapter 2 discusses various pension accounting standards developed by the 
three most well-known standard setters: the IASB, the FASB in the USA and the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK. It also reviews the previous 
empirical literature on pension accounting, which has been dominated by 
research on the value relevance of pension accounting and earnings 
management relating to pension accounting. The literature review suggests that 
there is little research on the economic consequences of pension accounting 
standards. Some researchers claim that requiring firms to account for certain 
events and transactions in specific ways may alter their incentives to engage in 
such transactions in the first place, or alter the nature of such transactions, 
thereby affecting their underlying cash flows. 
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Chapter 3 examines 63 comment letters by industrial firms on the Exposure Draft 
(ED) of IAS19R. It aims to set the motivation for the empirical research in the 
chapter 4 and describe the other potential consequences of IAS19R adoption that 
have been documented by these respondents. In doing so, it aims to shed light 
on the common strands of argument presented by industrial sponsor firms, the 
comprehensive economic consequences of IAS19R, and any lobbying 
behaviours driven by the self-interests of senders, based on Watts and 
Zimmerman’s (1986) Positive Accounting Theory. In particular, manual textual 
analysis focuses on three significant areas of IAS19: recognition, presentation 
and disclosure. 
Most respondents supported the proposal to recognise all changes in defined 
benefit obligations (DBO) and in the fair value of pension assets (FVPA) when 
those changes occur. However, they reminded the IASB about the very long-term 
nature of pension items. Thus, pension plan accounting based on point-in-time 
market indicators may result in high short-term volatility, which will distort the 
representational faithfulness of the true economic conditions of pension plans 
and the ability to fulfil future benefit obligations. The respondents were also 
worried about the impact of this accounting proposal on the investment decisions 
of sponsor firms. In particular, they warned the IASB that this situation would lead 
to managers trying to avoid fluctuations and investing pension funds only in bonds 
in order to secure fund levels. 
Besides the potential impact of the ED on financial statements, interim reporting 
was one of the most contentious issues raised by many respondents. Many 
respondents opposed the elimination of the ERR. The biggest issue raised by 
most respondents related to the “true and fair view” of pension accounting as a 
result of this proposal, as management policy would not be reflected in income 
 8 
statements. Furthermore, many argued that the use of spot rates unlinked to plan 
assets to calculate long-term returns is inconsistent. These spot rates are 
believed to be very volatile, which is inconsistent for calculating very long-term 
expected returns. 
In relation to presentation, the respondents chose to focus on two main principles 
in presenting their financial statements. Some believed that it is a sound principle 
that all management decisions should be reflected at some time in net results 
(income statements), and this continues to be the principal performance 
measure. In contrast, other respondents believed that income statements should 
only reflect recurring activities, and that other comprehensive income (OCI) 
should contain non-recurring activities. 
Many respondents raised a concern that distinguishing between curtailments and 
settlements is sometimes very complex1. In practice, a transaction may have 
characteristics of both a non-routine settlement and a curtailment; therefore, it 
may be impossible or meaningless to allocate resulting gains or losses between 
profits and losses for curtailments and OCI for non-routine settlements. 
In general, most respondents supported the objectives of disclosure suggested 
by the proposal. However, most were worried about the volume of disclosures for 
DB plans. They recommended that the IASB should review the level of mandated 
disclosures to reduce their volume. 
                                            
1 A settlement is a transaction that eliminates all further legal or constructive obligations for part 
or all of the benefits provided under a defined benefit plan, other than a payment of benefits to, 
or on behalf of, employees that is set out in the terms of the plan and included in the actuarial 
assumptions while a curtailment is a significant reduction by the entity in the number of employees 
covered by a plan. 
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Chapter 4 examines the impact of IAS19R adoption on pension plan asset 
allocation strategies. The first part of the chapter investigates a sample that 
consists of 253 firms in 9 countries across the EU. In addition to the elimination 
of ERR, IAS19R also requires full recognition of net pension assets/liabilities on 
balance sheet. This requirement, in turn, led to more volatile balance sheet and 
the one time-time impact of this requirement would have significant effects on 
debt covenants and equity-based covenants. This part aims to examine the 
overall impact of IAS19R on asset allocation of pension plans through these 
channels (elimination of the ERR and full recognition of pension assets and 
liabilities). The study first applied a mean and median difference test to compare 
the equity investment levels of the years 2012 (one year before the adoption of 
IAS19R) and 2014 (one year after the adoption of IAS19R). Secondly, I applied 
a cross-sectional test developed in Amir et al.  (2010) and introduce a new 
variable to capture the impact of IAS19R on the calculation of pension expense 
in the income statement to examine how the change in pension accounting would 
associate with pension plan asset allocation. Using a sample of 506 firm years 
from 9 European countries for the years 2012 and 2014, the results of the mean 
and median difference test suggest a reduction of equity investment levels 
throughout this period. Furthermore, the cross-sectional test suggests the change 
in pension assets and pension liabilities relative to shareholder equities and the 
change of pension expenses relative to net incomes were associated with the 
reduction of equity investment level between the years 2012 and 2014. These 
results also implied that this reduction was more pronounced for firms with large 
pension plans (in term of pension assets and pension liabilities) relative to 
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shareholder equity and for firms that had large pension expenses relative to net 
income. 
The next part of the chapter focuses on the UK context by using a difference-in-
differences (DID) method on a UK sample which consists of 123 DB sponsor 
firms (492 firm years) to shed light on how the adoption of IAS19R may have 
triggered the movement of pension plan investments from equities to bonds. 
Based on a sample of 123 UK firms for the period 2011 to 2013, matched with 
another 123 US firms using a propensity score-matching technique, the results 
suggest that, following the adoption of IAS19R, UK sponsor firms tended to 
reduce the level of equity investment in their pension plans more than the US 
sponsor firms in the control group. The reason for the choice of UK sponsor firms 
in this analysis is that most of the UK companies applied the full recognition of 
actuarial gains and losses before the adoption of IAS19R.Therefore the majority 
of UK sponsor firms (95% of them) in the sample were unaffected by the full 
recognition requirement under IAS19R since they had already chosen voluntarily 
to fully recognise changes in pension liabilities and assets on their balance sheets 
(Morais, 2008). This result firstly suggests that the adoption of IAS19R has effect 
on investment decision of sponsor firms. Secondly, in the comparison of pension 
reporting practice before and after the adoption of IAS19R, firms would have to 
use the discount rate under IAS19R irrespective of how they invest pension 
assets. This elimination of the ERR would also eliminate the benefit of reporting 
a higher return on net income if the pension plan invests in a risky asset class 
such as equity. In other words, this new requirement removed manager 
motivation related to boosting NI reporting by investing in a risky asset class. 
Thus, this outcome suggests that managers of sponsor firms take account of 
effects on reported income when deciding on pension plan investment strategies. 
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The final part of Chapter 4 examines whether pension board characteristics, 
including pension board member composition and competency, may explain the 
different movements from equities to bonds across the countries in the sample. 
It was expected that equity investment levels and decreases in equity investment 
levels following the adoption of IAS19R would be lower for firms in countries that 
require more member representatives or have more rigid pension plan licensing 
processes. The results of univariate and multivariate tests are consistent with the 
expectation in respect of equity investment levels following IAS19R adoption, but 
are insignificant regarding changes in levels owing to insufficient data for these 
tests. Further research would be necessary to extend the sample and revise the 
model identification. 
1.3 Contributions 
This paper contributes to two streams of literature. Firstly, it adds to the literature 
of “economic consequence” of accounting standards, suggesting the impact of 
accounting reports on the decision-making behaviour of business, government, 
unions, investors and creditors (Zeff, 1978). The empirical evidence on 
“economic consequences” has so far spanned a wide spectrum of accounting 
areas. The pension accounting area, in particular, has provided some prominent 
examples of “economic consequences” of accounting rules. For example, 
Mittelstaedt, Nichols and Regier (1995) showed that the introduction of SFAS 
106, which required recognition of other post-employment benefits, reduced 
employers’ willingness to provide these benefits. Similarly, Hamdallah and 
Ruland (1986) argued that accounting alternatives would impact on management 
behaviour through the operation of information inductance. However, their results 
did not suggest any adverse economic consequences from accounting or 
disclosure changes relating to accounting for pensions. Additionally, Kiosse and 
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Peasnell (2009) review the academic evidence on the extent to which changes in 
pension accounting rules have effected pension provision decisions. They 
documented that the termination of DB pension plans or the switch from DB to 
defined contribution (DC) plans would be the result of the gradual tightening of 
pension accounting rules. 
Second, in demonstrating that the accounting regime may drive pension 
investment decisions, this study contributes to the literature on determinants of 
pension asset allocations. Many pension investment theories have been 
proposed, including the put option theory that Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) insurance encourages plan sponsors to engage in 
excessive risk taking as they approach distress (Sharpe, 1976), and the tax 
arbitrage theory, which predicts that the tax-sheltered nature of pensions should 
induce tax-paying firms to invest pension assets in bonds (Black, 1980; Tepper, 
1981) and that a desire to avoid contribution volatility will lead very under- and 
over-funded plans to invest more in bonds (Bader, 1991; Amir and Benartzi, 
1999). Some commentators believe that pension plan assets are invested much 
more in equities than modern financial theory predicts (Gold, 2005). 
This study provides empirical support for smoothing mechanisms in pension 
accounting rules as an explanation for why this may be so. These findings will be 
of interest to regulators and standard setters. Pension expense smoothing has 
long been debated in the US, which still relies on an ERR-based model of pension 
expenses. As the UK has a regime that is close to the US in terms of pension 
accounting standards (under both FRS17 and IAS19), the economic 
consequences of moving away from ERR-based smoothing in the UK may inform 
the debate on pension expense smoothing under US GAAP. 
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Third, this research using a DID design provides reliable inferences of the causal 
effects of IAS19R adoption on the asset allocations of DB pension plans. 
Furthermore, the outcomes of this research are robustly tested using EU and UK 
data with Amir et al.’s (2010) cross-sectional model. These results are consistent 
with those results reported previously. 
This study also helps inform the IASB on the second phase of the project on 
“Accounting for employee benefits” which aims to improve the measurement of 
defined benefit plans and contribution-based promise plans by providing 
empirical evidence on the effect of pension accounting measurement on decision 
making of sponsor firms. Furthermore, in February 2016, FASB decided to add 
four new financial reporting issues in its agenda discussion paper, one of which 
was “Pension and Other Postretirement Employee Benefit Plans” (February 3, 
2016 FASB Board Meeting). Given that the application of ERR still exists under 
SFAS 158, this research provides an early indicator on the costs and benefits 
from a standard-setting perspective. Finally, the research is extended to apply a 
qualitative technique to comprehensive analysis of the comment letters of 
industrial firms on the ED of IAS19R in 2010. This analysis provides a complete 
view of the potential effects of the proposals put forward in the ED on the reporting 
of sponsor firms and, in turn, how these effects drive the economic decisions of 
firms’ management. The analysis adds to the literature on lobbying in the IASB 
standard-setting context. 
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Chapter 2: Institutional Background and Literature 
Review 
2.1 Economic and Regulatory Context 
2.1.1 Main features of DB and DC pension plans and distribution of risks 
In many countries with mature pension systems, employer pension plans are 
typically voluntary, and workforce coverage may therefore be quite limited. Such 
plans may be sponsored by an employer, an industry association or a labour 
union or professional organisation. Employer pensions are generally governed by 
legislation and regulation intended to protect employee benefits, and they may 
offer tax advantages to the employer and/or employee to encourage sponsorship 
and participation respectively.2 
Despite many common elements, there is considerable cross-country variation in 
the design of retirement income systems. Differences in tax policy, social security 
programmes, legislation, regulation and culture give rise to a wide array of 
approaches to pension systems and to the design of DB and DC pension plans, 
both within and across countries. This, in turn, influences the distribution of risks 
assumed by employers and employees in each type of plan, and may have 
implications for asset allocation. This section focuses on the most common 
features of traditional DB and DC plans. 
2.1.1.1 DC pension plans 
The DC arrangement is a conceptually simple retirement plan. Employers, and 
sometimes also employees, make regular contributions to employees’ retirement 
                                            
2 In some countries, such as Canada and the UK, employer pension plans have historically been 
structured as trusts, and hence are subject to trust law as well as pension legislation. 
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accounts. These contributions are usually specified as a predetermined fraction 
of salary, although that fraction need not be constant over the course of a career. 
Contributions from both parties are tax-deductible, and investment income 
accrues tax-free. Employees are often given a choice as to how their accounts 
are invested. In principle, contributions may be invested in any security, although 
in practice most plans limit investment options to various bond, stock and money-
market funds. At retirement, employees receive either a lump sum or an annuity, 
the size of which depends on the accumulated value of the funds in the retirement 
account. Employees thus bear all of the investment risk: the retirement account 
is by definition fully funded, and the firm has no obligation beyond making its 
periodic contributions. 
Valuation of DC plans is straightforward, simply by measuring the market value 
of assets held in the retirement account. However, as a guide for personal 
financial planning, DC plan sponsors often provide workers with an indication of 
the size of a life annuity starting at retirement age that could be purchased now 
with the accumulation in their account under different scenarios. The actual size 
of the retirement annuity will, of course, depend on the realised investment 
performance of the retirement fund, the interest rate at retirement, and the 
ultimate wage path of the employee. 
2.1.1.2 DB pension plans 
In contrast to DC plans where employees bear all of the investment risk, the major 
drawback of DB schemes from the employer perspective is that they are exposed 
to the plan risks including longevity risk, interest rate risk, inflation risk and 
investment return risk (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). Among those, the two most 
important risk categories defined benefit pension plans take are investment and 
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longevity risk. Unlike DC pension funds, which re-distribute these risks to their 
participants, DB pension funds, which give the employee the security of a pre-
defined pension benefit, perform their task of providing safe pension benefits by 
assuming and retaining risk.  
Investment risk is the most familiar risk for all retirement plans and is particularly 
prominent given the volatility in investment markets over the past 15 or so years. 
It reflects the impact of fluctuating or lower-than-expected investment returns. In 
DB plans, it is borne by the employers through the need for higher negotiated 
contribution rates. In DC plans, participants bear investment risk in full. 
Longevity risk is the risk that retirees may live longer than projected by a pension 
plan’s actuary. And in turn, this increase the cost of a DB plan. For participants in 
DB plans, longevity risk is pooled or shared, and borne by plan sponsors. That 
means retirees can count on income in retirement no matter how long they live. 
In contrast, in a DC plan, longevity risk is not shared. As a result, each individual 
DC plan participant bears the responsibility for accumulating a sufficient account 
balance for retirement and for properly managing its drawing after retirement. 
Inflation risk represents increases in the cost of living prior to and after retirement, 
which can reduce the purchasing power of a fixed DB pension. The effect of 
inflation on a DC account balance means that participants have to withdraw larger 
amounts to maintain a constant standard of living, thus increasing the likelihood 
they will outlive their account balances. 
A low interest rate environment may dampen the overall investment return on DB 
plan assets. Low interest rates can also affect actuarial assumptions, like those 
often used to determine the PBO. In turn, this effect might increase the 
contributions of a DB sponsor firm in the future. 
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Additionally, whereas the DC framework focuses on the value of the assets 
currently endowing a retirement account, DB plans focus on the flow of benefits 
that individuals will receive on retirement. 
A typical DB plan determines employees’ benefits as a function of both years of 
service and wage history, for example one per cent of final salary times the 
number of years of service. Assuming workers are fully vested, at any point in 
time their claims are deferred nominal life annuities, insured up to certain limits 
by government corporations such as the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in the 
UK and the PBGC in the USA. They are deferred annuities because employees 
cannot start to receive benefits until they reach the retirement age specified in 
plan rules. They may be nominal because the retirement benefits that employers 
are contractually bound to pay employees are fixed in currency amounts at any 
point in time up to and including retirement age, although, especially in the UK, 
deferred pensions and pensions in payment may be subject to inflation index-
linking. 
The present value of accrued liabilities may increase as a result of continued 
service because of three factors: (1) as years of service increase, so does the 
DB, (2) if wages increase, so will retirement benefits, and (3) as time passes, less 
time remains until the retirement benefits begin, so their present value increases 
due to the effect of discounting. 
In sharp contrast to DC plans, which by their nature are fully funded, calculation 
of the funding status of DB plans is complex and controversial. If a plan’s assets 
are invested in traded securities, its market value is relatively easy to ascertain. 
The source of difficulty is in measuring the sponsor’s liability. From a strictly legal 
point of view the sponsor’s liability is the present value of the accrued vested 
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benefits which would be payable if the plan were immediately terminated. 
However, many pension experts contend that sponsors have an implicit semi-
contractual obligation which makes it more appropriate to take account of 
projected future salary growth in computing firms’ pension liabilities. 
2.1.2 Pension accounting standards under IASB, FASB and FRS 
This section provides a general overview of pension accounting standards issued 
by various accounting bodies, including the IASB, FRC and FASB. In particular, 
it explains these accounting standard treatments under IAS19, FRS 17 and SFAS 
158 respectively. 
2.1.2.1 IAS19: Employee Benefits 
IAS19 was first issued by the IASC in February 1998. The standard outlined the 
accounting requirements for employee benefits, including short-term benefits 
(e.g. wages and salaries, annual leave), post-employment benefits (e.g. 
retirement benefits), other long-term benefits (e.g. long service leave) and 
termination benefits. IAS19 established the principle that the cost of providing 
employee benefits should be recognised in the period in which the benefit is 
earned by the employee, rather than when it is paid or payable. It also provided 
detailed guidance on post-employment benefits. This thesis focuses on the 
accounting treatment of DB pension plans. 
On the balance sheet, IAS19 required DB plan sponsors to recognise the net 
amount of DBO and the FVPA, adjusted for unrecognised actuarial gains and 
losses and unrecognised past service costs (IAS, 2009, para. 54): 
The amount recognised as a defined benefit liability shall be the net total 
of the following amounts: 
(a) The present value of the defined benefit obligation at the end of the 
reporting period (see paragraph 64); 
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(b) Plus any actuarial gains (less any actuarial losses) not recognised 
because of the treatment set out in paragraphs 92 and 93; 
(c) Minus any past service cost not yet recognised (see paragraph 96); 
(d) Minus the fair value at the end of the reporting period of plan assets (if 
any) out of which the obligations are to be settled directly (see 
paragraphs 102-104) (IAS, 2009, para. 54) 
In turn, the present value of the DBO must be determined using the projected unit 
credit method (IAS, 2009, para. 63). Valuations should be carried out with 
sufficient regularity such that the amounts recognised in financial statements did 
not differ materially from those that would be determined at the end of the 
reporting period (IAS, 2009, para. 56). The standard also provided guidance on 
the assumptions used to calculate DBO, which must be “unbiased and mutually 
compatible” (IAS, 2009, para. 72). The rate used to discount estimated cash flows 
was determined with reference to market yields at the end of the reporting period 
on high-quality corporate bonds or, where there is no deep market in such bonds, 
with reference to market yields on government bonds (IAS, 2009, para. 78). 
A choice of three options was available in adjusting actuarial gains and losses to 
determine the recognised numbers on the balance sheet. Sponsor firms could 
choose to (1) recognise the actuarial gains and losses (resulting from changes in 
actuarial assumptions or differences between expected and accrual returns on 
plan assets) in full in the OCI part of equity (OCI method), (2) recognise them in 
the income statement (IS method), or (3) use the “corridor method” to keep the 
recognition of actuarial gains and losses off the balance sheet and only recognise 
a portion of actuarial gains and losses (IAS, 2009, paras. 92-93): 
In measuring its defined benefit liability in accordance with paragraph 54, 
an entity shall, subject to paragraph 58A, recognise a portion (as specified 
in paragraph 93) of its actuarial gains and losses as income or expense if 
the net cumulative unrecognised actuarial gains and losses at the end of 
the previous reporting period exceeded the greater of: 
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(a) 10% of the present value of the defined benefit obligation at that date 
(before deducting plan assets); and 
(b) 10% of the fair value of any plan assets at that date 
These limits shall be calculated and applied separately for each defined 
benefit plan (IAS, 2009, para. 92) 
The portion of actuarial gains and losses to be recognised for each defined 
benefit plan is the excess determined in accordance with paragraph 92, 
divided by the expected average remaining working lives of the employees 
participating in that plan. However, an entity may adopt any systematic 
method that results in faster recognition of actuarial gains and losses, 
provided that the same basis is applied to both gains and losses and the 
basis is applied consistently from period to period. An entity may apply 
such systematic methods to actuarial gains and losses even if they are 
within the limits specified in paragraph 92 (IAS, 2009, para. 93). 
If, as permitted by paragraph 93, an entity adopts a policy of recognising 
actuarial gains and losses in the period in which they occur, it may 
recognise them in other comprehensive income, in accordance with 
paragraphs 93B-93D, providing it does so for: 
(a) All of its defined benefit plans; and 
(b) All of its actuarial gains and losses (IAS, 2009, para. 93A). 
In addition to actuarial gains and losses, sponsor firms were also required to 
make adjustments to past service costs on the balance sheet. Past service costs 
arise when an entity introduces a DB plan that attributes benefits to past service 
or changes the benefits payable for past service under an existing DB plan. If 
these amounts are vested,3 sponsor firms had to recognise them in their income 
statements as they occurred. Otherwise, sponsor firms had to establish an 
amortisation schedule for past service costs until the benefits concerned were 
vested (IAS, 2009, para. 97): 
In measuring its defined benefit liability under paragraph 54, an entity shall, 
subject to paragraph 58A, recognise past service cost as an expense on 
a straight-line basis over the average period until the benefits become 
                                            
3 Pension arrangements often include clauses that specify that retirement benefits earned for past 
service become vested, i.e. become unconditional on further employment, only after a minimum 
period of employment. Conversely, if an employment contract is terminated before reaching the 
minimum vesting period, the employee will receive no pension benefits. 
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vested. To the extent that the benefits are already vested immediately 
following the introduction of, or changes to, a defined benefit plan, an entity 
shall recognise past service cost immediately (IAS, 2009, para. 96). 
The fair value of any plan assets4 was deducted in determining the amount 
recognised in the statement of financial position under paragraph 54. When no 
market price was available, the FVPA was estimated, for example by discounting 
expected future cash flows using a discount rate that reflected both the risk 
associated with the plan assets and the maturity or expected disposal date of 
those assets (or, if they had no maturity, the expected period until settlement of 
the related obligation). 
In the profit or loss (P&L) statement, recognised net periodic pension expenses 
might differ depending on how sponsors chose to recognise AGL (OCI method, 
IS method or “corridor” method). Under the OCI method, the full AGL are 
recognised. The AGL of sponsor firms using this method are completely shielded 
from their P&L statements (which differs from SFAS 158 under US GAAP),5 
leaving their net periodic pension expenses with components of service costs, 
interest costs, expected returns on plan assets and amortisation of unvested past 
service costs. In addition, sponsor firms will recognise their AGL as a component 
of net periodic pension expenses in P&L statements if they choose the IS method. 
In order to use the “corridor method” for AGL, sponsor firms may only recognise 
a portion of AGL as part of their net periodic pension expenses under 
“amortisation of actuarial gains and losses”, rather than the full amount of AGL 
under the IS method: 
                                            
4 IAS, 2009, para. 102 
5 Under US GAAP, these actuarial gains and losses are recognised in OCI in the period they 
occur but will also be recycled in the P&L statement for a subsequent period. 
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An entity shall recognise the net total of the following amounts in profit or 
loss, except to the extent that another Standard requires or permits their 
inclusion in the cost of an asset: 
(a) Current service cost (see paragraphs 63-91) 
(b) Interest cost (see paragraph 82) 
(c) The expected return on any plan assets (see paragraphs 105-107) and 
on any reimbursement rights (see paragraph 104A); 
(d) Actuarial gains and losses, as required in accordance with the entity’s 
accounting policy (see paragraphs 92-93D); 
(e) Past service cost (see paragraph 96); 
(f) The effect of any curtailments or settlements (see paragraphs 109 and 
110); and 
(g) The effect of the limit in paragraph 58(b), unless it is recognised 
outside profit or loss in accordance with paragraph 93C (IAS, 2009, 
para. 61). 
Overall, IAS19 offered managers of sponsor firms flexibility in reporting and 
accounting for pension items in their financial statements. The three options 
under IAS19, which might be categorised as “smoothing mechanisms” (corridor 
method) or “full recognition mechanisms” (OCI and IS methods), were subject to 
considerable debate over which method should be used. 
In fluctuating financial markets, full recognition of actuarial gains and losses may 
cause substantial volatility in sponsor firm equity prices. In the mid-1980s, US 
sponsor firms opposed the FASB’s initiative to mandate immediate recognition in 
SFAS 87 (Saemann, 1995) and, in response to intense lobbying, the FASB 
developed the corridor method. In the mid-1990s, the IASC faced a similar 
situation, and also incorporated the corridor method as an option in its 1998 
revision of IAS19. However, comment letters to the IASB preceding the 2004 
amendment of IAS19 claimed that “adding options to standards is not desirable 
and obstructs comparability” and that “deferred recognition is preferable to 
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immediate recognition”.6 Therefore, the expectation may have been that few 
European companies would voluntarily adopt full recognition under IAS19. 
On the other hand, companies face pressure from regulators, politicians and the 
media to incorporate greater transparency into pension accounting, which may 
influence their decisions on pension accounting policies. For example, financial 
analysts strongly prefer immediate recognition (Zion and Carcache, 2005; JP 
Morgan, 2007). 
2.1.2.2 FRS 17: Retirement Benefits 
In the UK, Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 24 represented 
the first attempt to standardise both the calculation of pension costs and the 
disclosure of information relating to this calculation, particularly relating to DB 
pension schemes. It came into effect for periods ending on or after 1 July 1988 
and remained in force until the introduction of FRS 17, which superseded SSAP 
24 for all accounting years ending on or after 1 January 2005. 
Although SSAP 24 introduced a degree of standardisation, it left considerable 
scope for discretion in the choice of assumptions, making like-for-like 
comparisons difficult. FRS 17, on the other hand, allows much less scope to omit 
important information or alter the actuarial basis used. 
In particular, similar to the OCI method under IAS19, FRS 17 requires sponsor 
firms to recognise surpluses/deficits as excesses/shortfalls in the value of assets 
in their schemes over/below the present value of scheme liabilities7 (no 
                                            
6 IAS19, 2004, Basis for Conclusions, para. 48 
7 FRS 17, 2000, para. 37: “the employer should recognise an asset to the extent that it is able to 
recover a surplus either through reduced contributions in the future or through refunds from the 
scheme. The employer should recognise a liability to the extent that it reflects its legal or 
constructive obligation.” 
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adjustment need be made to AGL except for unvested/unrecognised past service 
costs).8 Consequently, AGL are recognised through statements of recognised 
gains and losses (FRS 17, 2000, para. 57), which are equivalent to OCI under 
IAS19: 
Actuarial gains and losses arising from any new valuation and from 
updating the latest actuarial valuation to reflect conditions at the balance 
sheet date should be recognised in the statement of total recognised gains 
and losses for the period (FRS 17, 2000, para. 57). 
In addition, once AGL have been recognised in the statement of total recognised 
gains and losses, they are not recognised again in the P&L account in 
subsequent periods.9 This statement marks a significant difference in DB pension 
accounting treatment between FRS 17 and SFAS 158 of US GAAP (SFAS 158 
will be explained in detail in the next sub-section). 
On the other hand, past service costs are recognised in the P&L account on a 
straight-line basis over the period in which the increases in benefit are vested. If 
benefits are vested immediately, past service costs should be recognised 
immediately. 
2.1.2.3 SFAS 158: Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and 
Other Postretirement Plans 
In the USA, accounting for DB plans has evolved over the past three decades. 
From 1987 until December 2006, pension information reported in financial 
statements was based on SFAS 87, which introduced a major change from 
previous DB plan accounting rules by requiring actuarial estimation of pension 
                                            
8 FRS 17, 2000, para. 60: “Any unrecognised past service costs should be deducted from the 
scheme liabilities and the balance sheet asset or liability adjusted accordingly.” 
9 FRS 17, 2000, para. 59. 
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liabilities (PBO), and fair value measurement of pension assets (PA). On the 
balance sheet, a net pre-paid pension asset or accrued pension liability was 
reported, representing only a portion of pension-related assets and liabilities. 
Specifically, the reported net pension amount was derived by netting several off-
balance-sheet items: PBO and the FVPA, as well as deferred items such as AGL, 
prior service costs and transition amounts.10 Off-balance-sheet items were a 
smoothing mechanism for pension expenses and pension liabilities/assets. They 
eliminated the income statement effects of short-term or one-off fluctuations in 
measuring pension assets and liabilities. This resulted in the balance sheet 
recognising net pension assets or liabilities, which were essentially the 
cumulative difference between amounts recognised as pension expenses 
incurred and contributions made by the company to the pension fund. 
In 1998, the FASB issued SFAS 132: Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions 
and Other Postretirement Benefits (FASB, 1998), which was amended by SFAS 
132 Revised in 2003. SFAS 132 and SFAS 132(R) significantly increased 
pension information disclosure requirements. However, neither amended the 
measurement nor reporting requirements that existed under SFAS 87. In addition 
to reconciliation of PBO and FVPA, they required detailed measurement of 
pension expenses, as well as information on expected future benefit payments, 
cash contributions, and information about the composition of pension assets and 
plans’ investment policies and strategies. 
                                            
10 The pension accounting treatment under SFAS 87 used the “corridor method” (one of three 
options under IAS19) to report funded status net of PBO and PA, adjusted for unrecognised 
actuarial gains and losses and unvested past service costs. 
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A further significant shift in pension measurement and reporting occurred in 2006. 
With the issuing of SFAS 158 as the first phase of its pension accounting project 
(Hann et al., 2007), the FASB required full recognition of the under- or over-
funded status of DB plans on firms’ balance sheets. Since SFAS 87 allowed 
sponsor firms to keep part of their AGL and past service costs off their balance 
sheets, the new requirement under SFAS 158 resulted in a significant increase 
in net pension liability amounts compared with the amounts reported under SFAS 
87:11 
A business entity that sponsors one or more single-employer defined 
benefit plan shall: 
(a) Recognize the funded status of a benefit plan – measured as the 
difference between the fair value of plan assets and the benefit 
obligation – in its statement of financial position. For a pension plan, 
the benefit obligation shall be the projected benefit obligation; for any 
other postretirement benefit plan, such as a retiree health care plan, 
the benefit obligation shall be the accumulated postretirement benefit 
obligation (SFAS 158, 2006, para. 4a). 
The second major change was to recognise in OCI the financial effects of certain 
plan events when they occur, such as changes in actuarial assumptions (resulting 
in AGL) and amendments to benefit arrangements (resulting in past service 
costs). The FASB rejected the idea of allowing recognition of an additional asset 
(a deferred charge) or liability (a deferred credit) for these amounts, which would 
otherwise decrease or increase shareholders’ equity. It stated that “it would not 
be representationally faithful to report losses and gains, such as those from the 
performance of plan assets, as deferred charges or credits because those items 
                                            
11 In 2006, most US pension schemes were unfunded and had accumulated significant amounts 
of actuarial losses and past service costs off balance sheet. 
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do not meet the definition of an asset or a liability in Concepts Statement 6” (FASB 
158, 2006, para. B35): 
A Business entity that sponsors one or more single- employer defined 
benefit plans shall: 
(c) Recognize as a component of other comprehensive income the 
gains or losses and prior service costs or credits that arise during 
the period but are not recognized as components of net periodic 
benefit cost of the period pursuant to Statements 87 and 106 (SFAS 
158, 2006, para. 4c). 
In general, the accounting treatment under SFAS 158 was similar to the “OCI 
method” under IAS19, except for a “recycling” factor that required some off-
balance-sheet items under SFAS 87 and 106 to be recognised as components of 
net periodic benefit costs (in the P&L statement) in subsequent periods: 
A Business entity that sponsors one or more single-employer defined 
benefit plans shall: 
(c) Recognize corresponding adjustments in other comprehensive 
income when the gains or losses, prior service costs or credits, and 
transition assets or obligations remaining from the initial application 
of Statements 87 and 106 are subsequently recognized as 
components of net periodic benefit cost pursuant to the recognition 
and amortization provisions of Statements 87, 88, and 106 (SFAS 
158, 2006, para. 4d). 
2.1.3 Amendment to IAS19 (IAS19R) 
2.1.3.1 Elimination of the corridor method and deferred recognition 
Recent amendments to pension accounting (SFAS 158 and IAS19R) also require 
pension obligations to be transferred from footnotes into the body of companies’ 
accounts. Fried (2012) provides empirical evidence of a negative stock price 
reaction around the release of the SFAS 158 ED, which proposed reallocation of 
already disclosed information from financial statement footnotes to balance 
sheets. He also identifies increased lobbying by managers of pension plan 
sponsoring companies against the implementation of SFAS 158, but did not 
investigate whether or not lobbying affected the neutrality of the standard. 
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Sun (2011) also examined the effect of recognition versus disclosure of pension-
related information, looking at the economic consequences in terms of market 
responses. According to her study, analysts interpret disclosed and recognised 
information differently, and recognition increases the market’s perceived equity 
risk and leads to a higher cost of capital. 
Pension plan assets growth with expected returns determined from actuarial 
assumptions on long-term rates of return on government bonds and suitable risk 
premiums, taking into account historical and expected market trends. Any 
differences between expected and actual returns on assets are recognised in the 
statement of comprehensive income. Thus, actual returns are used under current 
pension accounting, but these impact on firm equity and not the P&L account. It 
should not matter if expected rather than actual returns are used when computing 
pension expenses; however, using actual rates of return in the P&L account is 
likely to impact on the performance of sponsoring companies, as users of 
accounting information filter P&L account and OCI information differently. 
2.1.3.2 The finance cost component 
IAS19R requires companies to use a single interest rate to obtain net interest 
costs. In other words, pension funds expect to make future payments, and these 
cash flows are discounted with an interest rate. However, pension funds also 
make investments and expect to receive cash flows that will grow, not with an 
ERR but with the same interest rate as that used to discount liabilities. This allows 
for a net cost to be determined by subtracting the earnings obtained on assets 
from the expenses incurred on liabilities. 
Critics argue that the IASB did not follow a logical path in proposing such 
changes. First, there is a contract between a company and its employees that 
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dictates the worthiness of liabilities (likelihood that the liabilities will be paid), and 
after deciding on the liabilities, investments are chosen in order to sustain 
payments of those liabilities. Investments should be made such that they match 
liabilities; however, unless the assets completely mimic the liabilities, which is 
highly improbable, they should not be considered under the same interest rate 
regime. Imposing the same interest rate for assets and liabilities may remove 
management incentives to find optimal portfolios. In the latter chapter of this 
thesis (chapter 4, sub-section 4.2), the analysis of comment letters reply to ED of 
IAS19R shows that most of the respondents were opposed to the proposal to 
eliminate the ERR and require sponsor firms to apply the same rate to calculate 
the growth of pension assets and pension liabilities. Several respondents shared 
their concern that this requirement would alter asset allocation in pension asset 
portfolio (see table 2). 
2.1.3.3 Full recognition of unvested past service costs, curtailment and 
settlement 
Past service costs arise when an entity amends a benefit plan to provide 
additional benefits for services in prior periods. IAS19R changes the definition of 
past service costs to clarify the distinction between curtailments and past service 
costs. It also requires all past service costs to be recognised immediately in the 
P&L, regardless of vesting requirements (IASB, 2011). Plan amendments that 
reduce obligations to employees represent negative past service costs, so there 
will be symmetry between accounting for amendments that increase or reduce 
obligations for past service costs. A curtailment is the effect of a reduction in the 
number of employees participating in a plan. 
As a result, IAS19R requires management to recognise all past service costs in 
the P&L in the period of the plan amendment. Unvested past service costs can 
 30 
no longer be spread over future service periods. In addition, IAS19R removes the 
requirement to determine whether a benefit reduction is a curtailment or a 
negative past service cost. Changes to benefits that reduce DBO will be negative 
past service costs. 
IAS19R also brings in a slight change in the accounting treatment of settlement 
amounts. A settlement arises when an entity makes a payment to employees 
covered by a plan or a third party which eliminates all further liability under the 
plan. IAS19R clarifies the definition of a settlement but makes no significant 
changes to accounting for gains and losses on settlement. Settlement gains and 
losses are defined as the difference between (a) the present value on the 
settlement date of the DBO being settled, and (b) the settlement price, including 
any plan assets transferred and any payments made directly by the entity. These 
are recognised in the P&L when the settlement occurs. Settlement gains and 
losses will no longer include unrecognised actuarial gains and losses, as these 
will have been recognised immediately in OCI (IASB, 2011). This change clarifies 
that payments of benefits provided under the terms of a plan and included in 
actuarial assumptions – for example, options at retirement for employees to take 
their benefits in the form of a lump sum, rather than a pension or routine pension 
payments – are not settlements (PwC, 2013). 
2.1.3.4 Presentation of changes in net DB liabilities and assets 
IAS19R introduces a new term: “re-measurement”. This comprises actuarial 
gains and losses on DBO, the difference between actual investment returns and 
returns implied by net interest costs, and the effect of the asset ceiling12. Re-
                                            
12 A net defined benefit asset may arise where a defined benefit plan has been overfunded or 
where actuarial gains have arisen. In such case, asset ceiling is the present value of the future 
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measurements are recognised immediately in OCI and are not reclassified (IASB, 
2011). 
Thus, the corridor and spreading method and the immediate recognition of 
actuarial gains/losses in the P&L are no longer permitted. This reduces diversity 
in presentation and, subject to the asset ceiling, ensures that the balance sheet 
always reflects the extent to which a pension plan is funded. Amounts recognised 
in OCI are not reclassified through the P&L, but the standard no longer requires 
these items to be recognised immediately in retained earnings. This allows re-
measurements to be presented as a separate category within equity (PwC, 2013). 
In addition, interest expenses (or income) on net DB liabilities (assets) are now 
calculated by applying a discount rate, as mentioned above. However, this 
amendment has an implication for presentation. It separates and presents these 
net interest costs as part of finance costs in the P&L, while service costs are 
presented in the organisation part of the P&L. 
This amendment increases comparability across entities. Under the previous 
version of IAS19, there was no specific requirement regarding presentation of 
service and interest costs; thus, there were various accounting treatments of the 
different components of pension expenses (PwC, 2013). 
                                            
benefits that are available to the entity in the form of a reduction in future contributions or cash 
refund, either directly to the entity or indirectly to another plan in deficit (IAS19, 2011, para. 65) 
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2.1.3.5 Disclosure 
The amendment introduced additional disclosures. The IASB focused its 
disclosure objectives on matters most relevant to users of financial statements. 
The amendment requires disclosures to: 
 Explain the characteristics of and risks associated with DB plans; 
 Identify and explain the amounts in the entity’s financial statements arising 
from DB plans; and 
 Explain how DB plans may affect the entity’s future cash flows regarding 
timing, amount and uncertainty. 
As a result of these objectives, there are many new disclosure requirements, 
including: 
 A narrative description of specific or unusual risks arising from a DB plan 
(IASB, 2011). Judgement is required to identify risks that should be 
explained, which may be challenging if there are many DB plans with different 
characteristics within a group (PwC, 2013). 
 A breakdown of plans’ assets into categories that distinguish risk and liquidity 
characteristics and whether or not they have a quoted market price in an 
active market (IASB, 2011). 
 Disclosure of significant actuarial assumptions, together with a sensitivity 
analysis for reasonably possible variations in each significant actuarial 
assumption. Judgement is required to determine significant assumptions 
(PwC, 2013). 
 Reconciliation of opening and closing balances for plan assets, DBO, 
balance sheet assets and liabilities, and the effect of the asset ceiling (IASB, 
2011). 
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 Disclosure of significant information, in addition to the sensitivity analyses 
mentioned above, to help users understand the potential impact on cash 
flows, including: 
o A narrative description of any asset–liability matching strategies; 
o A description of the funding arrangements and funding policy; 
o The amount of expected contributions in the next year; and 
o The weighted-average duration of DBO (IASB, 2011). 
According to PwC (2013), the amendment replaces a checklist of items with the 
objective of providing relevant information when plans are material to the entity. 
However, the new requirements are likely to require more extensive disclosures 
and more judgement to determine what disclosure is required. Management 
should also be aware that some of the new disclosures may require additional 
actuarial calculations, and should consider whether internal reporting procedures 
must be updated to collect the information required for new disclosures. 
2.2 Empirical Research on Pension Accounting 
2.2.1 Value relevance 
This section examines the context of this study and reviews the related academic 
literature. In the process of reviewing the literature, it is important to consider its 
objectives, findings, and limitations such as inconclusive outcomes and 
methodological constraints. 
Value-relevance research focuses on extending knowledge of the relevance and 
reliability of accounting amounts as reflected in equity values (Barth et al., 2001). 
Relevance and reliability are the two primary criteria used by accounting 
standards bodies to choose between accounting alternatives. For example, as 
specified in the FASB’s (1984) conceptual framework, an accounting amount is 
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relevant if it is capable of making a difference to financial statement users’ 
decisions, and reliable if it represents what it purports to represent. (SFAC No.5) 
Value relevance, as defined in the academic literature, is not a stated criterion of 
accounting standards, but rather is one approach to operationalising the 
relevance and reliability criteria (Barth et al., 2001). For example, an accounting 
amount will be value-relevant if it has a predicted significant relationship with 
share prices, only if the amount reflects information relevant to investors in 
valuing the firm and is measured reliably enough to be reflected in share prices.13 
Under the latest Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting of IASB (2010), 
the enhancing qualitative characteristics of Accounting Standard – “reliability” – 
is now replaced as “verifiability”. Since the Framework defines that relevant 
financial information is capable of making a difference in the decisions made by 
users even if some users choose not to take advantage of it or are already aware 
of it from other sources, thus, information does not have to be new to a financial 
statement user to be relevant. An important role of accountants is to summarise 
or aggregate information that may be available from other sources. Barth et. al. 
(2001) also note that the concepts of value relevance and decision relevance 
differ. In particular, accounting information may be value-relevant but not 
decision-relevant if it is superseded by more timely information. 
The value-relevance literature extends back over forty years, as marked by the 
research of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver and Dukes (1972). These studies 
tested the impact of earnings on firm value, and were influenced by earlier 
research evidence that the earnings term is the most important explanatory 
                                            
13 This statement is subject to the power of empirical testing and conditional on the estimating 
equation being properly specified. 
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variable in predicting the value of the firm or the share price (Miller and Modigliani, 
1966). 
According to Holthausen and Watts (2001), the three main categories of value-
relevance studies are relative association studies, incremental association 
studies and marginal information content studies. Relative association studies 
compare associations between stock market values or changes in values and 
alternative bottom-line measures. They examine differences in the coefficient of 
determination, or R-squared, of regressions using different bottom-line numbers, 
and the accounting number with the greater R-squared is assumed to be more 
value-relevant. Incremental association studies investigate whether particular 
accounting numbers help to explain value or returns (over a long window) given 
other specified variables. An accounting number is supposed to be value-relevant 
if its coefficient is significantly different from zero. Some other incremental 
association studies examine the relationship between accounting numbers and 
inputs to a market valuation model in order to compare predicted coefficient 
values and estimated coefficients to assess measurement errors in accounting 
numbers. 
In contrast to the two types of association study, marginal information content 
studies investigate whether accounting numbers make any contribution to the 
information set available to investors. Thus, such studies usually use “event 
studies” or “short window return studies” to examine whether publication of 
accounting numbers (additional to and conditional on other accounting 
information released) are associated with value changes. Therefore, price 
reactions are considered as evidence for value relevance. Most pension 
accounting value-relevance studies are incremental association studies. In some 
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cases, they also incorporate relative association studies, and in a small number 
of cases use marginal input content analyses. 
The following sub-sections perform a literature review on pension accounting 
value relevance studies that can be separated into association studies in 2.2.1.1 
sub-section and marginal information content in 2.2.1.2 sub-section. 
2.2.1.1 Association studies in Pension Accounting 
In the field of empirical research, pension accounting value-relevance association 
studies have applied three types of model: earnings discount models, balance 
sheet models and variations of Ohlson’s (1995) model. The three following 
subsection documents the previous empirical studies that are classified into three 
model respectively. 
2.2.1.1.1 Earnings discount models 
Based on research by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1966), earlier value relevance 
studies using earnings discount models concluded that markets do take account 
of unfunded vested pension obligations when valuing firms’ stock prices. In 
particular, they found that accounting measures for unfunded vested pension 
benefits (disclosed by US companies under ABP 8) are systematically reflected 
in share price valuations. 
Daley (1984) examined associations between measures that US companies were 
required to disclose in the 1970s and stock market valuations. In this study, the 
earnings variables are disaggregated into earnings before pension costs, and 
pension costs themselves,14 using a sample of US companies for the years 1975 
                                            
14 The model has the following structure: MVE = α + β1EbPC + β2PC + ε 
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to 1979. Daley finds that estimations of the regression coefficient for pension 
expenses are significantly negative, and are thus “value-relevant”. However, this 
conclusion must be treated with caution since the sample size was quite small 
(153 firms), with large intercept terms that suggest measurement error and an 
under-specified model (Glaum, 2009). 
FAS 87, issued in 1987, marked a significant change to pension accounting under 
US GAAP. It required companies to use the projected credit unit method to 
estimate pension costs and liabilities, and to disclose several components of 
pension costs separately, such as service costs, interest costs and expected 
returns on plan assets. 
The value relevance of pension costs under FAS 87 was investigated by Barth et 
al. (1992, 1993). Using a similar model to that of Daley (1984), they find that the 
coefficient of total pension costs is significantly larger than the estimated 
coefficient for income before pension costs, which contradicts Daley’s (1984) 
finding. However, their findings are consistent with the market expectation that 
pension costs are more persistent than other income and expenses; in other 
words, a lower discount rate is applied to pension costs. In a further step, Barth 
et al. (1993) disaggregated pension cost components in order to examine 
whether different multiples are applied to different components of pension costs 
in determining security prices.15 They find that the coefficient of interest costs is 
significantly negative, whereas the coefficient of returns on plan assets is 
significantly positive. However, the coefficient on service costs is unexpectedly 
positive and significant in some model specifications. They attribute this finding 
                                            
15 Barth et al.’s (1993) full model: MVE = α + β1EbPC + β2SVC + β3INT + β4 RPLNA + β*Other 
PC-components + ε. 
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to multi-collinearity between pension cost components, or to the possibility that 
service costs are not viewed by the market as a measure of pension liabilities. In 
more recent research, Hann et al. (2007) attribute this positive relationship 
between the security value and pension costs to service costs serving as a proxy 
for the value created by human capital, whereas the accounting standard fails to 
capitalise these values on the balance sheet. In their model, they add the number 
of employees and research and development costs (as intangible asset creation) 
as control variables and find that the coefficient of service costs then becomes 
negative. This finding suggests an interesting theory that corporate pension 
systems are not only financial in nature, but are also a system that provides 
incentives for increased productivity and general improvements to long-term 
relationships between employees and employers (Ippolito, 1985; Klumpes, 
2001). 
2.2.1.1.2 Balance sheet model 
Landsman (1986) was the first to use a balance sheet model. He regressed the 
market value of companies’ equity on accounting measures for assets and 
liabilities. In particular, he split companies’ total assets between pension assets 
and non-pension assets, and companies’ total liabilities into pension liabilities and 
non-pension liabilities.16 Using a sample of US companies for the years 1979 to 
1981, he concludes that information on pension assets and liabilities (ABO), 
which US companies at that time had to disclose according to FAS 36, is value-
relevant in the same way as information on other corporate assets and liabilities. 
However, he also notes that the coefficients in his model are estimated with high 
standard error, and that their absolute values are often markedly lower or higher 
                                            
16 Landsman’s (1986) model is: MVE = α + β1NPA + β2NPL + β3PLA + β4PL + ε 
 39 
than their theoretical values of 1 or -1. Also, his intercept term is large and 
significantly different from zero. Theoretically, based on the simple balance sheet 
identity, the intercept should be zero. 
Overall, he concludes that disclosed accounting measures for pension assets 
and liabilities are valued similarly to recognised assets and liabilities. This 
conclusion is further supported by Dhaliwal (1986). His research examined the 
impact of unfunded pension obligations on companies’ systematic risk. Based on 
a sample of US companies for the years 1976 to 1979, he finds that investors 
take information on unfunded pension liabilities into consideration when 
assessing financial risk. A more recent study by Jin et al. (2006), with updated 
data (1993-1998), also concludes that equity betas appear accurately to reflect 
the betas of their pension assets and liabilities, “despite the practical difficulties 
of deciphering corporate pension accounts” (Jin et al., 2006, p.22). 
The introduction of FRS 87 required US companies to either recognise or disclose 
several different measures of both pension assets and liabilities. Barth (1991) 
investigated which measures are most closely associated with share price 
valuations, that is, which are most consistent with those implicitly used by 
investors. Her research design allowed her to determine the error with which 
pension accounting amounts are measured, which she calls measurement error, 
being the difference between the book and market values of pension assets and 
liabilities. Based on a sample of US companies from 1985 to 1987, she finds that 
the FVPA and the PBO and ABO of pension liabilities, which are only disclosed 
in notes, are measured with less error than recognised net pension assets and 
liabilities. Also, when focusing on companies where pension benefit formulas 
depend strongly on salary progression, the PBO exhibits less measurement error 
than the ABO. 
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Based on Landsman’s (1986) research, Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993) 
extended the model and investigated whether the unvested part of pension 
obligations and the expected future salary progression (as the difference between 
ABO and PBO) are value-relevant.17 Using a sample of US companies from 1987 
to 1988, their estimates for β4, β5, and β6 are all significantly negative. However, 
these estimations all differ from expected values. Also, β5 and β6 are considerably 
larger than β4. An F-test rejected the hypothesis that the three estimates are 
equal to each other. Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993) suggest that this may be 
because investors perceive the unvested and salary progression components of 
PBO to be inherently more noisy than the vested benefit obligations component. 
2.2.1.1.3 Ohlson’s model 
Ohlson (1995) describes firm value as the sum of the book value of equity and 
the present value of expected future abnormal earnings (see Ohlson, 1995; 
Feltham and Ohlson, 1995). A firm’s book value of total assets and liabilities will 
be equal to its market value if they are completely recognised and valued at their 
“true” economic value at the balance sheet date. However, accounting standards 
may not recognise large parts of companies’ assets and liabilities, for example 
intangible assets (see Scott, 2009, Ch.2.). Thus, the book value of firms’ assets 
and liabilities is often lower than their current market value. Ohlson (1995) shows 
that, under certain conditions, the portion of the value of a company not captured 
by the book value of equity is reflected in expected future abnormal earnings, i.e. 
in residual income. 
                                            
17 Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue’s (1993) model is: MVE = α + β1NPA + β2NPL + β3PLA + β4VBO 
+ β5UNVEST + β6SALARY + ε. 
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Most recent studies on the value relevance of pension accounting information are 
based on empirical variants of Ohlson’s (1995) model as it provides a direct link 
between accounting measures and firm value (Kothari, 2001; Beaver, 2002). In 
empirical research, expected future abnormal returns are usually approximated 
by analysts’ earnings forecasts or, more simply, by realised earnings (see Barth 
et al., 1998a; Collins et al., 1999; Dechow et. al., 1999; Landsman et al., 2007; 
Lo and Lys, 2000). Thus the basic structure of Ohlson’s model is as follows: 
MVE = α + β1NPE + β2EbPC + β3PLA + β4PL + β5PC + ε  (a) 
where NPE is company owners’ equity plus net pension liabilities, EbPC is 
earnings before pension costs, PLA is plan assets, PL is pension liabilities and 
PC is pension costs. In taking into consideration balance sheet and income 
measures simultaneously, these models are thought to be generally better 
specified than pure balance sheet (or income) models (Glaum, 2009). 
Applying this approach to data from 300 US companies for the years 1987 to 
1990, Barth et al. (1993) find that the FVPA and the fair value of items such as 
PBO, which are disclosed in the notes under FRS 87, are significantly correlated 
with share price valuations, whereas the incremental explanatory value of 
pension cost components (also disclosed in footnotes) are not significantly 
different from zero. They conclude that “pension cost component information is 
largely redundant in explaining share prices, once pension balance sheet 
variables are included” (Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1993, p.25). This suggests 
that Ohlson’s model is over-specified, and perhaps that pension assets and 
liabilities are essentially financial in nature (Barth et al., 1993) if there are no 
synergies with other corporate assets and liabilities and no other intangibles 
attached to them, and if their fair values can be measured with sufficient reliability. 
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Coronado and Sharpe (2003) follow a very similar research design to compare 
the value relevance of the funding status of pension plans, i.e. the difference 
between the PBO and the FVPA (disclosed in the notes) and the value relevance 
of pension costs (recognised in the income statement, and smoothed by the 
“corridor method”). Interestingly, their results contradict those of Barth et al. 
(1993). Based on a sample of US companies comprising the S&P 500 index from 
1993 to 2001, their results indicate that it is not the funding status of pension 
plans, but pension income and expenses that turn out to be relevant in explaining 
share prices. In their more recent research, Coronado et al. (2008) extend their 
sample to cover data for the years 2002 to 2005, with the same result. They 
conclude that the market pay more attention to the change of pension accruals 
recognized in the income statement than the marked-to-market value of pension 
assets and liabilities disclosed in the footnote. 
Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et al. (2008) attribute these results 
to investors’ fixation on earnings. During the second half of the 1990s, the 
pension plans of S&P 500 companies were, on average, over-funded, and 
companies reported, on average, net pension income rather than net pension 
expenses because expected returns on plan assets exceeded pension costs. In 
fact, as a result of the income-smoothing mechanisms of FAS 87, companies 
continued to report net pension income even in the first years of the 2000s, 
although S&P 500 pension plans were by then under-funded following 
deterioration of the stock markets. Coronado and Sharpe (2003) argue that the 
smoothing mechanism under FAS 87 misled investors to overvalue companies 
sponsoring DB pension plans (see also Franzoni and Marin, 2006; Picconi, 2006). 
Motivated by whether stock market investors treat net assets from over-funded 
pension plans and net liabilities from under-funded plans equivalently, Wiedman 
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and Wier (2004) conducted research based on data from 128 Canadian 
companies. They modified Ohlson’s model to include an indicator variable 
denoting companies with over-funded plans. They find that funding status is more 
closely associated with stock prices for companies with under-funded plans than 
for those with over-funded plans. More precisely, the net pension assets of 
companies with over-funded plans appear not to be implicated in stock market 
valuations at all. They conclude that from the investors perception, deficits 
amount in under-funded plan are more likely similar to the liabilities of the 
sponsoring firm, but the surpluses arising from plan over-funding are not seen as 
assets of the firm. 
Similar studies of the effect of pension assets and liabilities on bond ratings have 
produced the same asymmetric results. These credit relevance studies suggest 
that unfunded pension liabilities reduce debt ratings more strongly than pension 
assets increase them (Maher, 1987; Carroll and Niehaus, 1998). This may be 
attributed to the fact that, under the going concern assumption, companies are 
required to fund pension deficits over time, while they have little power to control 
net pension assets (Ippolito, 1985; Stone, 1987). Moreover, reversion 
(terminations by sponsoring companies with the intention of claiming plan 
surpluses) has been hard to achieve in other countries, and has also been made 
much more difficult in the US by new regulatory hurdles and tax disincentives 
(Ippolito, 2001; Fortune, 2005). 
In investigating a similar research question to Barth et al. (1993) and Coronado 
and Sharpe (2003), Hann et al. (2007) compare the value relevance of 
recognised pension amounts smoothed according to FAS 87 with the value 
relevance of fair-value pension amounts disclosed in companies’ footnotes. 
Based on a sample of more than 2000 US companies from 1991 to 2001, they 
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first take account of the fact that full recognition of actuarial gains and losses will 
greatly increase the volatility of pension costs, and hence decrease the 
persistency of earnings. Based on Ohlson’s model, they modify the empirical 
model as follows: 
MVE = α + β1NPE + β2EbPC + β3NetPAL + β4RecPC + β5PGL + ε (b) 
where NetPAL is net pension assets and liabilities and pension expenses 
disaggregated into a recurring component (RecPC) equal to service costs plus 
interest costs less expected returns on plan assets, and a gains/losses 
component (PGL). 
Hann et al. (2007) estimate the model twice, once with FAS 87 amounts and the 
other with fair-value amounts. They find that the explanatory power of the two 
estimations does not differ statistically, based on a Vuong (1989) test. However, 
pension cost components are less persistent, and hence less value-relevant 
under fair-value accounting. 
Werner (2011) undertakes a combined relative and incremental association 
value-relevance study applied to pension accounting information in a more recent 
period. He examines both value relevance and credit relevance, or “credit rating-
based value relevance”. His analysis period covers the period 1998 to 2005, 
using a sample of Fortune 200 firms from Compustat to provide 1,189 firm-year 
observations for an Ohlson (2995) “equity model”. The results show an adjusted 
R-squared of 0.343 for smoothing the SFAS 87 version of the equity model, and 
a virtually equal adjusted R-squared of 0.342 for the fair-value version. 
Apart from ex ante research on SFAS 158 (Hann et al., 2007; Werner, 2011), a 
recent ex post study by Mitra and Hossain (2009) examines the value relevance 
of pension transition adjustments and other comprehensive income components 
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in the adoption year of SFAS 158. The term “pension transition adjustments” 
means the total unrecognised gains or losses, prior service costs or credits, and 
any transition assets or obligations as a direct adjustment (net of tax), reported 
as separate accumulated OCI in stockholders’ equity. Using data from S&P large, 
mid-cap and small-cap firms in the year for which information about SFAS 158 
pension transition adjustments in the financial statements was available 
produced a final sample of 696 firms comprising 283 S&P large, 212 S&P mid-
cap and 202 S&P small-cap firms. By performing several cross-sectional 
regression analyses, they find a negative association between both the level of 
and change in stock returns and the magnitude of pension transition adjustments. 
When analysed separately, they find that the main results are confined mainly to 
the sample of large S&P 500 firms. There is no significant relationship between 
stock returns and pension transition adjustments for the S&P mid-cap and small-
cap firms. These results suggest that the capital market reacted negatively to the 
adverse impact of pension transition adjustments following SFAS 158 on firms’ 
net worth and potential future cash flows when that impact was of substantial 
magnitude in dollar terms. When the impact was not severe, the market did not 
respond to the adjustment amount. Hence, stock price changes occur to varying 
degrees, depending on the dollar effect of the transition adjustment amount. 
Further value-relevance research on the impact of SFAS 158 has been carried 
out by Beaudoin, Chandar and Werner (2011), who investigate whether the 
recognition of pension information under SFAS 158 previously disclosed only in 
footnotes is incrementally value-relevant from both an equity and a credit rating 
perspective. They examine whether a particular, previously unrecognised funded 
status component was incrementally more significantly associated with firm value 
and credit ratings once its recognition was required on the balance sheet under 
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SFAS 158. They collected a US sample from Compustat consisting of 878 firms 
in 2005 (disclosure year) and 2006 (recognition year), providing 1,756 firm-year 
observations. Overall, the results are consistent with no incremental valuation 
effects for information that was recognised rather than disclosed, in both equity 
valuation and credit-rating contexts. The findings indicate that equity investors 
value the incremental portion of net pension assets or liabilities similarly, whether 
disclosed or recognised, suggesting that equity markets are efficient with respect 
to pension accounting information, regardless of the implementation of SFAS 
158. The authors’ credit-rating analysis, using a sample of 428 DB firms (856 firm 
years) for 2005 and 2006, also shows no differential impact of recognition over 
disclosure. In fact, credit-rating agencies do not appear to incorporate the portion 
of DB plan information in their decisions, whether recognised or disclosed. 
Furthermore, similarly to previous research by Mitra and Hossain (2009), their 
overall results were driven by larger firms and firms with greater liability impacts 
from the adoption of SFAS 158. Taken as a whole, they suggest that SFAS 158 
made no significant difference with respect to how key market participants use 
pension-related financial statement information from both credit and equity 
valuation perspectives. 
There appears to be no literature concerning the actual or perceived decision 
usefulness of pension accounting information. The literature focuses mainly on 
pension accounting from a technical point of view or from a value-relevance 
perspective. Gopalakrishnan (1994) refers to “usefulness”, but only as part of a 
quantitative value-relevance study, with no specific analysis of “decision 
usefulness” or the perception of decision usefulness. Barth et al. (2001), in a 
general review of value relevance, refer to any test of value relevance being a 
joint test of relevance and reliability. They discuss the difference between the 
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concepts of value relevance and “decision relevance”, but this is merely a 
commentary and does not include an empirical study of decision usefulness or a 
link to value relevance. 
Furthermore, most of the data used in the literature on pension accounting value 
relevance is now quite old, and even the more recent studies examine periods no 
later than 2006. Many of the major studies of pension accounting value relevance, 
such as those by Daley (1984), Landsman (1986), Dhaliwal (1986) and Barth et 
al. (1992, 1993), were undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s. Other studies after 
the year 2000 include Coronado and Sharpe (2003), who examine results for the 
period 1993 to 2001, Franzoni and Matin (2006) for the period 1980 to 2002, 
Picconi (2006) for the period 1988 to 2001, Hann et al. (2007) for the period 1991 
to 2001, and Coronado et al. (2008) for the period 2002 to 2005, which extends 
earlier study by Coronado and Sharpe (2003). 
Most pension accounting value-relevance research has been carried out on the 
US market, and has therefore used accounting information prepared under US 
GAAP. Since the institutional differences between the US market and elsewhere 
adds different contest on these research, the generalisability and applicability of 
such research to the other markets such as the UK and EU countries where the 
prevailing accounting regime is IFRS/IAS or a local GAAP is therefore 
questionable. It is important to conduct research in different markets and explore 
different perspectives that may be possible in some situations but not in others. 
Review of the wider value-relevance literature suggests that there are significant 
differences in associations between share prices and accounting data in different 
jurisdictions (Alford et al., 1993; Joos and Lang, 1994). 
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2.2.1.2 Marginal information content value relevance studies in pension 
accounting 
This sub-section summaries the third value relevance category study – marginal 
information content – that is accounting number has effect on decision making of 
investors, managers and debtors. 
2.2.1.2.1 Changes in earnings management behaviour following adoption of 
pension accounting standards 
Accounting standards provide guidelines rather than regulations with respect to 
discount rates. For example, IAS19 provides an instruction that market yields on 
high-quality corporate bonds which have similar duration with plan liabilities can 
be used as discount rates (IAS19, 2009, para. 78). This allows for flexibility with 
respect to the choice of discount factor. Since there is variety in the market yields 
on fixed instruments, the choice between a high or low market yields, namely the 
choice between a higher or lower discount rate, may cause significant changes 
in pension liabilities and expenses. Earnings can be managed if high discount 
rates are chosen with the purpose of lowering service and interest costs (Adams 
et al., 2011). Fried (2010) documents the impact of SFAS 158 on the behaviour 
of sponsoring companies and identifies that, owing to increased SFAS 158-
related pension liabilities, managers chose to use higher discount rates. Similarly, 
Houmes and Boylan (2010) identify the use of higher discount rates following the 
enactment of SFAS 158, especially by sponsoring companies with decreased 
liquidity and increased leverage. 
Apart from the discount rate, companies have other ways to increase or decrease 
pension expenses and to manage earnings to their advantage. Previous research 
documents this behaviour. According to Adams et al. (2011), using high expected 
rates of return may unjustifiably decrease expenses and inflate earnings, showing 
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a better financial situation for the company. Moreover, there is doubt about how 
expectations relating to rates of return on pension assets are formed. 
Ramaswamy (2012) identifies that the median assumed return for US companies 
was 8.5 per cent, even though the yield on Treasury securities (i.e. the discount 
rate for pension liabilities) had been declining. SFAS 132 introduced 
requirements for the disclosure of the composition of pension assets in addition 
to reporting ERR. When both ERR and portfolio asset allocations are reported, it 
is harder for managers to justify unrealistic expected return assumptions given 
the asset portfolio composition (Komissarov, 2014). Komissarov (2014) shows 
that the degree of inconsistency between ERR and asset allocations declined 
following the adoption of SFAS 132(R). 
A plethora of previous literature provides evidence that managers exercise 
discretion in responding to mandatory accounting changes. For instance, Balsam 
et al. (1995) document that when a timing option is provided, firms usually adopt 
income-increasing regulations in the year in which a change in their return on 
assets would have been the lowest and the increase in the tightness of their debt 
covenants is the greatest. Balsam et al. (1995) find that firms implemented SFAS 
No. 123 to reduce criticism of their compensation practices. 
More recently, Beatty and Weber (2006) offer evidence that SFAS 142 adoption 
choices are associated with contracting and market incentives. Firms’ debt 
contracting, bonuses, turnover and exchange delisting incentives affect their 
decisions to accelerate or delay expense recognition in income statements, and 
firms’ equity market considerations affect their preference for above-the-line 
versus below-the-line accounting treatments. Balsam et al. (2008) and 
Choudhary et al. (2009) show that publicly-held companies accelerated the 
vesting of some or all of their employee stock options in advance of adopting 
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SFAS 123R. They conclude that accelerated vesting of options is a form of 
earnings management. 
In 2011, IAS19R has not changed the guideline on discount rate assumption. It 
also forced full recognition of pension liabilities, with potentially significant effects 
for the equity of companies that previously used the corridor method to smooth 
the impact of changes in the value of pension assets and liabilities. As a result, 
in the year of IAS19R adoption, managers had an incentive to exploit the 
accounting standard to manipulate the firms’ reported performance by choosing 
a discretionary discount rate. 
Several studies examine the costs associated with debt covenant violations and 
provide evidence that such violations are costly (see Beneish and Press, 1993; 
Roberts and Sufi, 2009). Given the significant impact of IAS19R, with elimination 
of the “corridor method” on contracting-based accounting numbers, firms may 
manage discretionary accruals to reduce the cost of debt covenant violations. 
Sweeney (1994) finds that during the years minus five to plus two surrounding 
technical default, the cumulative effect of accounting changes made by 130 firms 
violating debt covenants were significantly more income-increasing than changes 
made by non-defaulting firms in a matched sample. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) support this finding, showing that in both the year of and the year prior to 
debt covenant violation, abnormal accruals are positive and significant. More 
recently, Beatty and Weber (2003) find that firms with debt covenants are more 
likely to adopt income-increasing accounting policies than their non-covenant 
counterparts. 
In contrast, DeAngelo et al. (1994) find no statistical difference in the accounting 
choices made by firms facing potentially binding debt covenants and firms without 
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such binding debt covenants, and conclude that accounting choices reflect firms’ 
financial difficulties rather than attempts to either avoid debt covenant violation or 
mask financial difficulties. Healy and Palepu (1990) find that firms cut dividends 
and do not appear to make accounting changes to avoid violating dividend 
constraints in debt covenants. 
2.2.1.2.2 Capital market consequences 
Previous research suggests that financial statement users’ judgments may be 
affected by the location of items in certain contexts, for example in financial 
statements or in footnotes. Aboody (1996) finds that oil and gas firms that 
recognised a write-down in connection with a decrease in oil prices experienced 
a negative stock market reaction, while there was no significant stock market 
reaction for firms disclosing, but not recognising, an as-if write-down in the 
footnote18. Ahmed et al. (2006) find that stock prices are significantly associated 
with recognised derivatives but insignificantly associated with disclosed 
derivatives, while Libby et al. (2006) find that auditors require much greater 
correction of mis-statements in recognised amounts than they do for disclosed 
amounts. 
In the context of pensions and post-retirement benefits, Landsman and Ohlson 
(1990) find that the market under-reacted to pension information disclosed in 
footnotes under SFAS No.36 (FASB 1980) from 1979 to 1982. Amir (1993) finds 
that investors reacted more to OPEB after the FASB began to require recognition 
of post-retirement benefit liabilities. Davis-Friday et al. (2004) find that investors 
                                            
18 A firm recognize a write-down only if their net capitalized costs are higher than the net 
undiscounted value of their proved oil and gas reserves. In contrast to firms using full cost method, 
a “successful method” firms need only disclose the capitalized cost and ceiling in the 
supplementary unaudited part of the financial statements (Aboody, 1996, page 23). 
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assigned a larger valuation multiple to recognised OPEB liabilities under SFAS 
No. 106 than disclosed under SFAS No. 74. 
Theoretically, Barth et al. (2003a) attribute the difference between disclosure and 
recognition to the cost of processing information. They argue that information 
disclosed in footnotes is technically complex; therefore, unsophisticated investors 
may be unable to recast financial statements using footnote disclosures, and will 
incur costs in acquiring such informational benefits. 
In addition, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) suggest that systematic bias in how 
investors process information, such as limited attention or differences in the 
perceived reliability of recognised versus disclosed items, indicates why 
disclosed and recognised items are different. The intuition is that, owing to limits 
to investor attention, investors use information that is presented in a salient, 
easily-processed form (on the balance sheet) more readily than information that 
is less salient (e.g. disclosed in footnotes). 
Besides information processing costs and systematic bias, an alternative 
explanation for why the market may not treat recognition and disclosure equally 
is differences in the reliability of recognised and disclosed items. Schipper (2007) 
concludes that disclosed amounts are less reliable than recognised amounts. 
She explains that these differences may be due to differences in the preparation 
and auditing of disclosed versus recognised amounts, as opposed to intrinsic 
differences (Libby et al., 2006) 
While these studies provide both empirical and theoretical support for the 
difference between recognition and disclosure, some other studies nonetheless 
suggest opposite results. For example, Dhaliwal (1986) and Imhoff and Thomas 
(1988) find that footnote information on pension and lease obligations is 
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incorporated into market-risk assessments no differently from recognised debt. 
Landsman (1986) finds that disclosed accounting measures for pension assets 
and liabilities are valued similarly to recognised assets and liabilities. Jin et al. 
(2006) find that the capital market is able to incorporate available pension 
information without bias “despite the practical difficulties of deciphering corporate 
pension accounts”. Shaw (2008) finds that there is no difference in the estimated 
effects of recognised and disclosed pension information on yield spreads. 
Theoretical support for the lack of difference between recognition and disclosure 
is provided by the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama, 1997), which suggests that 
recognition adds little when the information investors seek is disclosed. 
Therefore, the choice between recognition and disclosure has no effect on equity 
investors’ perceptions. 
In summary, research suggests that recognition versus disclosure matters at 
least in some contexts, but the research is inconclusive regarding the equivalence 
of disclosed and recognised amounts. Thus, market reactions to information 
changes in firms’ financial statements are an interesting topic for study. 
Moreover, in addition to full recognition of pension assets and liabilities on the 
balance sheet, IAS19R also requires firms using ERRs equal to the discount rate 
to report the performance of pension plan assets during the year. The difference 
between actual returns on plan assets and discount rate-based estimated returns 
is included in the gains and losses recognised through OCI. The new measure of 
net interest income or cost reflects the standard setter’s view of unfunded benefit 
obligations as being debt or debt-like. As with debt, plan sponsors will accrue 
interest costs on the unpaid principal (the unfunded PBO) or on the principal 
surplus (the over-funded net pension assets). However, it cannot be concluded 
that the market will take the same view as the standard setter. Previous research 
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indicates an asymmetric market view between unfunded pension liabilities and 
over-funded pension assets. Cardinale (2007) documents that unfunded pension 
liabilities decrease ratings more than equivalent amounts of excess pension 
assets enhance debt ratings. In other words, the market views pension liabilities 
as debt or debt-like, but does not view all or part of pension assets as the property 
of the firm. Moreover, pension assets and liabilities have very different risks; thus, 
they should be discounted at different rates. Sophisticated investors view the net 
interest costs of pensions reported in financial statements as irrelevant and will 
go further to work out the true number based on allocations of pension assets 
reported in footnotes. Given the controversy over net pension interest expenses, 
it would be interesting to study how shareholders and debt-holders process this 
information. 
2.2.1.2.3 Shift from DB to DC 
Funded occupational pension systems were traditionally designed around DB 
pensions. DC plans accounted for a small fraction of employer-sponsored 
pensions and were typically offered by smaller firms or as supplementary plans 
for high income earners. Over the past three decades, there has been a gradual 
shift, predominantly in the private sector, toward employee-directed DC plans and 
hybrid arrangements that combine features of both DB and DC plans.19 Research 
of Kiosse and Peasnell (2009) reveals that there have been many factors other 
than new accounting requirements that contribute to the shift of DB to DC. 
Nevertheless, the research suggested that there is clearly a widespread 
perception that changes in pension accounting standards that result in increased 
volatility in reported earnings and the incorporation of pension surpluses and 
                                            
19 See Aaronson and Coronado (2005) for data indicating a shift from DB to DC. 
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deficits on the balance sheet will lead firms either to change pension investment 
strategy or to close or restrict their DB schemes. 
2.2.2 Managerial discretion and earnings management in pension 
accounting 
Estimating net pension obligations and periodic pension costs involves 
demographic and financial assumptions, such as expectations concerning 
employee turnover, mortality rates of pension beneficiaries, and future salary and 
benefit trends, as well as the interest rate used to discount future pension 
payments, and the ERR on plan assets. In addition, pension liabilities are highly 
sensitive to changes in actuarial assumptions. For instance, the value of pension 
liabilities will change by three to four per cent on average if employees’ life 
expectancy changes by one year (Blake et al., 2008; Coughlan et al., 2007). 
Moreover, a one per cent change in the discount rate will on average decrease 
or increase the value of liabilities by 15 per cent (Gohdes and Baach, 2004; May 
et al., 2005.). 
Furthermore, as accounting for pensions is tied to funding decisions, changes in 
actuarial assumptions may also have cash-flow consequences. Determining 
actuarial assumptions involves judgement. In other words, companies’ 
management enjoys a certain degree of discretion in setting these parameters, 
thereby influencing key financial figures such as debt–equity ratios and earnings. 
This raises an obvious question of whether managers use, or even abuse, their 
discretion over pension accounting to influence earnings and other accounting 
figures. 
In relation to pension accounting, two areas have been researched intensively, 
namely motives for the early adoption of FAS 87 in the US in the 1980s, and 
determinants of cross-sectional differences in actuarial assumptions. Although, 
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previous literature in this area is almost completely based on US data (Glaum, 
2009), given the focus of this thesis on IAS19, the following sub-section performs 
a literature review on earnings management not only relate to adoption of FRS 
87 but also relate to the IAS19. 
2.2.2.1 Early adoption of FAS 87 and actuarial method changes 
The introduction of FAS 87 fundamentally changed US GAAP pension 
accounting. With the adoption of accrual accounting for pension obligations, 
companies with under-funded pension plans had to recognise a (minimum) 
pension liability. FAS 87 introduced the application of the projected credit unit 
method. The FAS deliberated for more than a decade over its pension project, 
and even when FAS 87 was issued in 1985, it allowed for an extended adoption 
period. In general, the standard became effective in 1987, but the application of 
some provisions (such as the recognition of a minimum liability) became 
mandatory only in 1989. This extended adoption period gave companies a 
choice: they could adopt the regulation early, or postpone adoption until the 
mandatory date. 
Before FAS 87, companies in the US applied “cost allocation methods”. These 
methods typically arrived at conservative estimates of pension costs and 
contributions because they aimed for a high degree of security for pension 
beneficiaries. Thus, compared with the projected credit unit method, pension 
costs tended to be higher, resulting in the accumulation of plan assets larger than 
the present value of expected future benefits (Ghicas, 1990). In other words, for 
most companies, the adoption of FAS 87 led to lower pension costs, and 
therefore increased earnings. 
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Ghicas (1990) collected a sample of 45 companies between 1980 and 1983 
(before FAS 87 was issued) that had switched from a cost allocation method to a 
benefit allocation method, an accounting policy change that anticipated FAS 87. 
He matched the “switch companies” with non-switching companies from the same 
industries and developed hypotheses predicting which companies would be more 
likely to switch. He expected that companies facing liquidity and financing 
constraints would be more likely to take advantage of the lower pension costs 
associated with a benefit allocation method. He also expected companies with 
high funding ratios to adopt the new method so as to lower future pension 
contributions, and that companies with low earnings growth and low cash flows 
from operations would attempt to benefit from lower pension expenses and 
contributions. According to other hypotheses, due to public and regulatory 
scrutiny, larger companies are more reluctant than smaller ones to switch. Finally, 
given that pension contributions may generate tax benefits, Ghicas predicted that 
switching companies would have lower effective tax rates than their non-
switching counterparts. Applying a multivariate logit model, Ghicas finds support 
for several of his hypotheses. High funding ratios, high leverage and low working 
capital significantly predict a pension accounting method switch. He also finds 
that switching companies have lower rates of investment. These findings are 
consistent with financing constraints being a driver of method change. Company 
size, as a proxy for political and regulatory costs, is also significant, albeit only 
marginally. The effective tax rate, on the other hand, does not appear to influence 
switching decisions. 
Subsequent studies on motives for the early adoption of FAS 87 also focus on 
the income effects of early adoption, since companies were permitted to delay 
recognition of a minimum liability even if they adopted other provisions of FAS 
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87. Scott (1991) refines some of Ghicas’s (1990) theoretical arguments. He finds 
strong support for political determinants of early adoption (company size, 
regulated industries and legal proceedings). In addition, companies were more 
likely to adopt FAS 87 early if the absolute magnitude of the income effect was 
large and if they had experienced earnings decreases in prior years. If, on the 
other hand, a company’s performance was negative, it was less likely to adopt 
FAS 87 early if it had bonus plans with management compensation tied to 
accounting income. In contrast to Ghicas (1990), Scott finds only weak evidence 
for debt constraints to explain companies’ accounting choice. 
Ali and Kumar (1994) demonstrate that the magnitude of the income effect was 
a strong moderator of other determinants of companies’ choice to adopt FAS 87 
early. In their basic model, debt constraints and political arguments do not appear 
to be linked significantly with companies’ adoption choice. However, once the 
interaction of these variables with the magnitude of the income effect or early 
adoption are included in the models, these determinants turn out to be significant. 
The magnitude of the income effect also moderates other determinants, such as 
regulatory costs (regulated industries) and agency costs (earnings-linked 
management bonus plans). 
Overall, research on the early adoption of pension accounting standards, 
primarily in the US, provides evidence consistent with companies exercising 
inherent accounting choices based on economic incentives. Important 
determinants appear to be the self-interests of managers whose remuneration is 
tied to key financial accounting indicators, debt constraints, and political and 
regulatory costs. The importance of these determinants appears to be moderated 
by the magnitude of the earnings effect of the accounting choice. 
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On the other hand, there are several researches that provide some opposite view 
from the researches above based on the sample other than the US sample.  
Sweeting (2011), based on a sample of FTSE 100 non-financial firms, 
investigated the pension disclosures of sponsor firms in the context of SSAP 24. 
He found no association between funding ratio and choice of discount rate. In 
addition, he claimed that large firms offer more complete disclosure, however, 
they also have influence on their actuarial to use weaker assumptions such as 
high discount rate to value the pension liabilities.  
In addition, Klumpes and Whittington (2003) examine the response of UK 
companies to a change in a regulatory requirement that was designed to restrict 
the ability of companies to under-fund defined benefit pension schemes. As with 
US companies in pre-FAS 87 times, until the introduction of IFRS and IAS19, UK 
companies could choose between different pension valuation methods. Building 
on Ghicas (1990), Klumpes and Whittington (2003) surveyed UK companies from 
1994 to 1998 and identified 45 companies that had switched actuarial firms, 
deferred reporting of their funding status, or changed from cost-based to market-
based valuation of pension assets. They matched these firms with companies 
that had not reported comparable accounting method changes and, like earlier 
US studies, applied logistic regression to explain companies’ accounting policy 
changes. They reported that their findings are consistent with the traditional UK 
view that the decision to switch actuarial valuation methods is determined by the 
long-run characteristics of a company’s pension fund. They also contend that 
their findings contradict the results in earlier US studies supporting a corporate 
finance perspective. However, the performance of their models is not very strong. 
As Forker (2003) points out, this may be attributable to conceptual and 
methodological problems inherent in the research design. 
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A more recent research based on UK sample was performed by Billings, O’Brien, 
Woods and Vencappa (2017). They collected a sample consisted of UK-listed 
companies over the period of 2005 through 2009 to examine the actuarial 
assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities in the context of IAS19. 
Specifically, based on data for a panel of FTSE 350 companies, they concluded 
that some companies appear to exercise discretion in order to reduce reported 
pension liabilities. In particular, their results indicate that firms with relatively 
poorly funded DB pension plans tend to make assumptions that lower their liability 
valuations. They also found a relationship between assumptions and the size of 
the pension plan relative to company’s size. However, their result did not indicate 
any association between pension assumptions and company profitability, or debt 
ratio which are contrary to the finding of three US papers (Asthana 1999; Bodie 
et. al. 1987, and Godwin et. al. 199720). 
2.2.2.2 Determinants of actuarial assumptions 
Earlier studies examined companies’ assumptions and changes in assumptions 
over time, or compared companies’ assumptions with benchmark variables. More 
recent studies attempt to explain cross-sectional variance in pension valuation 
assumptions with company characteristics relating to earnings management 
incentives. 
Blankley and Swanson (1995) refer to allegations in the business press and to 
criticism raised by the SEC that company management in the US abused the 
discretion inherent in FAS 87 pension accounting rules. They compare US 
companies’ pension discount rates and expected rates of return for the years 
                                            
20 These researches will be discussed in the upcoming sections 
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1987 to 1993 with benchmark rates. They observe that companies do not change 
discount rates as often as might be expected on the basis of FAS 87 
requirements. Overall, however, they find discount rates to be in line with 
benchmarks. Regarding expected rates of return, they conclude that these 
capture “to a surprising degree” the sample companies’ actual returns. Godwin 
(1999) also examines trends in US companies’ actuarial assumptions. He 
gathered data for 1987 to 1996 and, unlike Blankley and Swanson, finds some 
evidence that companies set assumptions to manipulate accounting measures. 
More precisely, in nine out of the ten sample years, companies with under-funded 
pension plans had, on average, higher discount rates than over-funded 
companies, consistent with the former choosing rates that would inflate their 
funding status. 
Godwin et al. (1996) investigate whether company characteristics that proxy for 
earnings management motives may explain changes in actuarial pension 
assumptions over time. The data for this study related to US companies during 
the years 1981 to 1983. Based on note disclosures required by FAS 36, the 
authors categorise companies according to the earnings impact of actuarial rate 
changes. This categorical variable is then explained in a cross-sectional setting 
using ordered logit regression. They find that companies are more likely to 
change assumptions so as to increase earnings when they have experienced 
earnings decreases in previous years. Furthermore, earnings-increasing 
assumption changes are significantly related to higher leverage, dividend 
constraints, and declines in taxpayer status (resulting in lower tax benefits on 
pension expenses). 
Amir and Gordon (1996) focus on the assumptions applied by US companies in 
estimating their post-employment benefits other than pensions (OPEB). Similar 
 62 
to Godwin et al. (1996), they derive hypotheses for the determinants of cross-
sectional differences in companies’ healthcare trend assumptions and discount 
rates. Their study is based on data for the years 1991 to 1993. The results of the 
study are not entirely consistent, but the authors find some support for their 
hypothesis that actuarial assumptions are influenced by the relative size of OPEC 
obligations, leverage and the existence of extreme earnings. 
Amir and Benartzi (1998) examine whether variation in cross-sectional 
companies’ ERR may be attributable to differences in pension fund investment 
strategies (differences in levels of equity investment). They argue that, if 
managers’ assumptions are unbiased, cross-sectional differences in expected 
rates of return can only be explained by differences in the riskiness of companies’ 
portfolios. However, using a sample of US companies from 1988 to 1994, they 
find that a rather weak correlation between the ERR and the proportion of equities 
in pension funds. In contrast to Blankley and Swanson (1995), Amir and 
Benartzi’s (1998) findings indicate that ERR is not correlated with future returns 
on pension portfolios, even though future returns may be predicted by the asset 
composition of funds. 
While Amir and Benartzi (1999) suggest that managers use ERR on plan assets 
in a biased way, Bergstresser et al. (2006) take the investigation one step further 
and investigate possible incentives for opportunistic behaviour by focusing also 
on ERR on plan assets. Their comprehensive study is based on a total of 20,598 
firm-year observations representing 3,350 US companies for the years 1991 to 
2002. Unlike Amir and Benartzi (1999), they find assumed returns to be correlated 
with realised, or lagged realised, returns. However, this effect appears to be 
rather small. Controlling for actual returns, they partially explain cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns in terms of companies’ sensitivities to pension 
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assumptions: companies with large amounts of pension assets (relative to 
operating earnings or operating assets) on average are found to have higher 
expected returns, all else being equal. The results also indicate that companies 
make more aggressive return assumptions in the years before and in which they 
engage in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions. Moreover, companies 
appear to set higher ERRs on plan assets in periods in which seasoned equity 
offerings take place and in periods in which CEOs exercise stock options. 
Furthermore, Bergstresser et al.’s findings indicate that managers are more 
aggressive with return assumptions if their companies are close to failing to meet 
important earnings thresholds (positive earnings, previous years’ earnings, 
median industry earnings). Finally, they find a negative correlation between a 
corporate governance index and companies’ ERR on plan assets; that is, 
managers who are least constrained by their shareholders appear to set the 
highest return assumptions. 
Consistent with the results of US studies, research by Li and Klumpes (2013) 
examines the determinants of UK companies’ ERRs on plan assets, and find that 
the ERR is significantly associated with, inter alia, leverage and pension funding 
levels, suggesting that contracting and funding constraints systematically 
influence rates of return. 
Asthana (1999) analyses the filings of US pension funds with the Internal 
Revenue Service. Her extensive study is based on 6,040 filings from 2,419 
pension plans sponsored by 1,813 companies for 1990-1992. Her results are 
consistent with companies exercising discretion over actuarial choices in order to 
manage pension funding and maximise tax benefits. According to Asthana’s 
findings, companies make more conservative (aggressive) choices when funds 
become over-funded (under-funded). As pension contributions increase 
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(decrease) and come close to maximum tax-deductible (minimum required) 
contributions, companies make more conservative (aggressive) choices. 
Funding-related actuarial choices are also determined by companies’ profitability, 
cash flows from operations, leverage and taxpayer status. 
2.3 Research Questions 
The prior sub-sections provided a comprehensive review of empirical researches 
in pension area. They suggested a gap in previous literature relate to economic 
consequence of pension accounting standards. Furthermore, these researches 
were mainly conducted under US context and subjected to various limitation in 
methodology in drawing the causal effect of pension accounting standard impact 
on decision making of the firms and market. 
One of the main research questions of this thesis is motivated by the change of 
IAS19R on the abolition of ERR and the elimination of the “corridor method” 
(discussed in sub-section 2.1.3), to study the change of asset allocation of 
pension plan portfolio as the result of the adoption of IAS19R.  
According to sub-section 2.2.1.4.2 (Capital market consequences), there is a 
debate on whether market perceives disclosure items and recognition items in 
financial statement differently. In relation to pension accounting standard 
IAS19R, the elimination of the “corridor method” would require sponsor firms to 
bring the net pension assets/liabilities in the disclosure part to fully recognise 
them on balance sheet. This amendment would change perception of market 
about pension information received or provide marginal information to market 
(Barth et al., 2003a; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Libby et al., 2006 and Schipper 
2007). The subsequent result of the elimination and full recognition of pension 
items on the balance sheet also has significant impact on debt and equity 
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covenants. According to Amir et al.’s (2010) argument, full recognition of pension 
items on the balance sheet will increase the volatility of total liabilities and 
shareholders’ equity, and thus increase the likelihood of violating debt- and 
equity-based covenants. In order to mitigate the impact of this amendment, I 
predict that defined benefit pension plan sponsor would reduce the equity 
investment level following the year of IAS19R adoption in 2013. 
Secondly, the literature review on earnings management relate to pension 
accounting shows some significant evidences and explanations on how and why 
managers exploit their discretion on pension assumption to manipulate earning. 
The elimination of the ERR effectively removes the incentive for managers to 
“over invest” in risky asset classes by prohibiting them from recognise the 
premium/return of pension asset portfolio in excess of the high quality bond rate 
on the income statement as described in sub-section 1.2 (and will be described 
in detail in chapter 4). Therefore, this amendment might also be another channel 
to drive manager decisions on shifting pension assets from equities to bonds 
following the adoption of IAS19R. 
Furthermore, since the adoption of IAS19R was mandatory for all the listed firms 
among different countries within the EU, the effect of IAS19R is expected to be 
different due to the institutional difference across these countries. Therefore, in 
order to shed more light in how would the impact of IAS19R adoption on asset 
allocation of sponsor firm across EU countries, this thesis also takes into 
accounting institutional difference including regulation context, market context of 
different countries and examine how would these difference might be applied to 
explain the movement of pension asset allocation following the IAS19R. 
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In order to motivate the main research question of this thesis, another research 
question on how would the firm take part in the due process of IAS19R – pension 
accounting standard setting in order to lobbying against or support the adoption 
of IAS19R was also considered and conducted. This research question aims and 
set a big picture context to support and motivate the study on asset allocation of 
this thesis. 
The main part of the thesis includes manual textual analysis is presented in the 
next chapter – chapter 3, and the empirical analysis is presented in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3: Lobbying Activities of Sponsor Firms on 
IAS19 (Revised) Exposure Draft 
3.1 Introduction 
The IASB is the standard-setting body of the IFRS Foundation. The main 
objective of the organisation is to develop, in the public interest, a single set of 
high-quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards. In 
accordance with the IFRS Foundation’s constitution, the IASB has full discretion 
to develop and pursue its technical agenda and to organise the conduct of its 
work. The Trustees’ Due Process Oversight Committee has the task of regularly 
reviewing and, if necessary, amending the procedures for due process in light of 
experience and comments from the IASB and constituents. In order to gain a wide 
range of views from interested parties throughout all stages of project 
development, this committee and the IASB have established consultative 
procedures to govern the standard-setting process. The framework for, and the 
minimum requirements of, the IASB’s due process are set out in its Constitution 
and in the preface to its Due Process Handbook (IFRS, 2010). 
The IASB and FASB’s joint FCAG states that due process procedures are 
intended to ensure that all voices in all geographical regions have an 
adequate opportunity to make their view known ... Wide consultation also 
promotes excellence, neutrality, the identification of unintended 
consequences, and ultimately, broad acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
standards that are adopted (FCAG, 2009, p.14). 
Thus, constituent participation is seen not only as a key component for the 
standard setter to obtain legitimacy and success (Suchman, 1995), but also as 
an effective mechanism for the IASB to gauge the perceptions of various interest 
groups. 
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The IASB uses many steps in its consultation process to gain a better 
understanding of different accounting alternatives and the potential impact of 
proposals on affected parties. These steps include setting the agenda, project 
planning, development and publication of a discussion paper, an ED and an 
IFRS, and procedures once an IFRS has been issued (IFRS, 2010). 
Publication of an ED is a mandatory step in due process. Irrespective of whether 
the IASB has published a discussion paper, the ED is its main vehicle for 
consulting the public. An ED sets out a specific proposal in the form of a proposed 
IFRS (or amendment to an IFRS). 
Accounting for pensions had been on the IASB’s agenda since the 1980s, given 
its importance for society, the economy and financial markets. However, 
pressures to revise the pension accounting standard were increasing due to 
factors such as increasing life expectancy, falling birth rates, and decreasing 
employment and economic growth. Therefore, in July 2006, the IASB, 
coordinating closely with the US FASB, added two projects to its technical agenda 
with the purpose of fundamentally reviewing all aspects of its current rules for 
post-employment benefit (pension) accounting (IASB meeting December 2006). 
The two projects represented: (a) a targeted series of improvements to IAS19, to 
be completed within a four-year period; and (b) a comprehensive review and 
revision of the existing pension accounting model, to be undertaken in 
conjunction with the FASB. 
In compliance with the Due Process Handbook, in March 2008, the IASB 
published a discussion paper (IASB, 2008) that summarised the tentative 
decisions taken so far and considered further changes to IAS19: Employee 
Benefits. Following the discussion paper, in April 2010, the IASB issued an ED 
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proposing amendments to IAS19, which culminated in the introduction of IAS19R 
in June 2011. The draft proposed significant changes to recognition, presentation 
and disclosure with regard to employee benefit accounting in financial 
statements. One of the most significant proposals was the abolition of the 
“corridor method” and the smoothing of actuarial gains and losses, with the result 
that there would be immediate recognition of gains and losses through OCI and 
statements of financial position. A second major change was the introduction of 
a net interest approach to estimating the financial cost of DB pension obligations. 
Under the net interest method, financing costs are estimated as the net interest 
on DB assets/liabilities by applying to the net amount a discount rate equal to the 
yield on high-quality bonds. 
In addition to these two major changes, the new standard sought to improve the 
presentation of income statements. Most importantly, re-measurements were 
taken out of the P&L and moved to OCI, thereby removing from the P&L account 
much of the market-driven volatility in pension schemes. 
Research by Chircop and Kiosse (2015) focus on examine the driven factor that 
influence the lobbying behaviour of sponsor firms to agree (oppose) to the 
proposals to abolish the use of the “corridor method” and the replacement of the 
expected rate of return on pension plan assets with the discount rate. Based on 
a sample of 63 industrial firms, they examined responses to questions relating to 
full recognition and elimination of the ERR. They found that signalling, as 
captured by both pension plan size and the percentage of shares available for 
trading, influenced the decision to lobby. With regard to abolition of the “corridor 
method”, the results suggest that firms with unrecognised net actuarial losses 
were less likely to agree with the removal of the corridor method. Furthermore, in 
analysing firms’ responses to the replacement of ERR with a discount rate on 
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plan assets, they find evidence to support the hypothesis that firms with wider 
spreads between the ERR on plan assets and the discount rate were less likely 
to agree with the proposal. 
Following the research of Chircop and Kiosse (2015), this chapter also examines 
the arguments submitted by industrial respondents to the ED of IAS19R. 
However, this chapter conducts a manual textual analysis on all the proposals of 
IAS19R in relation to recognition, measurement and presentation in the pension 
accounting standard. These include but are not limited to abolition of the ERR 
and “corridor method” (Questions 1 and 5 in the ED). The other proposals that 
will be considered in this chapter include: “recognition of unvested past service 
cost” (Question 2); Disaggregation of pension expense (Question 3); presentation 
of pension expense (Question 6); Settlements and curtailments (Question 7); 
Disclosure (question 8, 9 and 12).  In doing so, it aims to shed light on the 
common themes of argument presented by industrial sponsor firms, and any 
lobbying behaviours driven by the self-interests of senders, based on Watts and 
Zimmerman’s (1986) Positive Accounting Theory. 
It is important to examine the comment letters of the 63 industrial firms because 
the proposed changes would have a significant impact on: (1) how sponsor firms 
recognise net pension assets/liabilities on the balance sheet; (2) the calculation 
and recognition of pension expenses; (3) the presentation of re-measurement 
(actuarial gains and losses), which had been heavily debated by academics and 
practitioners regarding their various treatments under the previous IAS19; and (4) 
disclosure of information on pension schemes, which had been criticised as 
“excessive” under the previous version of IAS19. This study extends the previous 
chapter and literature on the economic impact of pension accounting standard 
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adoption. It also adds to the relatively limited literature on lobbying in the IASB 
standard-setting context. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
previous literature on participation in the standard-setting process based on 
Positive Accounting Theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Section 3.3 reviews 
in detail the basis for conclusions relating to proposals in the ED, and Section 3.4 
presents analysis of the comment letters submitted by 63 industrial sponsors. 
Finally, Section 3.5 draws conclusions. 
3.2 Review of Literature on Participation in Standard-Setting 
Process 
Economic consequences have been a serious issue for accounting standard 
setters since the mid-1970s. The case for considering them was set out by Zeff 
(1978). The argument is that changing how a corporation accounts for a particular 
transaction through the introduction of a new accounting standard may change 
that corporation’s income statement or statement of financial position, which in 
turn will have an impact on relevant decision makers, such as investors, creditors 
and governments. Simply put, changing an accounting treatment may have 
economic consequences, as interested parties may behave differently as a result. 
Specifically, the term “economic consequences” has been used to describe the 
“impact of accounting reports on the decision-making behaviour of business, 
government, unions, investors and creditors” (Zeff, 1978). Those who have a 
vested interest in how such decision-making behaviour is conducted may put 
pressure on the standard setter not to approve any standard containing an 
unwanted feature (Zeff, 2012). This is lobbying, which includes writing letters, as 
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well as giving oral testimony at hearings arranged by a standard setter to expose 
its tentative views to public comment. 
Previous research on participation in the standard-setting process can be 
classified into three theoretical groups: Positive Accounting Theory, the economic 
theory of democracy, and the theory of coalition and influence. This research 
focuses on Positive Accounting Theory to analyse the arguments of industrial 
respondents to the ED of IAS19 and study the incentives of these entities to lobby 
against the amendment to IAS19. 
Positive accounting theorists have studied the economic motivations underlying 
preparers’ position on proposed accounting standards. The theory was first 
conceptualised by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), who developed a positive 
theory relating particularly to the determination of accounting standards. This 
aimed to aid understanding of the source of pressures driving the accounting 
standard-setting process, the effects of various accounting standards on different 
groups of individuals and the allocation of resources, and why various groups 
may be willing to expend resources on trying to affect the standard-setting 
process. Their analysis distinguishes between mechanisms that increase 
management’s wealth, either by increasing share prices (making stock and stock 
options more valuable), or increase cash bonus incentives. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) argue that management’s position on a proposed accounting 
standard is influenced by the likely effects of that standard on the firm’s taxes, 
regulation, political costs, information production costs and management 
compensation plans. The first four factors increase managerial wealth by 
increasing cash flows, and hence the share price. The last factor may increase 
managerial wealth by altering the terms of incentive compensation. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) tested their theory empirically by examining corporate 
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responses to the proposed reporting requirement concerning the effects of 
general price-level changes in financial statements. Their findings indicate that a 
possible explanation for why firms may expend resources on trying to influence 
the determination of accounting standards is provided by the government 
intervention argument. That is, firms that have (actual or potential) contact with 
governments, directly through regulation (such as public utility commissions, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission or the Civil Aeronautics Board) or 
procurement, or indirectly though possible governmental intervention (antitrust, 
price controls, etc.) may affect their future cash flows by discouraging government 
action through the reporting of lower net income. 
Dhaliwal (1982) extends Watts and Zimmerman’s (1978) research by examining 
the impact of some additional variables on the lobbying behaviour of 
management. In particular, he hypothesises that a firm’s capital structure is an 
important determinant of management’s lobbying position on an accounting 
standard. Thus, he suggests that, because of the protective covenants that 
typically exist in loan agreements, firms with higher leverage will oppose 
accounting standards that decrease reported income and equity or increase the 
volatility of reported earnings. Dhaliwal’s (1982) results are consistent with the 
hypothesised relationship between the capital structure of the firm and the 
lobbying behaviour of its management. 
Furthermore, Hill et al. (2002) extend the previous research on lobbying 
behaviours by examining the direct link between lobbying behaviour and the 
effect of the proposed standard on net income. In particular, they examined 
whether economic self-interests affect corporate lobbying on disclosure, 
especially on (a) whether to disclose similar or identical information in proxy 
statements versus annual reports (i.e. a venue choice between proxy and annual 
 74 
reports), and (b) the choice between disclosure via summary information in 
footnotes versus disclosure via pro forma income statements (i.e. a format choice 
within the annual report). The results of the study indicate that differences in 
corporate lobbying positions on disclosure relate to the value of corporate stock-
based compensation (SBC). In particular, the more wealth management holds in 
the form of stock options, the more likely managers will be to oppose disclosing 
SBC information in annual reports, even though proxy statements already 
disclose SBC information for firms’ top five executives. 
The previous literature has also used Positive Accounting Theory to study the 
incentives influencing decisions to lobby accounting standard-setting bodies on 
specific issues. These studies examine how motivations for lobbying may affect 
respondents’ inclinations for or against accounting standard adoption. 
Kelly (1982, 1985) finds that lobbying positions in opposition to FAS No.8 
occurred where firms held large proportions of remuneration as incentive 
compensation, greater leverage, larger asset size, and lower percentages of 
management stock ownership. She also documents that firms that both lobbied 
and changed financing or operating activities were characterised by greater 
leverage, larger asset size, and lower management stock ownership. 
In addition, Deakin (1989) investigated the association between management 
lobbying on accounting for oil- and gas-producing activities and the effect that the 
method might have on firms’ cash flows and on accounting numbers restricted by 
the terms of firms’ contracts. The results of this study are consistent with the 
hypotheses proposed in the positive theory literature. 
Dechow et al. (1996) employed complementary research approaches to evaluate 
the nature and extent of the predicted economic consequences of accounting for 
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stock-based compensation (FASB, 1993). They examined the characteristics of 
firms lobbying against the 1993 ED (FASB, 1993), the characteristics of firms 
using employee stock options under the original financial reporting rules, and 
stock price reactions to announcements concerning the new financial reporting 
rules. Their results are consistent with the hypothesis that opposition to 
expensing of stock options arose from concerns about potential costs stemming 
from reporting higher levels of top-executive compensation. They find strong 
evidence that the likelihood of submitting a comment letter opposing mandatory 
expensing was systematically related to the use of stock options in top-executive 
compensation. Relative to a size- and industry-matched control sample, top 
executives of firms submitting comment letters that opposed mandatory 
expensing received a greater proportion of their compensation from options and 
higher levels of total compensation, and their firms used options relatively more 
intensively for top-executive compensation than for other employees. 
Furthermore, they find no evidence to support the claim that expensing employee 
stock options increases the cost of raising new capital by reducing reported 
earnings. 
Based on Watts and Zimmerman’s (1978) Positive Accounting Theory, Saemann 
(1997) tested whether comment letters filed during the FASB’s due process were 
indicative of overall corporate opinions or only of a specific interest group. The 
research also offers explanations for the relationship between filing choice and 
accounting preferences. The results confirm previous findings that filing choice 
relates inversely to positions taken on certain issues and, more importantly, that 
filers and non-filers have differing accounting concerns. Large companies, which 
tend to be more active filers than their smaller peers, are more likely to oppose 
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and comment on measurement issues that lead to increases in reported income 
levels and volatility. 
Georgiou (2004) studied the potential importance of non-observable forms of 
lobbying that may be used by corporate managers to influence accounting 
standard-setting bodies. In particular, this study investigated other forms of 
lobbying in the context of the ASB standard-setting process. It examined the 
lobbying activity of a sample of UK listed companies over a six-year period from 
1991 to 1996, which were the first six years of the ASB’s tenure. Through a 
questionnaire survey, the research aimed to learn about the lobbying methods 
used by the sample companies, the stages of the process at which they employed 
these methods, and the perceived effectiveness of their lobbying. The results 
support the prediction that, in order to maximise the probability of influencing the 
standard setter, companies employ a number of lobbying methods which they 
rate differently in terms of their effectiveness. Importantly, however, companies 
that use these methods are more often those that also use comment letters than 
those that do not. These findings suggest that comment letters are likely to be a 
good proxy of at least the direct corporate lobbying activity to which the ASB is 
subject. The findings also suggest that companies do not consider lobbying at the 
early stages of the process to be more effective than belated lobbying, and thus 
do not appear to concentrate their lobbying activity on these early stages. 
In addition, Georgiou (2010) documents evidence from a sample of UK 
investment management firms relating to perceptions of and participation in the 
IASB process. The findings indicate that the level of lobbying activity undertaken 
by investment management firms is lower than that of other interest groups such 
as financial statement preparers. Georgiou (2010) claims that this confirms that 
the use of comment letters is significantly associated with the use of other 
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lobbying methods. Importantly, however, the study also reveals that, rather than 
using comment letters, a substantial number of firms choose to lobby through 
indirect means, notably by appealing to a report users’ representative 
organisation such as the Institute of Management Accountants. Another 
significant finding of this study relates to reasons for not participating in the 
process. Most respondents indicated that the most important reasons were the 
cost of lobbying and the belief that other users would represent their interests. 
Finally, the study also found that respondents to the questionnaire did not 
perceive report users’ groups to be particularly influential in the IASB process. 
A gap exists with regard to pension accounting standards, since very little 
research has focused on the potential consequences of and lobbying activities 
relating to pension accounting. Francis (1987) examines firms lobbying against 
the FASB’s 1982 proposals on pension accounting which (a) required recognition 
of the funded status of pension plans on the balance sheet, (b) constrained 
flexibility when determining pension expenses, and (c) gave rise to volatility 
because of the way that pension expenses would be determined. His findings 
suggest that firm size as well as the adverse impact on reported numbers explain 
the decision to lobby. 
In addition, Kreuze et al. (1993) examined relationships between the proposals 
included in the ED of Statement 106: Employer’s accounting for postretirement 
benefits other than pensions, the final standard and the views expressed in 
comment letters submitted to the ED. They find that issues partly or wholly 
modified in the final standard were strongly opposed by the majority of comment 
letter submitters. In addition, they find that none of the issues with which 
respondents agreed was modified. 
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More recently, Fried (2012) examined the lobbying behaviour of firms in response 
to the ED for SFAS No. 158 on pensions in the US, which proposed recognition 
of the funded status disclosed under the accounting standard prevailing at the 
time on the balance sheet. The research suggests that firms that opposed 
recognition had large under-funded plans, and the magnitude of balance sheet 
adjustments under the proposed changes explained their opposition to the 
amendments in the ED. 
With reference to IAS19R, recent research by Chircop and Kiosse (2015) focuses 
on explaining the drivers of lobbying behaviour regarding a pension accounting 
standard in an IASB context. They argue that different institutional settings and 
proposed amendments and different firm characteristics may drive submitters to 
lobby the IASB differently. This study also sought to shed light both on factors 
that drove firms to submit comment letters and on factors that influenced how 
submitters lobbied on two critical proposals in the 2010 ED – abolition of the 
corridor method when recognising actuarial gains or losses, and elimination of 
the ERR. Based on a sample of 63 industrial firms, they examined responses to 
questions relating to full recognition and elimination of the ERR. They found that 
signalling, as captured by both pension plan size and the percentage of shares 
available for trading, influenced the decision to lobby. With regard to abolition of 
the “corridor method”, the results suggest that firms with unrecognised net 
actuarial losses were less likely to agree with the removal of the corridor method. 
Furthermore, in analysing firms’ responses to the replacement of ERR with a 
discount rate on plan assets, they find evidence to support the hypothesis that 
firms with wider spreads between the ERR on plan assets and the discount rate 
were less likely to agree with the proposal. 
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Building on previous studies and research by Chircop and Kiosse (2015), this 
research conducts a comprehensive analysis of the lobbying behaviours of 
respondents to the ED of IAS19. In particular, it examines the comment letters of 
all industrial firms that responded to questions 1, 2 and 5 on the ED proposals 
relating to recognition, questions 3, 6, 7a and 7b on the proposals relating to 
presentation, and questions 8, 9 12 and 7c on the proposals relating to disclosure. 
Following publication of the ED in April 2010, the IASB received 225 comment 
letters from around the world from various stakeholder groups, including 
academics, accounting firms, actuaries, financial institutions, industrial firms and 
accounting standard setters. Among these groups, the most comment letters 
were submitted by industrial firms (28%, N=63), while the least were submitted 
by academics (1%). Industrial respondents were chosen for analysis, not only 
because they represented the largest number of comment letters received by the 
IASB, but also because of the direct impacts of IAS19R on those entities. 
The study first analysed the Basis for Conclusions (BC) set out by the IASB 
regarding the amendments in the ED. These were developed as the IASB 
considered issues based on staff research and recommendations, as well as 
comments received on the discussion paper and suggestions made by the IFRS 
Advisory Council, working groups and accounting standard setters and arising 
from public education sessions (IFRS, 2011). A BC is the main instrument 
through which the IASB defends the proposals in an ED and gains acceptance of 
and legitimacy for a new or amended accounting standard (Larson, 2007). 
Second, the research built a descriptive analysis of the arguments used by 
industrial respondents to oppose and raise issues against the proposals in the 
ED. Manual textual analysis was conducted on these opposing opinions to 
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understand their incentives for lobbying against the ED. The analysis also aimed 
to paint a comprehensive picture of the economic consequences of IAS19R 
adoption from various angles relating to the recognition, presentation and 
disclosure amendments of IAS19R. 
3.3 Main Proposals of the ED and the Basis for Conclusions 
As discussed in Section 2.1.2 (Chapter 2), IAS19R and its ED proposed several 
significant changes regarding the recognition, presentation and disclosure of 
pension information in the financial statements of sponsor firms. This section 
details the BC as a background to all the important proposals in the ED. 
This BC summarised the IASB’s considerations in reaching its conclusions in the 
ED. The IASB developed it after considering all comment letters received on the 
discussion paper published in March 2008, as well as input obtained from 
meetings with the IASB’s Employee Benefits Working Group, users, preparers, 
regulators and others interested in the financial reporting of employee benefits 
(IASB, 2010). 
The table below classifies the proposal of ED draft into three main categories – 
Recognition, Presentation and Disclosure. It also summaries the questions sent 
out for comment and briefly basis for conclusion of the IASB. After that, the sub-
sections following provide detail and describe these proposal as well as their 
basis. 
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Table 1: Summary of main proposals and Basis for Conclusions 
 Question 
number 
 Question Summary of Basis for 
Conclusions 
R
e
c
o
g
n
itio
n
 
1. Elimination of 
corridor 
method 
The exposure draft proposes 
that entities should recognise 
all changes in the present 
value of the defined benefit 
obligation and in the fair value 
of plan assets when they 
occur. (Paragraphs 54,61 and 
BC9-BC12) Do you agree? 
Why or why not? 
BC10: More useful 
information to users: 
More relevant to users and 
easier to understand 
Improves comparability 
 
2 Full 
recognition of 
unvested 
past service 
costs 
Should entities recognise 
unvested past service cost 
when the related plan 
amendment occurs? ( 
Paragraphs 54, 61 and BC13) 
Why or why not? 
BC13:Because the 
attribution of unvested 
benefits to past service 
results in a liability as defined 
by IAS19 
Most respondents to the 
discussion paper agreed with 
this view. 
 
5 Elimination of 
ERRs 
The exposure draft proposes 
that the finance cost 
component should comprise 
net interest on the net defined 
benefit liability (asset) 
determined by applying the 
discount rate specified in 
paragraph 78 to the net 
defined benefit liability 
(asset). As a consequence, it 
eliminates from IAS19 the 
requirement to present an 
expected return on plan 
assets in profit or loss. 
Should net interest on the net 
defined benefit liability (asset) 
be determined by applying 
the discount rate specified in 
paragraph 78 to the net 
defined benefit liability (asset) 
Why or why not? If not, how 
would you define the finance 
cost component and why? 
Paragraphs 7, 119B, 119C 
and BC23-BC32) 
BC23: Part of the change in 
plan assets arises from the 
passage of time, and this part 
offset the interest cost that 
arise from DB obligation 
BC24: in principle, the 
change in value of any asset 
can be divided into an 
amount that arises from the 
passage of time and other 
changes. 
BC25: the amount arising 
from the passage of time 
does not have the same 
implications for predicting the 
amounts, timing and 
uncertainty of future cash 
flows as the amount that 
represents all other changes 
BC26: More importantly, the 
IASB found it is difficult to find 
a practical method for 
identifying the change in the 
FC of PA as the result of 
passage of timethus 
proposes the discount rate 
BC26(a): The ERR could not 
be determined in an objective 
way 
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P
re
s
e
n
ta
tio
n
 
 
3 
Components 
of Pension 
Expense and 
Presentation 
of each 
components 
Should entities disaggregate 
defined benefit cost into three 
components: service cost, 
finance cost and 
remeasurements? 
(paragraphs 119A and BC14-
BC18) Why or why not? 
BC14: the components of 
pension expense have 
different predictive values. 
Also improve comparability 
BC16: growth in PA 
compensate the growth in PL 
overtime 
4 Should the service cost 
component exclude changes 
in the defined benefit 
obligation resulting from 
changes in demographic 
assumptions? Paragraphs 7 
and BC19-BC23) Why or why 
not? 
BC21: changes in 
demographic assumptions 
cause a re-estimate of 
service costs and need to be 
treated in different way with 
service cost 
6 Should entities present: 
Service cost in profit or loss? 
Net interest on the net defined 
benefit liabilities (asset) as 
part of finance costs in profit 
or loss? 
Remeasurements in other 
comprehensive income? 
(Paragraph 119A and BC35-
BC45) Why or why not? 
BC37: present all gains and 
losses in P&L would combine 
items of different predictive 
value 
Some components of 
pension expense are 
conceptually different from 
other items in P&L 
This presentation help reflect 
risk clearly 
Reporting all changes in P&L 
would result in volatile swings 
in P&L that are not related to 
the entity’s underlying 
operations. 
7 Settlements 
and 
curtailments 
Do you agree that gains and 
losses on routine and non-
routine settlement are 
actuarial gains and losses 
and should therefore be 
included in the 
remeasurement component? 
(Paragraphs 119D and BC47) 
Why or why not? 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you agree that 
curtailments should be 
treated in the same way as 
plan amendments, with gains 
and losses presented in profit 
or loss? (Paragraphs 98A, 
119A(a) and BC48) 
BC47: gains and losses arise 
on settlements is an 
experience adjustment 
arising in the period thus 
need to be treated as the 
same way with actuarial 
gains and losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BC48: The IASB views that 
curtailment is similar to a plan 
amendment thus similar 
treatment with past service 
cost (plan amendments 
treatment 
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D
is
c
lo
s
u
re
 
8 
Disclosure 
Objectives 
and new 
disclosure 
requirements 
The exposure draft states that 
the objectives of disclosing 
information about an entity’s 
defined benefit plans are: 
To explain the characteristics 
of the entity’s defined benefit 
plans; 
To identify and explain the 
amounts in the entity’s 
financial statements arising 
from its defined benefit plans; 
and 
To describe how defined 
benefit plans affect the 
amount, timing and variability 
of the entity’s future cash 
flows.  
(Paragraphs 125A and BC52-
BC59) 
Are these objective 
appropriate? Why or why not? 
If not, how would you amend 
the objectives and why? 
BC52: the IASB observed 
that: in some case DB plans 
are material to an entity’s 
financial statements 
Many respondent to 
Discussion Papers that 
IAS19 do not provide 
adequate basis and 
information 
Also volume of disclosures 
about defined benefit plans 
risks reducing 
understandability and 
usefulness by obscuring 
information 
BC55: the IASB proposes 
not to provide guidance in 
IAS19 on materiality nor 
requirement disclosures but 
provide objectives for 
disclosures give entities 
flexibility to decide on an 
appropriate level of 
disclosure 
BC57: the IASB consider it 
should require the same 
disclosure objective for DB 
plans as for long-term 
financial instruments and 
insurance contracts, 
However, the IASB conclude 
that some disclosure 
requirements are not match 
and suitable. 
9 To achieve the disclosure 
objectives, the exposure draft 
proposes new disclosure 
requirements, including: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information about risk, 
including sensitivity analyses 
(paragraph 125C(b), 125I, 
BC62(a) and BC63-BC66) 
 
 
Information about the process 
used to determine 
demographic actuarial 
assumptions (paragraphs 
125G(b) and BC60(d) and 
(e)); 
 
 
 
 
 
The present value of the 
defined benefit obligation, 
BC63: Users of financial 
statements have consistently 
emphasised the fundamental 
importance of sensitivity 
analyses to their 
understanding of the risks 
underlying amounts included 
in the financial statement 
 
 
BC62: Actuarial risk is a 
significant risk for any entity 
with a DB plan 
 
 
 
 
BC60d: the IASB proposes 
not to require specific 
disclosures about mortality 
rates. Instead, entities will 
use judgment to determine 
whether assumptions about 
mortality rates require 
disclosure. 
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modified to exclude the effect 
of projected salary growth 
(paragraphs 125H and 
BC60(f)); 
 
 
Information about asset-
liability matching strategies 
(paragraphs 125J and 
BC62(b)); and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information about factors that 
could cause contributions to 
differ from service cost 
(paragraphs 125K and 
BC62(c)). 
 
 
 
 
Are the proposed new 
disclosure requirements 
appropriate? Why or why not? 
If not, what disclosures do 
you propose to achieve the 
disclosure objectives? 
BC60(f): ABO in some 
circumstances, this amount 
is similar to the amount of the 
entity’s obligation if the plan 
were terminated, and some 
users believe that is relevant 
additional information. 
  
BC62(b): the IASB believes 
that information about an 
entity’s use of asset-liability 
matching investment 
strategies or the use of 
techniques, such as 
annuities or longevity swaps, 
to manage longevity risk, 
would be informative. 
 
BC62(c): the Board believes 
that it is useful to highlights 
possible differences between 
current service cost and cash 
contribution in the near 
future. This might be the case 
if a surplus or deficit affects 
the level and timing of an 
entity’s contributions. 
7c Disclosure of 
settlements 
and 
curtailments 
Should entities disclose (i) a 
narrative description of any 
plan amendments, 
curtailments and non-routine 
settlements, and (ii) their 
effect on the statement of 
comprehensive income? 
(Paragraphs 125C(c), 125E, 
BC49 and BC78) Why or why 
not? 
BC49: the IASB propose the 
similar disclosure 
requirement to the previous 
IAS19 
12 Other 
comments 
Do you have other comments 
about the proposed 
disclosure requirements? 
(Paragraphs 125A-125K and 
BC50-BC70) 
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3.3.1 Proposal in Recognition of Defined Benefit Pension Items 
3.3.1.1 Elimination of the corridor method and deferred recognition 
The ED proposed that entities should recognise all changes in DBO and in the 
FVPA when those changes occur. Under the previous version of IAS19, sponsor 
firms had the option to recognise all gains and losses when they occur, but also 
permitted actuarial gains and losses to be left unrecognised if they were within a 
“corridor” and to defer recognition of actuarial gains and losses outside the 
corridor. The ED proposed to remove the latter option. 
In the ED, the IASB invited comments relating to this issue in answer to Question 
1 in the Invitation to Comment section of the ED: 
Question 1: The exposure draft proposes that entities should recognise all 
changes in the present value of the defined benefit obligation and in the 
fair value of plan assets when they occur. (Paragraphs 54, 61 and BC9-
BC12). Do you agree? Why or why not? 
In the BC, points 9 to 12, the IASB’s view was that immediate recognition would 
provide the most useful information to users of financial statements because (a) 
the resulting amounts in the statements of financial position and comprehensive 
income would be relevant to financial statement users and easier for them to 
understand, and (b) it would improve comparability between entities by 
eliminating the options under the previous version of IAS19. 
The IASB also documented responses to the discussion paper that had raised 
several concerns about the proposal for immediate recognition as follows: 
 Measurement model required further work: The respondents argued that the 
measurement model needed substantial review, and that it would be 
disruptive to move to immediate recognition. Until that review was performed, 
some believed that the existing “corridor method” was needed to take account 
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of the long-term nature of DBO. The IASB agreed with the view that the 
measurement model was in need of review; however, it did not see the 
necessity for deferred recognition as part of the measurement model. 
Furthermore, the IASB aimed to improve the faithfulness of entities’ 
obligations; thus, it believed that immediate recognition need not be delayed 
until further work on the measurement model was completed. 
 Relevance of information: Some concerns related to the view that some 
changes to net DB liabilities occurring in a period are not relevant to the 
measurement of long-term liability. This is because past gains or losses may 
be offset by future losses or gains. However, the IASB argued that it is not 
inevitable that future gains or losses will occur and that they will offset past 
losses or gains. Indeed, if the actuarial assumptions at the end of the 
reporting period are valid, future fluctuations will offset each other and will not 
offset past fluctuations. 
 Volatility: This was the most common concern raised by respondents. Their 
view was that volatility in reported profits or losses might result if an entity 
reported all changes in net DB liabilities (assets) in each period, and that this 
volatility would impede year-on-year comparability and would obscure the 
profitability of the entity’s core business. Responding to this concern, the 
IASB stated that a measure should be volatile if it faithfully represents 
transactions and other events that are themselves volatile; thus, financial 
statements should not omit such information. On the other hand, the IASB 
also compromised with the view that financial statement reporting should aim 
to be most useful to users; thus, it also proposed to require a presentation 
that would permit financial statement users to isolate re-measurements of 
entities’ net DB liabilities (assets). 
 87 
 Behavioural and social consequences: Several respondents argued that full 
recognition might have adverse behavioural and social consequences. For 
example, entities might try to eliminate short-term volatility by making long-
term, economically inefficient decisions about the allocation of plan assets, 
or by making socially undesirable amendments to plan terms. The IASB 
emphasised its responsibility for setting standards resulting in the provision 
of relevant information that faithfully represents an entity’s financial positon, 
financial performance and cash flows so that users of that information can 
make well-informed decisions. Therefore, the IASB denied any intended 
consequences of the proposal. 
 Potential effect on debt covenants: Other respondents raised a concern that 
immediate recognition might lead to difficulties with debt covenants based on 
earnings or net assets and impair entities’ ability to pay dividends because of 
legal restrictions based on amounts in financial statements. However, 
according to the IASB, it is up to the entity and the holder of a covenant to 
determine whether to insulate a debt covenant from the effects of a future 
IFRS and to determine how they might renegotiate any existing covenant so 
that it reflects only changes in an underlying financial condition rather than 
those resulting from changes in reporting. 
In summary, the IASB believed that financial reporting would be significantly 
improved if entities were to recognise all changes in the FVPA and in long-term 
employee benefit obligations in the period in which those changes occur. 
3.3.1.2 Full recognition of unvested past service costs 
The IASB believed that attribution of unvested benefits to past service results is 
a liability, as defined by IAS19; thus, entities should fully recognise unvested past 
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service costs when the related plan amendment occurs. The IASB set up 
Question 2 for comments: 
Question 2: Should entities recognise unvested past service cost when the 
related plan amendment occurs? (Paragraphs 54, 61 and BC13) Why or 
why not? 
Most respondents to the discussion paper agreed with the IASB’s view on 
unvested past service costs. As a result, the ED confirmed this preliminary view 
and proposed to implement it. 
3.3.1.3 The finance cost component 
The ED proposed that the finance cost component should comprise net interest 
on net DB liabilities (assets), determined by applying the discount rate specified 
for DBO to net DB liabilities (assets). This proposal would implicitly remove from 
IAS19 the requirement to present an expected return on plan assets in the P&L. 
All respondents were asked to answer Question 5 of the ED to comment on this 
proposal: 
Question 5: The exposure draft proposes that the finance cost component 
should comprise net interest on the net defined benefit liability (asset) 
determined by applying the discount rate specified in paragraph 78 to the 
net defined benefit liability (asset). As a consequence, it eliminates from 
IAS19 the requirement to present an expected return on plan assets in 
profit or loss. 
Should net interest on the net defined benefit liability (asset) be determined 
by applying the discount rate specified in paragraph 78 to the net defined 
benefit liability (asset)? Why or why not? If not, how would you define the 
finance cost component and why? (Paragraphs 7, 119B, 119C and BC23–
BC32) 
The IASB argued that the ERR on plan assets might be subjective. Thus, it 
proposed to alter this return by separating the return on plan assets into two parts. 
The first part arises as the result of the passage of time, and offsets interest costs 
arising from DBO. The net amount would be recognised in the P&L under finance 
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cost components. The second part of the plan asset return would join the re-
measurement amount and be recognised in OCI. In support of this proposal, the 
IASB also stated that the amount arising from the passage of time does not have 
the same implications for predicting the amounts, timing and uncertainty of future 
cash flows as the amount that represents all other changes in the FVPA. 
Therefore, to be consistent with the IASB’s proposal that components of DB costs 
with different predictive implications should be presented separately (BC14-
BC18), it proposed that the finance cost component should not include returns on 
plan assets that do not arise from the passage of time. 
3.3.2 Proposals in Presentation of Define Benefit Pension Items 
3.3.2.1 Components of Pension Expense and presentation of each 
components 
Question 3: Should entities disaggregate defined benefit cost into three 
components: service cost, finance cost and remeasurements? 
(Paragraphs 119A and BC14-BC18) Why or why not? 
The ED proposed to disaggregate DB costs into three components: service costs, 
finance costs and re-measurement. The IASB stated that the components of DB 
costs have different predictive values; thus, disaggregation is essential for a 
proper understanding of changes in DBO and in plan assets during the period. 
The IASB suggested the separation of re-measurement from service costs and 
interest costs. Unlike service costs and interest costs, re-measurement 
represents period-to-period fluctuations in the long-term value of DBO and plan 
assets, indicating the uncertainty of future cash flows. Thus, it conveys little 
information about their likely amount and timing. 
Both service costs and interest costs convey information that helps users to 
assess the likely amount and timing of future cash flows. However, the IASB 
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believed that growth in plan assets compensates for growth in DBO over time. 
Specifically, growth in plan assets and DBO as a result of the passage of time is 
offset in each period; thus, the IASB proposed the separation of service costs 
and finance costs or DB expenses. In turn, finance costs should consist only of 
returns as a result of the passage of time from both plan assets and DBO. 
Question 6: Should entities present: Service cost in profit or loss? Net 
interest on the net defined benefit liability (asset) as part of finance costs 
in profit or loss? Remeasurements in other comprehensive income? 
(Paragraphs 119A and BC35-BC45) Why or why not? 
In this proposal, the IASB considered how entities should present service costs, 
finance costs and re-measurement. While it acknowledged the limitation of IAS1: 
Presentation of Financial Statements, with a clear principle of identifying items 
that should be recognised in OCI rather than in P&L, based on preliminary views 
on this topic in the discussion paper, the IASB focused on three possible 
approaches to the presentation of information on these components. One 
approach proposed that entities should present all gains and losses in the P&L. 
The other two proposed that entities should present some gains and losses in 
OCI. 
Based on responses to the discussion paper, the IASB was convinced to retain 
the presentation of some gains and losses in OCI. In particular, it stated that, 
although changes in DBO and plan assets which are part of the re-measurement 
component may provide information that helps with assessment of the 
uncertainty of future cash flows, many respondents regarded those changes as 
not providing useful information about the likely amount and timing of such cash 
flows. Thus, the IASB decided to present the re-measurement component as an 
item of OCI. 
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Relating to the finance cost component of pension expenses, both the IASB and 
respondents to the discussion paper agreed that there was no basis for 
presenting finance costs for long-term employee benefits in one section of the 
statement of comprehensive income and finance costs for other liabilities in a 
different section of that statement. Thus, the ED proposed that the finance cost 
component of pension expenses should be presented in the P&L statement. 
3.3.2.2 Settlements and curtailments 
The IASB proposed to treat gains and losses arising from settlements in the same 
way as actuarial gains and losses presented in the re-measurement component. 
It argued that these gains and losses arise from differences between a DBO, as 
re-measured at the transaction date, and the settlement price. Thus, these gains 
and losses experiences adjustment similar to AGL resulting from changes in 
assumptions. 
In addition, the IASB viewed curtailments as similar to plan amendments because 
these occur when an entity takes an action that reduces the benefits provided by 
the plan to employees. Therefore, the ED proposed that curtailments should be 
treated in the same way as plan amendments, with gains and losses presented 
in the P&L. The IASB set up question 7 relating to these issues: 
Question 7:  
(a) Do you agree that gains and losses on routine and non-routine 
settlement are actuarial gains and losses and should therefore be 
included in the remeasurement component? (Paragraphs 119D and 
BC47) Why or why not? 
(b) Do you agree that curtailments should be treated in the same way 
as plan amendments, with gains and losses presented in profit or 
loss? (Paragraphs 98A, 119A(a) and BC48) 
(c) Should entities disclose (i) a narrative description of any plan 
amendments, curtailments and non-routine settlements, and (ii) 
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their effect on the statement of comprehensive income? 
(Paragraphs 125C(c), 125E, BC49 and BC78) Why or why not? 
3.3.3 Proposals in Disclosure of Defined Benefit Pension Items 
According to the IASB, the objectives of disclosing information about an entity’s 
DB plans are: to explain the characteristics of the entity’s DB plans; to identify 
and explain amounts in the entity’s financial statements arising from its DB plans; 
and to describe how DB plans affect the amount, timing and variability of the 
entity’s future cash flows. Based on these objectives, the ED proposed several 
additional disclosure requirements for DB plan sponsors. 
3.3.3.1 Information about risk, including sensitivity analyses 
The ED proposed that entities should provide a narrative description of exposure 
to risk arising from their involvement with the plan. Specifically, actuarial risk is a 
significant risk for any entity with a DB plan; thus, the ED proposed that entities 
should provide quantitative disclosures, including sensitivity analyses of actuarial 
assumptions used to determine DBO. 
After considering all views and opinions from respondents to the discussion 
paper, the IASB decided to focus the application of sensitivity analysis on DBO 
and current service costs. In relation to sensitivity analyses of the effect of 
changes in actuarial assumptions on net DB liabilities (assets), the IASB 
concluded that this would be difficult to achieve. First, it was unclear how a 
change in market interest rates would apply to plan assets. If plan assets are 
invested in equities and bonds, analysis showing only the direct effects of 
changes in market interest rates will show the effect on bonds, but show no 
effects on equities. Thus, this may not provide meaningful information. Second, 
net DB liabilities (assets) include the effect of the asset ceiling, but it would be 
difficult to determine how changes in assumptions change the effect of this asset 
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ceiling. Therefore, because of these issues relating to plan assets, the ED 
required sensitivity analyses only for DBO. 
The IASB also believed that it would be useful to financial statement users for 
sponsor firms to provide sensitivity analyses of service costs, since this test would 
give an indication of variability in service costs recognised in the statement of 
comprehensive income. However, service costs are determined at the beginning 
of the period; thus, it had been argued that there is no effect from changes in 
assumptions at the end of the period. Consequently, the ED proposed that 
entities should perform sensitivity analyses for service costs using changes in 
assumptions that were reasonably possible at the start of the reporting period. 
3.3.3.2 Information about the process used to determine demographic 
actuarial assumptions 
Since the IASB intended to keep the requirement under the previous version of 
IAS19 for entities to provide quantified disclosures on actuarial assumptions 
(para. 125G (a)), it believed that it was necessary to provide extensive 
supplementary information that would help to interpret the information disclosed. 
Specifically, the ED proposed that entities should explain how they had 
determined their actuarial assumptions. For example, if an entity had developed 
mortality assumptions using a standard table, it should disclose the source of that 
information and when it was compiled. 
3.3.3.3 Present value of DBO, modified to exclude the effect of projected 
salary growth 
The IASB proposed that entities should disclose DBO excluding projected growth 
in salaries (ABO). According to the IASB’s view, this amount is similar to the 
amount of the entity’s obligation if the plan were to be terminated, and it believed 
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that this information would provide relevant additional information to some users. 
Moreover, it did not think that this information would be costly to provide because 
it would use inputs that were needed to determine DBO. 
3.3.3.4 Information about asset–liability matching strategies 
The ED proposed that entities should disclose details of any asset–liability 
matching strategies used by the plan, including the use of annuities and other 
techniques such as longevity swaps to manage longevity risk. 
Although the IASB initiated this disclosure requirement, it acknowledged that 
many entities would try to mitigate the risk arising from DB plans through their 
investment strategies; thus, such a requirement would result in generic 
disclosures that might not provide enough specific information to be useful to 
financial statement users. 
3.3.3.5 Information about factors that might cause contributions to differ 
from service costs 
The ED proposed that entities should provide a narrative discussion of factors 
that might cause contributions over the next five years to differ significantly from 
current service costs over that period. For example, entities should disclose how 
they expect any surplus or deficit to affect the level and timing of their 
contributions over the next five years, and the period over which they expect the 
surplus or deficit to disappear. 
According to the IASB, the original objective of this requirement was to provide 
an indicator to predict the best estimate of the contributions expected to be paid 
to the plan in the future. However, the IASB also believed that such information 
would be useful if it were to highlight possible differences between current service 
costs and cash contributions in the near future. This might be the case if a surplus 
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or deficit were to affect the level and timing of an entity’s contributions. The IASB 
believed that this would be more useful than merely disclosing expected 
payments in the next year, because those payments depend partly on estimated 
service costs, and also because mere disclosure of the amount would not indicate 
likely trends beyond the following year. 
Question 8 of the ED summarised the objectives of disclosing information about 
entities’ DB plans, and Question 9 asked respondents for their opinions on the 
specific new disclosure requirement in the ED. 
Question 8: The exposure draft states that the objectives of disclosing 
information about an entity’s defined benefit plans are: 
(a) to explain the characteristics of the entity’s defined benefit plans; 
(b) to identify and explain the amounts in the entity’s financial statements 
arising from its defined benefit plans; and 
(c) to describe how defined benefit plans affect the amount, timing and 
variability of the entity’s future cash flows. (Paragraphs 125A and 
BC52–BC59) Are these objectives appropriate? Why or why not? If 
not, how would you amend the objectives and why? 
Question 9: To achieve the disclosure objectives, the exposure draft 
proposes new disclosure requirements, including: 
(a) information about risk, including sensitivity analyses (paragraphs 
125C(b), 125I, BC60(a), BC62(a) and BC63–BC66); 
(b) information about the process used to determine demographic 
actuarial assumptions (paragraphs 125G(b) and BC60(d) and (e)); 
(c) the present value of the defined benefit obligation, modified to exclude 
the effect of projected salary growth (paragraphs 125H and BC60(f)); 
(d) information about asset-liability matching strategies (paragraphs 125J 
and BC62(b)); and 
(e) information about factors that could cause contributions to differ from 
service cost (paragraphs 125K and BC62(c)). 
3.4 Comment Letter Analysis 
This part provides a manual textual analysis on 63 comment letters sent by 
industrial firms in response to the ED of IAS19R. The analysis looks at the 
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answers of these respondents on those questions relate to recognition (questions 
1, 2 and 5), presentation (question 3,6, 7a and 7b) and disclosure (7c, 8, 9 and 
12). The two most significant change of IAS19R, namely the full recognition of 
pension assets/liabilities and elimination of the ERR, will be discussed separately 
in sub-section 3.4.1 and sub-section 3.4.2 respectively. Following sub-sections 
of 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 provide the analysis of presentation and disclosure 
requirement, respectively, of ED 
3.4.1 Recognition of all changes in present value of DBO and fair value of 
plan assets 
The majority of respondents (83%) expressed their support for the proposal and 
agreed with the IASB’s BC. Most acknowledged that application of the full 
recognition proposal would improve the comparability and transparency of 
financial statements. They also supported elimination of the corridor method, as 
the amount of changes recognised in the present value of DBO and the FVPA 
according to the “corridor method” is very arbitrary. Several respondents 
questioned why the corridor needed to be exactly 10 per cent, and why the 
amount outside the corridor should be recognised over the expected average 
remaining working lives of employees. Furthermore, they supported the proposal 
since it would support the alignment of IFRS with US GAAP which was in process 
at that time. 
However, among these supportive respondents, a significant number viewed the 
proposal as a pragmatic solution. Together with respondents who opposed or 
partly agreed, they raised several concerns about the full recognition proposal. 
First, most opposing respondents reminded the IASB about the very long-term 
nature of pension plans. Thus, pension plan accounting based on point-in-time 
market indicators may result in a large amount of short-term volatility that distorts 
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the representational faithfulness of the true economic conditions of a pension plan 
and its ability to fulfil future benefit obligations (Altria comment letter, 2010). 
Moreover, according to Air France–KLM (Calavia, 2010), applying full recognition 
to DBO would lead to volatility in this number on the face of the balance sheet, 
since the discount rate may be very volatile. For example, in the case of Air 
France–KLM, the average discount rate decreased by about 0.75 points between 
31 March 2009 and 31 March 2010, which would increase DBO by 1.5 billion 
Euros. Company policy (strategy, management, etc.) has no impact on external 
factors such as the discount rate, which is more driven by the global economy 
(Calavia, 2010). This does not appear to be a particularly strong argument; all 
companies are impacted to some extent by developments in the global economy, 
airlines as much as any. 
The comment letter from British American Tobacco Holdings (BAT) addressed 
the same concern that “point in time” valuations of pension assets and liabilities 
are extremely volatile, and this volatility does not reflect the underlying business 
impact nor the way in which items are managed (BAT comment letter, 2010). 
Most respondents in the sample supported removal of the corridor method as 
they did not believe there was a “sound conceptual basis” for its application 
(AngloAmerican comment letter, 2010). Bayer’s comment letter argued that 
“there is no specific reason why the corridor should be exactly 10% or why the 
amount outside the corridor should be recognized over the expected average 
remaining working lives of the employees” (Bayer comment letter, 2010). 
However, removal of the corridor method would be equivalent to removing the 
smoothing mechanism from the balance sheet, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Entities that would experience a significant impact from this change had an 
incentive to resist this proposal. For example, British Airways claimed that: 
the abolition of the “corridor method” would add to the confusion 
surrounding accounting for defined benefit schemes since the use of the 
corridor approach takes into consideration that in the long term, actuarial 
gains and losses may offset one another. It allows a portion of the actuarial 
gains/losses outside of the corridor to be spread over the expected active 
life of the employees (British Airways comment letter, 2010). 
However, British Airways, during the years of 2009 and 2010, had attempted to 
fix deficits in its DB pension schemes. According to Croft and Powley (2015), in 
2010, British Airways agreed not to pay dividends for at least two years because, 
in December 2009, the company deficit had deepened from £1.9 to £3.7 billion. 
This suggests that the company used this opportunity to lobby the accounting 
standard setter and sought to avoid full recognition of pension deficits on its 
balance sheet, consistent with the Positive Accounting Theory argument. 
Additionally, their argument regard to the increase of confusion if the “corridor 
method” is eliminated is very disingenuous since it has been argued by 
academics that the “corridor method” was a source of confusion since it allowed 
sponsor to keep part of net pension assets/ liabilities off-balance sheet. 
Second, the IASB itself admitted that there were still 
... unresolved issues that relate to performance reporting including: (1) 
whether financial performance included those items that are recognised 
directly in equity; (2) the conceptual basis for determining whether items 
are recognised in the income statement or direct in equity; (3) whether net 
cumulative actuarial losses should be recognised in the income statement, 
rather than directly in equity; and (4) Whether certain items reported 
initially in equity should subsequently be reported in the income statement 
(recycling) (BC 41, IAS19 Exposure Draft, 2010). 
Thus, some opposing respondents urged the IASB to review the concept of 
“presentation of financial statements” (IAS1) prior to revising IAS19. Air France–
KLM suggested that a clear definition of net income and OCI would enable easier 
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discussion of revisions to other standards. It emphasised that this clear definition 
should be a prerequisite for revision of IAS19. It also believed that the wide range 
of existing regulations, markets and legal forms in the definition of pension plans 
should be taken into consideration prior to applying the concept of fair value to 
long-term employee benefit reporting. Similarly, BAT raised a concern about the 
need for a fundamental review of pension accounting and, in particular, the linked 
issues of measurement and performance reporting. 
In some other comment letters, respondents suggested that the IASB should 
consider differences between and uses of net income and OCI by proposing a 
presentation model that would generally reflect recurring activities in net income 
and non-recurring activities in OCI (Constellation Energy comment letter, 2010). 
Third, many respondents shared concerns about the impact of the ED on their 
financial statements and, ultimately, on their firms’ management activities. Air 
France–KLM feared that, as a consequence of the ED, management of funding 
would be driven by accounting rules rather than management rules (decisions led 
by economic factors). In relation to pension assets being valued at fair value, all 
variation is immediately recognised. Thus, according to Air France–KLM, when a 
company chooses to manage its pension funds dynamically (for example, to align 
with the age of participants), varying levels of funds are invested in stocks. Stock 
returns are rarely in line with the “expected return on assets” rate on a yearly 
basis but, on average over a long period, the return on assets is close to the 
expected return on assets. Thus, if the assets were required to be recorded at 
their fair value, major impacts would be recorded on the balance sheet each year. 
For example, Air France–KLM’s pension fund amounted to €13,487 million as of 
31 March 2010. The difference between the actual and expected return on assets 
amounted to €2,788 million for the year ending 31 March 2010 and €1,854 million 
 100 
for the year ending 31 March 2009. Respondents from Air France–KLM argued 
that this situation would lead to solutions where managers would try to avoid such 
“up and down” movements and invest pension funds only in bonds in order to 
secure the level of funds. It is easy to understand why managers may prefer not 
to have to recognise such significant divergences between actual and expected 
returns on their balance sheets. But it is hard to believe that investors could not 
consider such divergences to be relevant, regardless of accounting treatment. 
Similarly, Altria raised a concern about short-term volatility, which might distort 
the representational faithfulness of the true economic conditions of a pension plan 
and its ability to fulfil future benefit obligations. In addition, it believed that 
accounting for such long-term benefit arrangements should not result in the 
unintended consequence of plan sponsors trying to manage the effects of short-
term volatility, thereby sub-optimising long-term investment returns and cash 
contribution policies. However, its 2010 financial statement showed that 58 per 
cent of its pension plan investment was in equities, with only 20 per cent in 
corporate bonds. This may therefore have been a disingenuous comment, as the 
company seemed to want to have the flexibility to invest heavily in equities with 
no obligation to report the inevitable short-term volatility in asset values. 
AMX highlighted the impact of the proposal on entities’ financial statements. 
According to its response, entities would be expected to report lower net income, 
have lower net income volatility but higher OCI and retained earnings volatility, 
and recognise larger liabilities or smaller assets in their statements of financial 
position. It also feared that the proposals might cause entities to become more 
conservative in their investment strategies relating to DB plans, which might lead 
to higher costs of providing the associated benefits. 
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Beside the potential impact of ED on financial statements, interim reporting was 
one of the most contentious issues raised by many respondents. Specifically, IBM 
was concerned because plan re-measurements (including demographic updates, 
determining liability assumptions, and obtaining asset valuations for illiquid plan 
assets) may take several months to complete for large plans. Under US GAAP, 
companies that comply with US SEC requirements for quarterly filings do not 
perform quarterly re-measurements of pension costs unless a material change to 
the plan has occurred. According to IBM, these re-measurements are performed 
annually and are used as a basis for the following year’s pension costs. Also, 
given the very tight deadlines for quarterly reporting with the SEC in the US (40 
days for large, accelerated filers) and the fact that many companies release key 
financial data within weeks of the quarter close, they did not believe that full 
quarterly re-measurement would be practical, especially for multinational 
companies with numerous plans worldwide and in countries that may not have 
the actuarial infrastructure to support this increase in workload (IBM comment 
letter, 2010). 
Chevron Corporation viewed the requirement for such interim re-measurement 
as representing a significant change from current measurement practices, 
particularly for entities using the “corridor method”. It suggested that the IASB 
should consider clarifying this issue, either in IAS19 or in paragraph C4 of IAS34: 
Interim Financial Reporting, to identify the types of events that an entity should 
consider as triggers for re-measurement of benefit obligations and plan assets 
(Chevron comment letter, 2010). 
Moreover, many respondents doubted the relevance of quarterly re-
measurement and whether the benefits would be worth the additional costs, given 
the long-term nature of net obligations and net assets. All of them suggested that 
 102 
the IASB should limit re-measurement to an annual requirement. They believed 
that this would reduce the cost of complying with IFRS (and US GAAP), while at 
the same time significantly improving the benefits to both the company and 
investors (CIGNA, Entergy, Exxon Mobil, Goodyear, IBM, PepsiCo, Pfizer, PPL, 
Rayonier, Raytheon, Telefonos de Mexico, US Steel Corporation, United 
Technologies and Verizon Communications comment letters, 2010). 
3.4.2 Recognition of financial costs and elimination of ERR 
Most respondents (81%) were opposed to the proposal to recognise financial 
costs and eliminate ERR, and argued that the BC was insufficiently convincing. 
In particular, in opposing the IASB’s opinion that ERR is susceptible to 
management manipulation, many respondents argued that it involves no more or 
less judgment than any other pension assumption. Thus, elimination and 
replacement of ERR with the discount rate would essentially swap one estimate 
for another, while judgement would be involved in either case (Alcoa, Nestlé and 
Progress Energy comment letters, 2010). Such comments can be criticised; bond 
yields provide a clear basis for the discount rate assumption, and other 
assumptions can be appropriately benchmarked, for example mortality 
assumptions to mortality tables and salary growth rates to published data. 
In addition, many respondents shared their confidence in the process of 
determining the ERR. For example, Eli Lilly stated that its assumptions were 
reviewed and approved by various internal and third-party organisations, 
including actuaries and internal and external auditors. Similarly, to other public 
companies, it was also subject to oversight by the SEC (Eli Lilly comment letter, 
2010). 
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Some respondents also added that changes to ERR assumptions should not 
occur often. They agreed that assumptions about ERR on plan assets are 
principles-based assessments that should be encouraged, as opposed to being 
prescriptive. Moreover, accounting for pensions involves more subjectivity than 
virtually any other area of accounting, so the expected return should not be 
singled out as something different (BAT comment letter, 2010). 
Several respondents oppose to the IASB basis of conclusion used to address the 
issue of “anti-abuse clauses”, that is the elimination of the ERR is a solution to fix 
the opportunistic assumption of this rate. They argued that this issue should be a 
problem for regulators and auditors. Thus, this should not be a basis for standard 
setting (Nestlé and Siemens comment letters, 2010). 
Although these comments had the merit of addressing the reliability of the ERR, 
previous empirical evidence reveals that managers of sponsor firms do behave 
opportunistically when determining the ERR on pension assets (Amir and 
Benartzi, 1998; Li and Klumpes, 2007). Most sponsor firms have ERRs higher 
than the discount rate; thus, elimination of the ERR would lead to increases in 
pension expenses recognised in the P&L. These factors may have influenced 
their lobbying against the proposal. 
Some respondents shared opinions that differed from the IASB’s view that 
changes in the value of any asset may be split between an amount that arises 
from the passage of time and other changes. Alcoa believed that the concept of 
a return due to the “passage of time” is vastly different when looking at bonds 
versus equities. It argued that the current yield on bonds is clearly achievable 
simply by holding the bonds until maturity, whatever that maturity may be. The 
expected return on equities, on the other hand, has no equivalent fixed “passage 
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of time” component, as dividend payments are not contractual to equities as 
interest payments are to bonds. Thus, this lack of a true “passage of time” return 
component in equities is, in fact, the basis for the higher returns that are 
achievable and observable in that asset class versus bonds (Alcoa comment 
letter, 2010). This was an effective counter argument to the IASB’s view that “the 
change in value of any asset can be divided into an amount that arises from the 
passage of time and other changes” (BC24, IAS19 Exposure Draft, 2010). 
In addition, BAT stated that the liability charge reflects the unwinding of the 
discount (a true time value of money), while the asset effect should be different 
as it should reflect returns on various assets, i.e. the investment strategy. Thus, 
it did not see matching the “time value of money” for assets as being an 
improvement on use of the “expected return” in the previous version of IAS19 
(BAT comment letter, 2010). 
In addition, an argument raised in relation to the pension obligations part of net 
interest cost calculations was that the use of high-quality corporate bonds reflects 
not only the time value of money, but also a credit risk element above government 
bonds (Norsk Hydro comment letter, 2010). Thus, respondents believed that the 
IASB would not achieve its goal of reflecting only the net effect of the passage of 
time. According to the IASB’s argument, a risk-free rate would be more 
appropriate. 
The most significant issue raised by respondents generally related to the “true 
and fair view” of pension accounting as a result of this proposal. Air France–KLM 
argued that management policy would not be reflected in income statements. For 
example, whether funds were allocated 100 per cent to stocks or 100 per cent to 
bonds, the same rate would be used to record the impact in the income 
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statement. Many other respondents claimed that this method would ignore the 
economic realities of their plans and permanently exclude from the determination 
of pension expenses the excess returns that have historically been shown to be 
achieved by equities as opposed to bonds (see Table 2, Panel A). Specifically, 
AngloAmerican worried that this change would result in a net interest calculation 
that would not reflect actual circumstances, and would therefore be of less value 
to financial statement users. It also believed that this change would not support 
the IASB’s aim of increasing comparability across companies. These entities 
implicitly emphasise management perceptions of the important role of net income 
over OCI and comprehensive income numbers. The IASB’s view was that, 
although it acknowledged that this accounting treatment would not present a “true 
and fair view” of pension expenses represented in P&L statements, the economic 
substance of transactions would still be recognised in comprehensive income 
numbers. These arguments suggested the incentive for boosting net income 
through higher ERRs, as previously discussed. 
Furthermore, the use of a very volatile “spot rate”, not linked to plan assets, to 
calculate a long-term return is inconsistent with the need to calculate a very long-
term expected return (Calavia, 2010). But this argument appears to ignore the 
requirement that the discount rate is supposed to be based on the yield on bonds 
which match the duration of pension obligations. 
Some respondents used this opportunity to raise concerns about the practical 
issue of discount rates in countries where there is no deep market for high-quality 
corporate bonds. For example, in New Zealand there is no deep market, so 
Fletcher Building would have to use the government bond rate to represent the 
high-quality bond rate (Fletcher Building comment letter, 2010). The strong 
opposition expressed in its comment letter may have been because the earnings 
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rate in its pension plan is much higher than the government bond rate; thus, the 
impact of the new proposal would significantly under-state income and over-state 
expenses. 
Finally, some respondents warned the IASB that elimination of the requirement 
to incorporate an ERR on plan assets in the P&L might lead entities to alter their 
investment strategies to manage actual performance to the discount rate. In turn, 
investment strategies limited to discount-rate performance might inhibit plan 
sponsors’ ability to manage pension assets in the most financially disciplined 
manner, and might become detrimental to companies’ shareholders. As such, 
strategies would be likely to require additional benefit plan funding in excess of 
that required when investing for the long term in a mix of equities and fixed-
income securities (See Table 2, Panel A). This argument appears to imply that 
companies lack confidence in the governance procedures around their own 
pension funds to determine appropriate investment strategies. Some 
respondents also raised concerns about potentially broader capital market 
considerations if pension plans were to begin to move out of investments in equity 
securities. 
3.4.3 Presentation 
3.4.3.1 Disaggregation and presentation of pension expense components 
Sixty-five per cent of respondents from industrial companies supported the 
proposal to require disaggregation of pension expenses into three components. 
Most of those opposed to the proposal argued that DB costs are a component of 
total compensation and should be displayed consistently with other employee 
compensation costs. Interest and service costs are direct costs of providing these 
compensation benefits and should be reported as operating expenses in the 
current period. Air France–KLM believed that presenting these several cost 
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components as an aggregated item under a single heading would allow financial 
statement users to identify the impact of pension costs in one line (Calavia, 2010). 
Nevertheless, many supporters of the proposal disagreed with this argument 
since they believed that the disaggregated presentation of pension expenses 
would improve rather than diminish financial statement users’ understanding. 
In its comment letter, Nestlé also lobbied against this proposal and explained that 
its income statement is presented by function, where readers expect treasury-
related activities to be shown within finance costs rather than pension-related 
interest costs. However, this argument was quite specific to Nestlé. 
Progress Energy also opposed the proposal and suggested that the components 
of DB costs should be disclosed in notes. It believed that this would be sufficient 
to enable financial statement users to unravel the complexity of pension 
expenses. 
Many other respondents agreed with the IASB about the presentation of re-
measurement in OCI, but they still suggested that the service and interest cost 
components of pension expenses should not be separated. For example, Jardine 
Matheson raised a concern that the proposed form of presentation might distort 
users’ understanding of a company’s financial performance. For example, it 
would affect certain performance indicators, such as interest cover. Interest cover 
takes into account the net interest expenses/income on net pension plans (which 
bears no direct relationship to companies’ financing structure), distorting 
assessment of companies’ ability to pay interest on outstanding debts. This 
argument would not be approved by many academics or practitioners, since 
several previous studies have found that pension plans should be viewed as part 
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of a company’s capital structure (Klumpes, 2001; Glaum, 2009; Kiosse et al., 
2007; Klumpes and Whittington, 2003. 
Many other respondents expressed the opinion that presenting service and 
interest costs together would allow financial statement users to identify the full 
cost of pension programmes (AMX, Canada Poster Corporation and Infosys 
Technologies comment letters, 2010). 
With regard to the principle of presentation, many respondents questioned the 
IASB’s rationale for determining what to present within or outside net income, and 
when and on what basis to recycle items in order to ensure that users are 
provided with useful net income figures. 
Although, the IASB stated that development of these principles was still in 
progress, respondents said that they chose to base the presentation of their 
financial statements on two main principles. Most believed that it is a sound 
principle that all management decisions should be reflected at some time in the 
net result (income statement), which continues to be the principal performance 
measure (See Table 2, Panel B). Therefore, the provision of additional benefits 
to employees and choices to invest in different kinds of plan assets are 
management decisions, the effects of which should all ultimately be reflected in 
net income. These respondents appreciated the importance of “recycling”. They 
argued that a change in an asset or liability may not be relevant to performance 
analysis in one period, but may be relevant to such analysis in a later period. 
Recycling is the only way to guarantee the relevance of net income in a context 
where values recognised in statements of financial position do not always 
represent an entity’s business model. 
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In its comment letter, Altria argued that failure to recognise the impact of re-
measurement through the P&L in subsequent periods might be misleading to 
financial statement users with regard to the true cost of DB plans. For example, 
if an entity’s benefit plan were to lose a significant portion of its asset value in a 
particular period, the change in asset value, net of amounts in net interest costs, 
would be reflected in OCI in the period of occurrence. However, if the entity 
funded the asset losses within the same period to return the benefit plan to its 
original funded position, the future net interest costs in the P&L would remain 
unchanged, and therefore the true cost of the asset losses would never be 
reflected through the P&L (Altria comment letter, 2010). 
The “recycling” method applied to re-measurement amounts does not strictly 
uphold the principle of recognising all management decisions in income 
statements. Re-measurement amounts may be divided into actuarial gains and 
losses associated with plan obligations and the difference between expected and 
actual returns on plan assets. The actual return on plan assets may reflect at 
some level the performance of managers. However, actuarial gains and losses 
relating to pension obligations are the result of changes in macro assumptions; 
therefore, only amounts relating to the performance of management should be 
recycled back to the P&L statement in subsequent periods. Some respondents 
tried to persuade the IASB that “actuarial gains and losses associated with the 
plan obligation should be treated similarly to actual returns on plan assets” 
(Entergy Corporation comment letter, 2010). Thus, they suggested that the 
“recycling” method should be applied to the whole amount of re-measurement. 
In contrast, some other respondents believed that income statements should only 
reflect recurring activities, while OCI should contain non-recurring activities. 
These respondents supported the presentation of re-measurement in OCI. They 
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argued that, by including all recurring items in OCI, presentation of the net amount 
of profits or losses would avoid volatility arising from economic events and offer 
financial statement users more relevant information. Also, some effects of such 
events may be expected to be reversed over time (Bayer, Constellation Energy, 
Larsen and Toubro comment letters, 2010). However, Bayer still emphasised that 
“a clear policy on the recycling … should be developed in the long term” (Bayer 
comment letter, 2010). 
Other respondents exploited their answers to these questions to lobby against 
abolition of the corridor method and elimination of the ERR. Altria argued that the 
“corridor method” for recognition of re-measurement amounts in the P&L through 
a systematic and rational method of amortisation more faithfully represents the 
long-term economic impact of DB plans which, by their nature, are long-term 
arrangements. Also, it stated that the “corridor method” is similar to other long-
term arrangements such as debt, which require amortisation of premiums and 
discounts. However, it did not suggest that the corridor method has different 
accounting implications. That is, it would allow managers to keep part of the net 
amount of pension liabilities/assets off the balance sheet and smooth the pension 
accounting numbers. 
Other respondents used this opportunity to re-emphasise their opposition to the 
elimination of the ERR. Canada Poster Corporation raised a concern that the 
predictive value of finance costs shown on a standalone basis would be further 
reduced by the use of a discount rate rather than the ERR if the IASB required 
sponsor firms to present service and interest costs separately in P&L statements. 
3.4.3.2 Settlements and curtailments 
The IASB defines a curtailment as either: 
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(a) A significant reduction in the number of employees covered by a plan; or 
(b) An amendment to the terms of a DB plan so that a significant element of 
future service by current employees will no longer qualify for benefits, or will 
qualify only for reduced benefits. (IAS19, 2011, para. 105) 
A non-routine settlement is a transaction (other than routine payment of benefits 
to or on behalf of employees) that eliminates all further legal or constructive 
obligations for part or all of the benefits provided under a DB plan. 
Thirty-five per cent of respondents in the sample did not entirely agree with the 
IASB’s proposal on routine and non-routine settlements. Some of these 
respondents argued that differences between the settlement price and DBO are 
not entirely the result of re-measurement, since part of such differences will reflect 
a transfer of the risk of the obligations (premium payments, etc.). Specifically, 
they agreed with the IASB about the treatment of routine settlement gains and 
losses as part of re-measurement. However, they considered non-routine 
settlements to be more likely to arise from the direct action of reporting entities, 
with many similarities to curtailments (AstraZeneca, Deutsche Post DHL and Eli 
Lilly comment letters, 2010). 
Nestlé suggested that if management were to decide to close a plant for strategic 
or other reasons, then the impact of this event on pension obligations should be 
recorded in the income statement since it would reflect an event relating to 
management actions. Again, it claimed that it would be premature to decide on 
whether this should flow through OCI and not the income statement because 
“performance” had not been properly defined by the IASB. 
In addition, BASF stated that neither plan participants nor third parties would carry 
out settlement transactions that provided neither a risk premium nor a profit 
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margin. Therefore, the difference between the settlement price and the DBO at 
the settlement date, as if the plan were continued and paid out by the plan 
sponsor, is not entirely the result of re-measurement. Similarly, to Nestlé, it 
argued that at least part of the difference reflects compensation for the transfer 
of the risk of uncertain future cash flows. 
Other respondents raised a concern that distinguishing between curtailments and 
settlements is sometimes very complex. Both curtailments and non-routine 
settlements are likely to arise from actions of the company (rather than actions of 
an individual pension scheme member), and they believed that it would be more 
appropriate to record such corporate actions in the P&L. Many other firms (e.g. 
Bayer, BT, Deutsche Post DHL, ING, PPL and Shell) also noted that, in practice, 
a transaction may have characteristics of both non-routine settlement and 
curtailment. They therefore argued that it might not be possible or meaningful to 
allocate resulting gains or losses between P&L for curtailments and OCI for non-
routine settlements. They suggested that curtailments and non-routine 
settlements should be treated similarly and reported in OCI. Nevertheless, in their 
comment letters, they failed to illustrate their arguments with any examples. 
Regarding the accounting treatment of curtailments, most respondents agreed 
with the IASB’s proposal. They agreed that curtailments should be treated in the 
same way as plan amendments, with gains and losses presented in the P&L. 
According to their comment letters, curtailments are very similar to past service 
costs in that they reflect decisions made by management, which should be 
reflected in the P&L. 
On the other hand, Ford offered a different view, stating that plan amendments 
are different from curtailment transactions. It argued that plan amendments are 
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often initiated through employee/employer negotiations, and change employees’ 
expectations of the level of future benefit payments from the employer. Plan 
amendments may be positive or negative. In contrast, curtailments, like 
settlements, are triggered by actions taken by the plan sponsor, and permanently 
reduce or eliminate benefits. 
Although some other respondents agreed with the IASB that curtailments should 
be treated in the same way as plan amendments, they believed that amounts 
relating to curtailment, prior service costs and other plan amendments are 
significant events requiring re-measurement; therefore, these amounts should be 
components of OCI rather than P&L (URS and PepsiCo comment letters, 2010). 
In addition, FirstEnergy argued that, owing to the long-term nature of pension 
obligations, they will not be satisfied for many years. Therefore, it believed that 
reporting the effects of settlements and curtailments in current earnings would 
not reflect the economics of long-term pension obligations (FirstEnergy comment 
letter, 2010). These arguments appear to represent lobbying activities, since the 
respondents were trying to convince the IASB to recognise all curtailments and 
settlements together in the OCI, without providing any underlying justification for 
their arguments. 
3.4.4 Disclosure 
In general, most respondents supported the objectives of disclosure as 
suggested by the proposal. However, many raised concerns about the volume of 
new disclosures on DB plans proposed in the ED. AstraZeneca warned the IASB 
that such a volume of disclosures would reduce the understandability and 
usefulness of financial statements by obscuring important information. Although 
it recognised that certain current disclosure requirements were removed in the 
ED, it believed that the level of proposed additional disclosure requirements more 
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than outweighed the volume of disclosures no longer required. It recommended 
that the IASB should review the level of mandated disclosures to further reduce 
their excessive volume (AstraZeneca comment letter, 2010). 
Similarly, BAT accused the IASB of supporting excessive disclosure. Relating to 
the IASB’s argument that the new disclosure requirement would not be costly to 
produce and would therefore pose no problems (paras 125H and BC60f), it 
argued that if the logic used by the IASB in deciding to include disclosure was 
deemed acceptable, then a whole series of further requirements could be justified 
in many different standards (BAT comment letter, 2010). 
Some other respondents considered the new disclosure requirements to be 
highly technical and difficult to understand for most financial statement users. Of 
the five new disclosure requirements in the ED, the requirement on risk, including 
sensitivity analyses, attracted the highest rate of support (40%), although 
respondents raised several concerns. Most of those opposed were worried that 
sensitivity analysis might be impractical. For example, Altria argued that 
sensitivity analyses might not be warranted because the necessary information 
could not be extrapolated due to the non-linear nature of some factors relating to 
the PBO and service costs, and that such information might mislead financial 
statement users who do not understand relationships between significant 
assumptions (Altria comment letter, 2010). 
Similarly, BASF argued that interrelationships between various parameters of 
actuarial assumptions would negatively impact on the validity and predictive 
value of the proposed sensitivity analyses. Due to these interrelationships, 
actuarial assumptions should be defined as mutually compatible, and consistency 
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is particularly important for assumptions about inflation, discount rates and salary 
growth (BASF comment letter, 2010). 
In line with BASF, Chevron believed that the proposed analysis would be difficult 
to apply in practice, as it would require entities to identify “reasonable possible” 
changes in actuarial assumptions. It suggested that, rather than focusing on 
selecting the types of changes to present, the analysis should focus on providing 
users with an understanding of the impact of specific changes in assumptions 
and allowing users to use this information to model their own “reasonably 
possible” scenarios. Sensitivity information should be provided on changes in the 
discount rate using a consistent parameter, for example one per cent for changes 
to benefit costs and a quarter per cent for changes to benefit obligations. It 
believed that this would provide users with comparable information between 
periods, as well as providing users with information to model their own scenarios. 
Other respondents suggested that the analysis should be limited to the most 
significant sensitivity, i.e. discount rates on DBO (see Table 2, Panel C). Hydro-
Québec suggested that sensitivity analysis should be used for net amounts 
recognised on balance sheets, not for benefit obligations or service costs (Hydro-
Québec comment letter, 2010). 
Fletcher Building stated that sensitivity analysis would be extremely complex for 
groups that have many plans across a number of countries. As they all have 
different discount rates, different salary growth projects and different mortality 
rates, it did not see how any meaningful sensitivity analysis could be conducted 
across these plans (Fletcher Building comment letter, 2010). 
Most respondents commented negatively on the other proposed disclosure 
requirements, including the process used to determine actuarial assumptions, 
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ABO disclosure, asset–liability matching strategy and factors that cause 
contributions to differ from service costs. In its comment letter, AngloAmerican 
argued that a significant element of the process used to determine actuarial 
assumptions would be generic across many companies, and this disclosure 
requirement would be unlikely to present any beneficial information. Furthermore, 
its inclusion might result in significant generic information being included, making 
key information more difficult to identify (AngloAmerican comment letter, 2010). 
Chevron added that actuaries use relatively standard processes to develop most 
of these assumptions. Therefore, this information might not be relevant to 
investors as it would not provide any entity-specific information and would add to 
the already extensive disclosures on DB plans (Chevron comment letter, 2010). 
The requirement to disclose the present value of DBO, modified to exclude the 
effect of projected salary growth (ABO), received extensive and negative 
comments. Balfour Beatty stated that the disclosure of ABO would not provide 
any decision-useful information. In addition, it argued that disclosure of two 
figures for the present value of DBO, one of which excludes a factor that is almost 
certain to occur, would be confusing to many readers of financial statements 
(Balfour Beatty comment letter, 2010). Other respondents also stated that, in 
many countries, legal or practical reasons make a plan settlement or freezing 
impossible or impracticable; therefore, this sort of disclosure requirement might 
be misleading at a group level. 
Few respondents agreed with the IASB regarding the requirement to disclose 
asset–liability matching strategies. First, they argued that such disclosures are 
highly technical and might mislead financial statement users. AngloAmerican also 
believed that this requirement would be likely to result in generic information 
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across companies and would be of limited value (AngloAmerican comment letter, 
2010). 
In addition, British Airways commented that decisions about asset–liability 
matching strategies are the responsibility of pension fund trustees, whereas 
financial statements are the responsibility of company directors. Thus, disclosing 
information about matching strategies within financial statements would overlap 
with trustees’ responsibilities and would therefore be inappropriate.  
Similarly, AstraZeneca argued that the investment strategies of many DB 
schemes are not determined by the sponsoring company but by the trustees of 
the pension scheme. Thus, disclosure of asset–liability matching strategies would 
create a misleading impression to financial statement users that the preparing 
company had a greater influence over the pension fund investment strategy than 
might in reality be the case. AstraZeneca claimed that such disclosures would be 
excessive and not in accordance with the stated aim of the IASB in publishing the 
ED to simplify information for financial statement users. Therefore, other 
respondents suggested that such information should be disclosed only if material 
(AstraZeneca comment letter, 2010), although it is difficult to believe that they 
could not be. Responses of this type are arguably disingenuous, as for most 
schemes in the UK sponsoring companies have the power to nominate the 
majority of trustees (see table 3). Therefore, these sponsor firms would have 
significant power to influence trustee boards and the strategies adopted by 
trustees, so users would find such disclosures valuable. 
Regarding the disclosure requirement for factors that might cause contributions 
to differ from service costs, many respondents raised a concern that this proposal 
was too wide and would lead to a boilerplate list of risks. They also worried about 
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the practical application of this proposal. In particular, BASF argued that 
multinational entities usually have many different plans in many jurisdictions. 
Therefore, on a consolidated basis, adequacy of funding could not be judged by 
using the proposed funding ratio. Reliable conclusions regarding the adequacy 
of funding and future funding ability should be derived from the overall financing 
situation of the reporting entity, which is described in cash flow statements and in 
the discussion and analysis of management reports. BASF believed that 
disclosures on future benefit payments would also be more useful than the 
proposed narrative discussion. It further argued that comparison is only 
meaningful for fully-funded plans. For pension plans operating in the US or the 
UK, where the objective of full funding dominates, the requested narrative 
discussion might help to draw useful conclusions. However, many companies 
outside these regions, particularly in Europe, apply different funding approaches 
(BASF comment letter, 2010). 
Several respondents disagreed with the IASB on the requirement to combine 
disclosure under the “old” IAS19 post-employment benefits (e.g. pensions) with 
other employee benefits (e.g. jubilee payments) under the “new” (i.e. ED) long-
term employee benefits, which would cause significant additional work and costs 
for companies. Since typical liabilities and provisions for such “other long-term 
employee benefits” are much smaller than those for pensions, they did not believe 
that this would justify the additional costs, work and disclosure pages required. 
(Deutsche Post DHL comment letter, 2010). 
In general, most respondents opposed the IASB’s proposals for disclosure and 
claimed that the level of disclosure relating to pension plans at that time were 
sufficient. Adding any additional requirements would be very costly for 
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companies, and these costs would exceed the benefits of the new disclosure 
requirements, which many entities failed to recognise in these new proposals. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In June 2011, the IASB published IAS19R, which implemented significant 
changes to the recognition, presentation and disclosure of employee benefit 
accounting in financial statements. 
These changes had a significant impact on (1) how sponsor firms recognise net 
pension assets/liabilities on the balance sheet, (2) the calculation and recognition 
of pension expenses, (3) the presentation of re-measurement (actuarial gains 
and losses), the various treatments of which under the previous IAS19 had been 
heavily debated by academics and practitioners on their various treatments under 
the previous IAS19, and (4) the level and volume of disclosures on pension 
schemes, which had been criticised as “excessive” under the previous version of 
IAS19. 
Relating to the first and third points, full recognition of all changes in the present 
value of DBO and in the FVPA when they occur effectively removed application 
of the corridor method, which was a smoothing mechanism for net pension 
assets/liabilities and pension expenses under the previous IAS19. This had a 
significant impact on companies who used the corridor method to keep actuarial 
gains and losses off the balance sheet. These entities must recognise actuarial 
gains and losses in full on their balance sheets under OCI. 
The second point addressed the requirement regarding how sponsor firms 
calculate and recognise pension expenses. That is, it had an impact on the 
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calculation of expected returns on pension plan assets, as it replaced the ERR 
with a discount rate, and thus had an impact on reported profits. 
The ED also added significant new requirements for sponsor firms’ disclosure on 
pension schemes. These new disclosures included: (1) information about risk, 
including sensitivity analyses; (2) information about the process used to 
determine demographic actuarial assumptions; (3) the present value of DBO 
modified to exclude the effect of projected salary growth; (4) information about 
asset–liability matching strategies; and (5) information about factors that might 
cause contributions to differ from service costs. 
This study has conducted analysis of comment letters sent by 63 industrial firms 
on the ED preceding IAS19R. It aimed to shed light on the common arguments 
presented by industrial sponsor firms, the comprehensive economic 
consequences of IAS19R, and whether lobbying behaviours were driven by the 
self-interests of senders based on Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986) Positive 
Accounting Theory. 
Most respondents supported the proposal to recognise all changes in DBO and 
in the FVPA when those changes occur. However, they raised several issues 
relating to the proposal. First, they reminded the IASB about the very long-term 
nature of pension liabilities. Thus, pension plan accounting based on point-in-
time market indicators might result in a large amount of short-term volatility that 
would distort the representational faithfulness of the true economic conditions of 
pension plans and the financial and economic impact on sponsoring employers 
and their ability to fulfil future benefit obligations. Second, respondents also 
worried about the impact of this accounting proposal on the investment decisions 
of sponsor firms. In particular, they warned the IASB that this situation would lead 
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to a solution whereby sponsoring employers would try to avoid fluctuations and 
invest pension funds only in bonds in order to secure the level of funds. 
In addition to the potential impact of the ED on financial statements, interim 
reporting was one of the most controversial issues raised by many respondents. 
The proposal would lead to re-measurement of pension items every three 
months, rather than annual interim reporting. This would quadruple the cost of 
preparing pension items. Thus, the respondents urged the Board to revise the 
proposal and suggested that requirement for interim reports on an annual basis 
would be more appropriate. 
Another issue raised by both supporters and opposers related to revision of the 
concept in IAS1: Financial Statements and performance reporting. In particular, 
they urged the Board to revise and develop the basis on which items should be 
reported in either net income or OCI as a long-term development of pension 
accounting. 
In relation to elimination of the ERR, many respondents opposed the proposal. 
The biggest issue raised by most respondents related to the implications for the 
“true and fair view” of pension accounting, as management policy would not be 
reflected in income statements. Specifically, reporting of interest income using a 
discount rate, typically based on market yields on high-quality bonds, on a mix of 
assets that might be heavily weighted toward equities, for example, would not 
provide clarity to financial statement users. 
Furthermore, the use of a “spot” rate, unlinked to plan assets, would represent 
only a snapshot of a rate at a single point in time to calculate a long-term return, 
which would be inconsistent. Respondents believed this spot rate to be very 
volatile and therefore unsuitable for calculating a very long-term expected return. 
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In addition, the spot rate also raised debate because according to standard 
requirement, a yield on bond with duration similar to the one of pension liability 
should be used as discount rate, although, in practice, such bonds might not exist. 
Determination of discount rates relies mainly on the respective interpretations of 
management and various audit and actuarial firms. Moreover, it seriously affects 
comparability between pension plans operating in countries where there is or is 
not a deep market for high-quality bonds. For example, pension plans in deep 
markets for bonds, such as the UK, the US, Japan and part of the EU, would 
report materially lower pension liabilities than companies in much of Asia for 
reasons that are impossible to explain to most financial statement users. 
Third, many respondents opposed the Board’s BC in relation to the argument that 
ERR is susceptible to management manipulation. Based on their own 
experience, they stated that the process of estimating this rate was subject to 
many stages of verification and supervision. Therefore, they believed in the 
reliability of the ERR, regardless of many previous studies documenting the issue 
of opportunistic selection of ERR by sponsor firms (Amir and Benartzi, 1998; Li 
and Klumpes, 2007). 
The Board’s BC on separating returns on assets into value relating to the 
“passage of time” and “other” value also attracted many comments. Respondents 
argued that the “passage of time” values of equities and bonds are different in 
nature; thus, it is inappropriate to use a discount rate for pension plan assets 
which have components of both equities and bonds. 
In relation to the issue of presentation in financial statements, respondents 
focused on two main principles. Some believed that it is a sound principle that all 
management decisions should be reflected at some time in net results (income 
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statements), which continues to be the principal performance measure. In 
particular, the ED proposal to present re-measurement in OCI was inappropriate 
without the application of “recycling”. Re-measurement also includes actual 
returns on plan assets, which respondents believed are the result of management 
performance. Therefore, this re-measurement should be recognised at least once 
in net income. 
In contrast, some other respondents believed that income statements should only 
reflect recurring activities, and OCI should contain non-recurring activities. These 
respondents supported the presentation of re-measurement in OCI. However, 
they also urged the Board to develop the principle of “recycling” as a long-term 
plan for pension accounting. 
With regard to the proposal on settlements and curtailments, many respondents 
raised a concern that distinguishing between curtailments and non-routine 
settlements is sometimes very complex. In practice, a transaction may have 
characteristics of both a non-routine settlement and a curtailment, and therefore 
it may not be possible or meaningful to allocate resulting gains or losses between 
P&L for a curtailment and OCI for a non-routine settlement. 
In general, most respondents supported the objectives of disclosure as 
suggested by the ED proposals. However, most were worried about the volume 
of the proposed new disclosures in relation to DB plans. They recommended that 
the Board review the level of mandated disclosures to reduce their excessive 
volume. In particular, they recommended that sensitivity analysis should be 
narrowed to key assumptions, such as interest rates, and should not be applied 
to PBO and service costs. Rather, they suggested that sensitivity analysis should 
be conducted on net pension assets/liabilities. 
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Most respondents voted against the new disclosure requirements on the process 
of determining actuarial assumptions, ABO, asset–liability matching strategy, and 
factors that might cause contributions to differ from service costs. 
Overall, analysis of the arguments made by industrial entities suggests that the 
lobbying behaviour of this group against the IAS19 ED proposals related to 
elimination of the corridor method, abolition of ERR, and the new disclosure 
requirements. This is consistent with Positive Accounting Theory and the 
previous literature on participation in due process for accounting standard setting. 
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Table 2: Summary of arguments 
General Themes Responding Firms 
Panel A: Recognition 
Question 1: Full recognition of all changes in PA and PBO 
Long-term nature of pension plans would not be 
faithfully reported using point-in-time reporting 
principle. This would cause volatility on balance 
sheets and in income statements. 
Altria Group, Air France-KLM, 
AngloAmerican, British Airways, BAT, 
Hoffmann–La Roche, Shell, Telefonos de 
Mexico 
Revision of the concept in IAS1: Financial 
Statements on performance reporting before 
revision of IAS19: Employee Benefits. 
Air France–KLM, BAT, Constellation 
Energy, ING 
Impact of proposals in ED: management of 
funding driven by accounting rules rather than 
management rules. 
Air France–KLM, Altria Group, AMX, BAT, 
Deutsche Post DHL 
Concerns about interim reporting. Chevron, CIGNA, Entergy, Exxon Mobil, 
Goodyear, IBM, PepsiCo, Pfizer, PPL, 
Rayonier, Raytheon, Telefonos de Mexico, 
US Steel, United Technologies, Verizon 
Question 5: Elimination of the ERR 
Opposition to the Board’s argument that ERR is 
susceptible to management manipulation. 
Alcoa, AngloAmerican, BP, BAT, Canada 
Poster Corporation, CIGNA, Deutsche 
Post DHL, Eli Lilly, Exxon Mobil, Ford, 
Hydro-Québec, Jardine Matheson, Kesa 
Electricals, Pfizer, Nestlé, PPL, Progress 
Energy, Sanofi–Aventis, Shell, Siemens 
Opposition to the Board’s view that changes in 
the value of any assets can be divided between 
amounts arising from the passage of time and 
other changes. 
Alcoa, Altria, BAT, Canada Poster 
Corporation, CIGNA, Entergy, Norsk 
Hydro, Raytheon, Sanofi–Aventis, Shell 
Concerns about the “true and fair view” of 
pension accounting. 
Alcoa, Altria, AMX, AngloAmerican, 
Balfour Beatty, BASF, British Airways, BP, 
BAT, BT, Canada Poster Corporation, 
CIGNA, Eli Lilly, Entergy, Exxon Mobil, 
FirstEnergy, Fletcher Building, Ford, 
Hydro-Québec, Infosys, ING, Jardine 
Matheson, Kesa Electricals, Nestlé, Norsk 
Hydro, PepsiCo, Pfizer, PPL, Progress 
Energy, Rayonier, Raytheon, Sanofi–
Aventis, Shell, Siemens 
Concerns about using a “spot” discount rate for 
long-term items such as pension plans. 
Altria, Balfour Beatty, British Airways, Eli 
Lilly, Entergy, Fletcher Building, Ford, 
Infosys, Jardine Matheson, Kesa 
Electricals, Norsk Hydro, Pfizer, Progress 
Energy, Raytheon, Sanofi–Aventis, 
Siemens 
Concerns about the economic consequences of 
ERR elimination. 
Altria, AMX, BASF (counter view), BAT, 
Deutsche Post DHL, Jardine Matheson, 
Nestlé, PPL, Shell 
Panel B: Presentation 
Question 6: Presentation of pension expense components 
Presentation of net interest costs together with 
service costs. 
AMX, Canada Poster Corporation, 
Fletcher Building, Hydro-Québec, Infosys, 
Jardine Matheson, Shell, SKF 
Re-measurement amounts should be recycled 
back to P&L statements since part of these 
amounts reflect management operational 
decisions. The proposal also does not reflect the 
“true and fair view” of the cost of DB plans. 
Altria, Canada Poster Corporation, Bayer, 
BAT, Entergy, Exxon Mobil, Progress 
Energy 
Recurring activities should be presented in net 
income and non-recurring activities in OCI. 
Bayer, Constellation Energy, Larsen & 
Toubro 
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General Themes Responding Firms 
Lobbying activities against abolition of the 
“corridor method” and ERR. 
Altria, AMX, Canada Poster Corporation, 
FirstEnergy 
Question 3: Disaggregation of pension expenses 
Simplify accounting for pensions by presenting 
net periodic pension costs as a global item under 
a single caption. 
Air France–KLM, ING, Nestlé, Progress 
Energy, Rayonier, Sappi, Stagecoach 
Settlements and curtailments 
Settlement transaction outcomes are not 
necessarily the result of re-measurement; non-
routine settlements are more likely to arise from 
direct action of the reporting entity, and share 
many similarities with curtailment. 
AstraZeneca, BASF, Deutsche Post DHL, 
Eli Lilly, Hoffmann–La Roche, Nestlé, PPL 
Distinguishing between curtailments and 
settlements is sometimes very complex. 
BASF, BT, Deutsche Post DHL, Ford, 
Shell 
Are curtailment transactions decisions made by 
management or significant events requiring re-
measurement? 
British Airways 
Both curtailment and settlement should be taken 
out of P&L since they are significant events that 
require re-measurement. 
FirstEnergy, Ford, PepsiCo, Stagecoach, 
URS 
Panel C: Disclosure 
Sensitivity analysis might be impractical due to 
the non-linear nature of some factors, and 
extremely complex for groups with several plans 
in different countries. 
Altria, BASF, Fletcher Building, Nestlé, 
PepsiCo, Shell, Telstra 
Sensitivity analysis should be limited to key 
assumptions. 
Air France–KLM, AngloAmerican, 
Chevron, Deutsche Post DHL, 
FirstEnergy, Unilever 
Sensitivity tests for PBO and service costs are 
inappropriate. 
Goodyear, Hydro-Québec 
Disclosure relating to processes used to 
determine actuarial assumptions are impractical, 
and would lead to boilerplate lists in financial 
statements because the process would be 
generic across many entities. 
AngloAmerican, BASF, BP, Chevron, 
Hoffmann–La Roche, Pfizer, PPL, Shell, 
Telstra, Unilever 
Disclosure of ABO would not provide any 
decision-useful information and might cause 
confusion. 
AngloAmerican, AstraZeneca, Balfour 
Beatty, Deutsche Post DHL, BASF, BP, 
E.ON, Hoffmann–La Roche, Hydro-
Québec, Kesa Electricals, National Grid, 
Shell, Telstra 
Disclosures of asset liability matching strategies 
might be highly technical and might mislead 
financial statement users. Such disclosures might 
also be generic. 
AngloAmerican, AstraZeneca, E.ON, Eli 
Lilly, FirstEnergy, Goodyear, Hydro-
Québec, Shell, Telstra 
Disclosure requirements for factors that might 
cause contributions to differ from service costs 
are too broad and might lead to a boilerplate list 
of risks. 
AstraZeneca, Balfour Beatty, BASF, BP, 
Deutsche Post DHL, E.ON, Eli Lilly, Exxon 
Mobil, Goodyear, Hydro-Québec, Nestlé, 
PPL, Shell, Telstra, Unilever 
Concern about requirement to combine 
disclosures under “old” post-employment benefits 
(pensions) and other employee benefits (jubilee 
payments). 
Deutsche Post DHL, E.ON, Hoffmann–La 
Roche, Nestlé 
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Chapter 4: Impact of Adoption of IAS19 (Revised) on 
Pension Plan Asset Allocations 
4.1 Introduction 
Following chapter 3 that documents and summaries the potential economic 
consequence of pension accounting standard IAS19R adoption, this chapter 
focuses on studying and providing the empirical evidence on those economic 
consequence. Specifically, it studies the impact of proposals on “full recognition” 
of net pension asset/liability and the abolition of ERR on asset allocation of 
pension plan portfolio. Additionally, this chapter also annualizes how the pension 
Board characteristic would contribute to the impact of IAS19R adoption on 
pension plan asset allocation. 
In June 2011, the IASB published an amendment to IAS19 (IAS19R), which was 
mandated in January 2013. IAS19R made significant changes to the disclosure 
and recognition requirements for pension surpluses/deficits and pension 
expenses. 
In particular, IAS19R fundamentally changed the measurement of pension 
expenses by requiring plan sponsors to apply a discount rate to calculate 
expected returns on pension asset portfolios. Expected returns on pension assets 
are the offset part of pension expenses, estimated by multiplying the long-term 
ERR by the FVPA. Under IAS19, this ERR was estimated by the sponsor firm in 
accordance with the risk characteristics of the pension asset portfolio. 
However, use of this ERR rather than the actual return rate has two main 
consequences. First, plan sponsors are able to anticipate and recognise in net 
income the benefits of investing in higher-risk versus lower-risk assets (equities 
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versus bonds), thus reducing pension expenses and boosting net income. 
Secondly, use of an ERR shields net income from the costs of investing in high-
risk asset classes since the higher volatility of that investment is not reflected in 
pension expenses. In other words, IAS19 allowed companies’ financial 
statements to recognise the benefits of investing in equity (or high risk taking), 
while not fully reflecting its costs. This asymmetry encouraged plan sponsors to 
engage in more risk taking than the optimal level, guided solely by economic and 
risk management considerations (Gold, 2005). 
The passage of IAS19R effectively removed this asymmetry by requiring plan 
sponsors to use a single interest rate to obtain net interest costs. Pension 
schemes have liabilities to make payments in the future, and these cash flows 
are discounted with an interest rate. However, these pension schemes also make 
investments and expect to receive cash flows that will grow, not with an ERR but 
with the same interest rate as that used to discount liabilities. This allows for 
pension expenses to be determined by subtracting the earnings obtained on 
pension assets from the expenses incurred by liabilities. Therefore, IAS19R, 
amongst other provisions (see Appendix A), mandated a fundamental change in 
the way pension expenses are determined. First, it eliminates ERR as a separate 
assumption determined by managerial judgment: managers no longer have to 
determine a long-term ERR assumption. Second, it effectively replaces ERR with 
a discount-rate assumption, which has historically been suggested as the yield of 
high-quality corporate bonds that have currency and term matching the currency 
and estimated term of post-employment benefit obligations (IASB, 2009). Hence, 
by eliminating estimated ERR, IAS19R no longer allows firms to recognise in net 
income the benefits of investing in risky assets with high expected returns without 
bearing the cost. Therefore, to the extent to which boosting net income through 
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higher ERR is an important factor in allocating pension plan assets, this removal 
of ERR also removes the incentive for plan sponsors to invest in high-risk assets. 
Following the adoption of IAS19R, sponsor firms were expected to reduce their 
investments in high-risk securities such as equity. 
In addition to the abolition of ERR, the IASB has also eliminated the options under 
IAS19 for recognising and presenting actuarial gains and losses. In particular, 
sponsor firms are no longer allowed to use the corridor method or income 
statement method to record actuarial gains and losses. Instead, entities must 
recognise all changes in the present value of DBO and in the FVPA when they 
occur, with the re-measurement (also known as actuarial gains and losses) being 
recognised in OCI (similar to the OCI method). 
According to PwC (2011), companies that were previously using the “corridor 
method” are likely to have a more volatile balance sheet as a result, especially if 
their pension plans are invested mainly in equity securities. In particular, reporting 
actual returns on pension assets injects volatility into shareholders’ equity, while 
recognised net pension assets/liabilities may form a significant portion of a 
company’s book value and market capitalisation (Amir et al., 2010). Moreover, 
full pension recognition may have contractual implications. For contracts based 
on balance sheet figures, higher recognised debt increases the likelihood of 
violating existing debt covenants. Also, greater volatility in shareholders’ equity 
increases the probability of violating equity-based covenants. Finally, a 
recognised pension deficit with a corresponding decrease in distributable 
retained earnings will decrease the ability to pay dividends (Amir et al., 2010). 
Several respondents to the IAS19R ED shared their concerns about the impact 
of IAS19R on their financial statements and, ultimately, on their firms’ 
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management activities. Air France–KLM feared that, as a consequence of 
IAS19R, management decisions would be driven by accounting rules rather than 
management rules. Specifically, it argued that this situation would lead to 
solutions where managers would try to avoid fluctuations on the balance sheet 
and invest pension funds only in bonds in order to secure levels of funding. Such 
movements from stock to bonds might create a crisis for financial markets. 
Similarly, America Movil SAB de CV (AMX) feared that the proposals might cause 
entities to become more conservative in their investment strategies relating to DB 
plans, which might lead to higher costs in providing associated benefits. 
In addition, many respondents were opposed to the elimination of the ERR and 
raised a problem relating to the “true and fair view” of pension accounting as a 
result of this proposal. They warned the IASB that elimination of the requirement 
to incorporate an ERR in plan assets in the P&L might lead entities to alter their 
investment strategies to manage actual performance to the discount rate (e.g. 
IAS19R ED comment letters from AngloAmerican, Air France–KLM and CIGNA, 
2010). 
In order to examine the research question, this study applies a DID research 
design which compares shifts in asset allocations between the pre- and post- 
IAS19R periods of UK-listed firms with a matched control sample of US firms. 
There are two reasons for using this pre-treatment approach with one-on-one 
matching without replacement, using US sponsor firms as a control sample for 
UK sponsor firms. First, before international accounting standards were adopted 
in the UK in 2005, UK sponsor firms had been following FRS 17: Retirement 
Benefits to report on their DB pension plans. In general, FRS 17 and SFAS 158 
under US GAAP are quite similar, suggesting similarity of institutional setting 
between UK and US sponsor firms. Second, prior to the adoption of IAS19R, 
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most US and UK sponsor firms chose to fully recognise pension surpluses/deficits 
on their balance sheets (as described in the section 2.1, sub-section 2.1.1, 
chapter 2); therefore, studying UK firms, will enable the income-driven incentive 
for sponsor firms’ pension asset allocations to be distinguished from the balance 
sheet-driven incentive described in the previous literature (Amir et. al., 2010). 
Based on a sample of 123 UK sponsor firms matched with 123 US control 
sponsor firms for a four-year window between 2010 and 2013 (984 firm years in 
total), after controlling comprehensively for determinants of equity investment, the 
results reveal that, relative to US sponsor firms, UK sponsor firms significantly 
decreased their level of equity investment in DB pension plans following the 
implementation of IAS19R. 
In addition to the main test, several sensitivity analyses were conducted. First, 
the sample size was reduced to 88 UK sponsor firms by eliminating 35 firms that 
had more than 20 per cent investment in opaque asset categories (categorised 
as “Other” in the Capital IQ database), since no information is provided about the 
risk and return characteristics of these assets. The matching and DID 
examination process was then repeated (Sensitivity Test 1). Second, DID 
analysis was tried with alternative treatment events (the publication of IAS19R in 
2011 and the adoption of IAS19R in 2013), retaining the same four-year time 
window (Sensitivity Test 2). Finally, the DID test was repeated for the two 
alternative treatment events (Years 2011 and 2013) and the main treatment event 
of the Year 2012, but with a narrower, two-year time window of one year before 
and one year after the treatment event (Sensitivity Test 3) (see Appendix B). 
The results of the tests on the new sample of 88 UK sponsor firms support the 
hypothesis. However, the results of the later sensitivity tests suggest that UK 
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sponsor firms did not respond to IAS19R immediately. Since they had two years 
to prepare (from the publication of IAS19R in 2011 until IAS19R became 
mandatory in 2013), they gradually reallocated their DB pension plan assets in 
order to manage liquidity costs. 
In addition to DID tests, the impact of IAS19R adoption across sponsor firms was 
also examined for European data using cross-sectional analysis similar to that of 
Amir et. al. (2010). This model was applied to test associations between changes 
in equity investment levels between the year prior to adoption of IAS19R (2012) 
and one year after adoption (2014), with measurement of the potential impact of 
IAS19R adoption on those firms. Similar to Amir et. al. (2010), the impact of the 
new pension accounting standard on sponsor firms was measured as: (1) the 
FVPA deflated by the book value of shareholders’ equity in Year t, capturing the 
exposure of shareholders’ equity to volatility in the market value of pension 
assets; and (2) PBO deflated by the book value of shareholders’ equity in year t, 
capturing the exposure of shareholders’ equity to volatility in discount rates. Since 
the amendment of IAS19R will also have had a significant impact on pension 
expenses reported in income statements, a third measurement was introduced 
to capture this impact on firms’ financial reporting as pension expenses deflated 
by net income before pension expenses of firms in year t to capture the exposure 
of firms’ net income to volatility in pension expenses, and thus asset allocations 
in pension asset plans. The model was first run using all firms in the sample, and 
then separately for each country. 
Based on the sample of 253 sponsor firms across 9 countries, the results of tests 
on the entire sample reveal that reductions in equity investment levels following 
the adoption of IAS19R were more pronounced in companies with pension plans 
that were larger relative to shareholders’ equity. On the other hand, the tests 
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separated by country provide mixed results. In particular, the results are only 
significant and have the expected sign in countries with historically high average 
equity investment levels, such as the UK. The outcome is less clear in other 
countries with historically low average equity investment levels. 
This study contributes to two streams of literature. First, it contributes to the 
burgeoning literature on the “real effects” of accounting standards, postulating 
that how accountants measure and report economic transactions may impact on 
firms’ real decisions (Kanodia, 2007). The empirical evidence on real effects has 
so far spanned a wide spectrum of accounting areas. The pensions area, in 
particular, has provided some prominent examples of accounting rules inducing 
real effects. For example, Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) show that the introduction of 
SFAS 106 (which required recognition of other post-employment benefits) 
reduced employers’ willingness to provide these benefits in the first place. Similar 
effects are purported to have arisen from the gradual tightening of pension 
accounting rules that has brought pension assets and liabilities fully onto 
corporate balance sheets. Kiosse and Peasnell (2009) review the academic 
evidence on the extent to which changes in pension accounting rules have 
affected pension provision decisions. 
Second, by demonstrating that the accounting regime may drive pension 
investment decisions, this study contributes to the literature on determinants of 
pension asset allocations. Over the years, many pension investment theories 
have been proposed, including the put option theory that PBGC insurance 
encourages plan sponsors to engage in excessive risk taking as they approach 
distress (Sharpe, 1976), and the tax arbitrage theory which predicts that the tax-
sheltered nature of pensions should induce tax-paying firms to invest pension 
assets in bonds (Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981), and that a desire to avoid 
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contribution volatility will lead very under- and over-funded plans to invest more 
in bonds (Bader, 1991; Amir and Benartzi, 1999). Some commentators believe 
that pension plans are invested much more in equities than is predicted by 
modern financial theory (Gold, 2005). 
This study provides empirical support for the explanation that this may be due to 
smoothing mechanisms in pension accounting rules. These findings will be of 
interest to regulators and standard setters. Pension-expense smoothing has long 
been debated in the US, which still relies on an ERR-based model for pension 
expenses. As the UK had a regime that was close to the US in terms of pension 
accounting standards, under both FRS17 and IAS19, the economic 
consequences of moving away from ERR-based smoothing in the UK may inform 
the debate on pension-expense smoothing under US GAAP. 
Third, this research using a DID design provides reliable inferences for the causal 
effect of IAS19R adoption on asset allocations in DB pension plans. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2.1 describes the background to 
international pension accounting amendments and hypothesis development. This 
section conceptualizes the impact of the proposals of full recognition and abolition 
of ERR as well as the pension board characteristic on asset allocation of pension 
asset portfolio. The next section 4.3 includes separated subsections that describe 
the research designs and data selection tailored to each set of hypotheses. 
Section 4.4 provides descriptive statistics and section 4.5 discusses the empirical 
results. Section 4.6 presents sensitivity analyses. Section 4.7 discusses 
opportunities for further research, and Section 4.8 draws some conclusions. 
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4.2 Background and Hypothesis 
4.2.1 The impact of full recognition of pension assets and pension liabilities 
on asset allocations of pension plans 
Following Amir et al.’s (2010) argument, full recognition of pension items on the 
balance sheet will increase the volatility of total liabilities and shareholders’ 
equity, and thus increase the likelihood of violating debt- and equity-based 
covenants. Moreover, a recognised pension deficit with a corresponding 
decrease in distributable retained earnings will decrease the ability to pay 
dividends. For instance, for Euronext Amsterdam-listed PostNL, with DB 
schemes covering 95,000 people including retirees, it was estimated in 2012 that 
the IAS19R change would force it to take a net loss of €1.08 billion. This would 
have wiped out its consolidated shareholders’ equity, which stood at €1.03 billion. 
Jan Bos, PostNL’s chief financial officer, said that the group would not be able to 
pay cash dividends if it had negative consolidated equity (Jones, 2012). Thus, in 
addition to the income-driven incentive discussed previously, the impact of the 
full recognition requirement might also shift pension assets from equities to debt 
securities to mitigate the effect of IAS19R on existing contracts. 
Following the argument above, I predict that defined benefit pension plan 
sponsors would reduce the equity investment level following the year of IAS19R 
adoption in 2013 
Hypothesis 1a: Defined benefit pension plan sponsors in European 
countries would reduce risk taking in pension asset allocation following the 
adoption of IAS19R 
However, it is conceivable that not all firms sponsoring pension plans were 
equally affected by the shift in the determination of pension expenses and full 
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recognition of changes in the value of pension assets and liabilities in IAS19R. 
Following Amir et al. (2010), the impact of the new pension standard was 
expected to be more significant when pension plans were larger relative to 
shareholders’ equity. For example, Charter plc, a UK-based engineering 
company, reported 2003 pension assets with a market value of £462.2 million 
and shareholders’ equity of £24.9 million. It was argued that a 5.4 per cent decline 
in the market value of pension assets, while holding pension liabilities constant, 
would eliminate the company’s shareholders’ equity. Furthermore, companies 
with larger pension plans would also experience larger actuarial gains/losses if 
more pension assets were invested in equity securities. To reduce the volatility 
effects of actuarial gains/losses on shareholders’ equity, such companies would 
be motivated to shift pension assets from equities to bonds. This led to the next 
sub-hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: The reduction in equity levels of DB pension plans following 
the mandatory introduction of IAS19R was more pronounced in firms with 
large pension plans relative to total shareholder equity, and with large 
pension expenses relative to net income. 
4.2.2 The impact of ERR abolition on asset allocation of pension asset 
portfolio 
This section first describes the relation of expense smoothing mechanism and 
risk taking in pension investment under the IAS19. Then, the following sub-
section conceptualize how the proposal of ERR abolition would have impact on 
decision making and risk taking of pension asset portfolio 
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4.2.2.1 Implications of expense smoothing for risk taking in pension 
investments 
The use of a long-term ERR rather than the actual return on plan assets is a 
fundamental feature of extant accounting regimes for pensions, in both current 
US GAAP and under the former IFRS regime. The consequences of this feature 
can be viewed in two closely-related ways. First, since ERRs are intended to be 
estimates of the long-term earning potential of assets in the pension trust, these 
rates do not fluctuate in the short term, resulting in an expected return component 
of pension expenses that is very sticky and smooth. Actual returns, on the other 
hand, may fluctuate significantly from year to year, especially when plan portfolios 
are heavily invested in equities or other high-risk asset classes. Therefore, the 
use of ERR protects net income from period-to-period volatility in actual returns. 
Second, the use of ERR allows benefits from higher risk investments in net 
income to be included in financial statements, as a higher-risk asset allocation 
strategy justifies the use of a higher ERR, which in turn reduces pension 
expenses. 
In addition, investing in equities versus bonds (or, more broadly, in higher-risk 
versus lower-risk assets) brings both risks and rewards. Investing in equities is 
likely to yield higher returns over the long term, which should reduce sponsors’ 
future contributions. However, returns are more volatile from period to period, and 
sponsors must bear the burden of that volatility, which may move plans from 
being well-funded in one period to substantially under-funded in a subsequent 
period, necessitating unpredictable cash contributions. 
Under the IAS19, sponsors’ net income did not reflect these costs and benefits 
symmetrically. Since pension expenses were calculated based on ERR, the 
accounting regime allowed plan sponsors to recognise the benefits of investing 
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in equities (or higher-risk assets) immediately. However, the fact that actual 
returns were only reflected in net income much later, or not at all, implies that the 
income statement was, at least for the foreseeable future, shielded from any 
correspondingly greater volatility as a result of investing in those higher-risk 
assets. Therefore, the former pension accounting standard recognised the costs 
and benefits of equity investment asymmetrically. 
Thus, it is possible that this accounting regime may have induced plan sponsors 
to engage in more risk taking in pension investments than they would otherwise 
have undertaken under a more “neutral” accounting regime. For instance, Zion 
and Carcache (2003, 2005) and Gold (2005) document that pension assets were 
invested much more in equities than predicted by modern financial theory 
4.2.2.2 The effect of ERR abolition and pension plan asset allocation 
In most of the extant literature, firms are exogenously endowed with liquidating 
dividends that are independent of the accounting regime, and the role of 
accounting disclosures is to provide information about these dividends (Kanodia, 
2007). For example, in relation to pension accounting, much research focuses on 
the value relevance of pension accounting items in financial statements (e.g. 
Barth, 1991; Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue, 1993; Barth et al, 1993; Coronado and 
Sharpe, 2003; Franzoni and Matin, 2006; Picconi, 2006; Hann et al., 2007; 
Werner, 2011). These studies suggest that the pension accounting regimes 
under IFRS and US GAAP accurately reflect market perceptions of sponsor firms’ 
pension schemes. However, none of these studies provides evidence on how 
financial statement information is used (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
Several more recent studies provide indirect evidence of the real effect of pension 
accounting by studying changes in decision making after exogenous shocks such 
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as a change to an accounting rule. For instance, Kiosse and Peasnell (2009) 
review the academic evidence on the extent to which changes in pension 
accounting rules affect pension provisions. In addition, Amir et al. (2010) study 
the impact on pension asset allocations of new pension disclosures and full 
pension recognition under FRS 17 and IAS19 in the UK and SFAS 158 in the US. 
Both studies reveal that pension accounting changes have a significant influence 
on the allocation of pension plan assets. This suggests that how sponsor firms 
report their pension scheme information plays a critical role in investment 
decisions on pension plan assets. In particular, Amir et al. (2010) conceptualise 
this driver of pension plan asset allocations in terms of its effect on the contractual 
efficiency of pension accounting rules. In their view, contracts between economic 
agents with conflicting interests are often based on accounting data, and better 
information makes these contracts more efficient. Adoption of IAS19 in the UK 
and SFAS 158 in the US both require full pension recognition, which, in turn, has 
contractual implications, such as basing contracts on balance sheet figures, since 
higher recognised pension liabilities increase the likelihood of violating existing 
debt covenants. They argue that, in order to mitigate the effect of adoption on 
existing contracts, sponsor companies will shift pension assets from equity to 
debt securities during the adoption of full pension recognition. 
Following a similar argument, this research focuses on one of the most 
controversial requirements of IAS19R, the new measurement of pension 
expenses with limitations on ERR. Several commentators on the IAS19R ED 
made similar predictions about this modification. For example, the Association of 
Consulting Actuaries (ACA) emphasised that: 
“The removal of the expected return on plan assets (to be replaced with 
effectively, the discount rate applied to plan assets) also removes the 
current advantage for companies of taking greater risk with employee 
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benefit plan assets without recognition of the corresponding increase to 
risk” (ACA comment letter on Exposure Draft of IAS19, 2010). 
The American Academy of Actuaries posited that the new regime: 
“... may allow plan sponsors to base decisions about asset allocation 
purely on economic and risk management grounds, without adversely 
affecting profit and loss. In fact, removing the immediate benefit of risk-
taking from the income statement may reduce the willingness of plan 
sponsors to take that risk. At the very least, removing the immediate 
accounting impact from the income statement refines the focus to the true 
economics of the decision” (AAA, 2010). 
The effective capping of the ERR at the prevailing yield on high-quality corporate 
bonds of similar duration to pension outflows implies two related consequences 
for plan sponsors. First, they can no longer build the expected risk premium on 
equities (or any asset class that is higher risk for higher returns than high-quality 
corporate bonds) into the ERR, and thus cannot anticipate or immediately 
recognise in net income the expected rewards from risk-seeking investment 
strategies. Second, while ERR was a smooth, long-term estimate that changed 
only infrequently, the discount rate is derived from spot rates at a particular 
moment in time, resulting in greater volatility than previously because the spot 
rate reflects macroeconomic factors that cause fluctuations in high-quality bond 
yields. 
Therefore, whereas the smoothing-based accounting regime recognised the 
expected benefits to risk taking in income while shielding it from any 
correspondingly greater volatility, the new accounting regime under IAS19R has 
removed this particular asymmetry. To the extent to which boosting net income 
through higher ERRs is a driving factor in plan sponsors’ investment decisions, 
the income statement benefits available under the smoothing regime may have 
encouraged a higher level of risk taking than plan sponsors would otherwise have 
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engaged in. If this is indeed the case, risk taking in pension investments would 
be expected to have decreased following the implementation of IAS19R. 
Based on the argument above, it is expected that IAS19R adoption will lead to a 
decrease in risk taking in asset allocations. 
Hypothesis 2a: UK sponsor firms will reduce risk taking in pension asset 
allocation following the adoption of IAS19R. 
There are several reasons to believe that the results of empirical tests may not 
support the hypothesis. First, if there was no link between the ERRs and actual 
asset allocation (for example manager selects high ERRs without investing in 
risky assets) prior to IAS19R, then the manager did not build the expected risk 
premium on equities investment into ERR and had no incentive to recognize in 
the net income the expected reward from risky investment at the first place. 
Therefore, the fact that IAS19R no longer allows the use of ERR need not lead 
to any realignments in asset allocation. The previous literature provides mixed 
evidence on the extent to which ERR reflects asset allocations in pension plans. 
For example, Amir and Benartzi (1999) document a weak link between ERR and 
asset allocation. However, more recent work by Bergstresser et al. (2006) shows 
that, although managers choose their ERR opportunistically, they also increase 
equity levels to rationalise their higher ERR. Similarly, Chuk (2013) indicates that 
firms have increased equity allocations to justify a high ERR since the 
requirement for asset allocations to be disclosed in financial statements was 
introduced. This again suggests that the ERR must be supported by actual 
allocations, at least to some degree. 
Second, it is crucial that managers believe that external financial statement users 
make no adjustments to pension expenses to account for asymmetric recognition 
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of the benefits of high-risk pension assets without corresponding recognition of 
the costs prior to IAS19R. However, if managers consider that reported net 
income does not matter because financial statement users can “unravel” ERR-
based pension accounting and replace expected with actual returns, then an 
ERR-based accounting regime will not affect the asset allocation decisions of 
sponsor firms. In addition, if both the costs and benefits of a riskier asset 
allocation strategy can be internalised by financial statement users, then 
managers of sponsor firms will have had no accounting incentive to adopt such 
riskier strategies under the pre-IAS19R regime. Again, evidence in the previous 
literature on whether investors are able to “see through” pension accounting rules 
is quite mixed. Several studies documents that the market perceives pension 
obligations as firm liabilities, even when they are not required to be recognised 
on the balance sheet (Dhaliwal, 1986; Landsman, 1986; Gopalakrishnan and 
Sugrue, 1993). In another research stream, Picconi (2006) claims that equity 
analysis fails to understand the implications of disclosed pension numbers for 
future earnings. 
Finally, asset allocations may take time to adjust; thus, responses to IAS19R will 
not be observed immediately. Plan sponsors typically do not change asset 
allocation policies very frequently. Furthermore, asset re-allocation is costly, 
especially in the short term; thus, the immediate impact of IAS19R may not be 
stark enough to justify the transaction costs. 
For all these reasons, whether firms indeed reduced investments in risky pension 
assets following the adoption of IAS19R is an open empirical question. 
Furthermore, given the baseline of Hypothesis 1a relies on the assumption that 
income statement consideration affected asset allocation strategies, it is 
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reasonable to expect that the effect on asset allocation would be different depend 
on how large the pension plan relative to net income. In particular, for a firm that 
has large pension plan would has the large offset part of pension expense equal 
to “ERR * fair value of plan asset” relative to net income, therefore, the 
accounting-based incentives to boost ERRs embedded in IAS 19 would be 
stronger for that firm and thus would invest more in risky asset. The removal of 
the accounting-based incentives (abolition of ERRs) could in turn lead to larger 
drops in pension risk for this sponsor. This argument thus lead to the following 
sub-hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b: The reduction in risk-taking in pension asset plan 
resulting from IAS19R would be more pronounced for firms whose pension 
plans are large relative to income. 
4.2.3 Pension Board Characteristic as an indicator to predict the magnitude 
impact of IAS19R on asset allocation of pension plan asset 
4.2.3.1 Composition of pension plans boards 
In nearly all OECD countries, members of occupational pension funds’ governing 
boards must be selected by sponsoring employers and employees, often in equal 
numbers21. In some other countries, such as Austria and the UK, member 
representation is required, but not necessarily in equal numbers to sponsor 
representation. 
Employee or member representation may ensure better alignment of the interests 
of the governing board with those of the fund’s beneficiaries. They also act as an 
                                            
21 The main exceptions are Canada, Ireland, Mexico and the US, where there is no requirement 
for employee or member representation in single employer plans. However, US legislation calls 
for paritarian representation for multi-employer plans. 
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effective channel to deliver information to plan members, strengthening the 
accountability of the governing board. For instance, a study by the Irish Pensions 
Board (2006) found that funds that did not have member representatives on the 
board would welcome them: “In fact, several employer-nominated interviewees 
suggested that the presence of member trustees provided protection against the 
emergence of such conflicts.” It also stated that, although the skill levels of 
member trustees varied, most saw member trustees as often offering valuable 
perspectives beyond those provided by company management, although they 
might need help, particularly with investment issues: 
It was evident from the research that the principle of member trustees had 
been accepted by all trustees interviewed, with many outlining the positive 
contribution that such trustees can bring to the trustee board. Of those 
schemes without member trustees, all of those respondents stated that the 
member trustees would be welcomed to the trustee board if there were 
sufficient interest amongst scheme members ... Member trustees play an 
active and unique role in pension scheme governance ... member trustees 
particularly act as intermediaries in the interface between service provider 
and employee, channelling information to scheme members in a role which 
has the flexible capacity to serve in members’ best interests in varied and 
changing circumstances (Pension Board, Ireland, 2006). 
However, there are questions over the contribution of member representatives to 
decision making on complex matters relating to pension fund orientation. For 
instance, member representatives may not have the necessary knowledge and 
understanding of investment matters and may not feel comfortable challenging 
investment advisors or the plan sponsor’s senior executives sitting on the board. 
There is also concern on the part of employers that, because member 
representatives do not directly bear plan costs, they may have an incentive to 
add special benefits to DB plans without regard to cost, or to avoid under-funding 
without a counterbalancing incentive to minimise costs. This may include overly 
conservative distortion of investments, unnecessarily driving up employer 
contributions. Another concern is that plans heavily influenced by the interests of 
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member representatives tend to have features that favour the specific categories 
into which such representatives fall, even though it may not be in the interests of 
plan members more broadly. 
Based on the argument above, it is expected that regulation of the number of 
employee representatives on pension plan boards will affect the equity 
investment levels of sponsor firms, and would thus reduce equity investments in 
those companies following the adoption of IAS19R. In particular, it is 
hypothesised that equity levels and decreases in equity levels following the 
adoption of IAS19R would be lower for firms in countries that require more 
member representatives on pension plan boards. 
Hypothesis 3a: Equity investment levels and decreases in equity 
investment levels following the adoption of IAS19R were lower for firms in 
countries requiring more member representatives on pension plan boards. 
Table 3 documents the regulations of each country in the sample regarding the 
composition of pension plan board representatives. In general, the rigidity of 
these regulations can be divided into two categories. The first has the most rigid 
requirement to protect pension plan beneficiaries by requiring the number of 
sponsor representatives to be equal to the number of beneficiary representatives. 
Countries in the second category allow the number of beneficiary representatives 
to be less than or equal to the number of sponsors representatives. 
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Table 3: Regulation across EU countries on the composition of pension plan boards 
Austria The board of supervisors of the pension fund may have two seats fewer 
for employee representatives than for the sponsoring employer or other 
shareholders of the pension fund. 
Belgium The board of directors of a pension fund must have equal representation 
of employers and employees. 
Germany  Supervisory board: employee representation depends on the number of 
employees in the pension fund, with a maximum of equal representation.22 
The managing board is appointed by the supervisory board. 
Italy The general assembly and the board of directors must each have equal 
representation of employers and employees. 
Netherlands The pension fund board must have equal representation of employers and 
employees. 
Spain The majority of the control commission must be selected by plan members 
and beneficiaries. No requirement for member representation on the 
boards of pension fund management companies. 
Sweden The board of the foundation must have equal representation of employers 
and employees. 
United Kingdom At least one third of trustees must be member-nominated. 
Source: OECD/ISSA/IOPS (2008) 
 
4.2.3.2 Pension plan board member competence 
Although a greater number of employee representatives on pension boards may 
ensure better alignment of the interests of the governing board with those of 
pension plan beneficiaries, Clark (2006, 2007) questions their involvement in the 
pension plan decision-making process due to their lack of competence. Using UK 
pension fund governance and US mutual fund industries as examples, his 
evidence suggests that very few trustees have the competence and consistency 
of judgment to challenge the experts who are responsible for executing complex 
financial decisions. There is a clear association between trustee boards’ 
understanding across key topics and their confidence levels in managing their 
                                            
22 In Germany, the supervisory board is elected by the general assembly or, if stated in the 
statutes, appointed by the general assembly directly. The board therefore reflects the proportions 
of the general assembly. According to the size of the joint stock company or mutual association, 
representation of employees may be required. There is no legal requirement for representation 
of plan members or beneficiaries in the administration of pension plans. It is possible for sponsors 
to be represented on the supervisory board, subject to legal conditions. 
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schemes. The importance of guidance is evident, and The Pensions Regulator 
continues to use education as a means of changing behaviour across schemes. 
Most countries in the sample for this study had introduced criteria disqualifying 
certain individuals from pension fund boards. In general, the basic disqualifying 
conditions include insolvency under administration, criminal records and other 
evidence of “improper” behaviour23.  
In addition, a few OECD countries (e.g. Austria, Finland, Germany and Poland) 
require pension fund board members to have specific qualifications and 
professional experience to allow them to carry out their duties more effectively. 
However, some other countries (e.g. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, 
Portugal and the Netherlands) have introduced general suitability (“fitness”) 
requirements for members of the governing board beyond the basic disqualifying 
conditions. On the other hand, some countries (e.g. France) have no legal fit and 
proper requirements for board members. 
The competency of pension plan board members may also be reflected in the 
process of licensing pension plans. Licensing is defined as the process by which 
an authority grants permission to a pension entity to operate and/or to have the 
right to benefit from specific tax treatments. This includes a range of actions 
involving assessment of compliance with specific requirements prior to granting 
permission to operate or granting tax benefits, or relating to the status of 
compliance with such requirements. The more rigid the steps that firms must 
                                            
23 For example, in the US, conviction for criminal acts and prior breaches of fiduciary duty may 
disqualify one from service. 
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satisfy to qualify for pension plans, the better the quality and competence of 
pension plan board members. 
Following the argument above, it was expected that the licensing process will 
have a significant impact on equity investment levels of sponsor firms, and thus 
on their changes in equity investment levels following adoption of IAS19R. This 
leads to the following sub-hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3b: Equity investment levels and decreases in equity 
investment levels following adoption of IAS19R were lower for firms in 
countries with more rigid pension plan licensing processes. 
In order to proxy for the rigidity of the licensing process in each country, data 
were drawn from the OECD-International Organisation of Pension Supervisors 
(IOPS) project on licensing requirements for pension entities. This project 
focuses on six criteria that a firm should meet if it wishes to be licensed as a 
pension entity and gain the tax benefits for this type of institution: (1) is there a 
licensing process in addition to the procedure for beneficial tax treatment; (2) is 
a statement of investment policy required; (3) are there “fit and proper” 
requirements for pension entity management; (4) is reinsurance or a guarantee 
fund required; (5) is there a licence application fee; and (6) is on-site inspection 
part of the application assessment process? 
The information was collected through questionnaires sent out to OECD and 
IOPS delegates and through consultation of information published on supervisory 
authorities’ websites. Information for the project was collected from 35 countries 
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(OECD report, July 2007).24 Details of the proxies built are described in Section 
4.3.3. Table 4 shows the results of the questionnaires.  
                                            
24 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kosovo, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Zambia. 
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Table 4: Licensing processes across EU countries 
Country Is there a licensing 
process in addition 
to a procedure for 
beneficial tax 
treatment? 
Statement of 
investment policy 
required? 
“Fit and proper” 
requirements for 
pension entity 
management? 
Reinsurance or 
guarantee fund 
required? 
Licence application 
fee? 
On-site inspection 
part of application 
assessment 
process? 
Austria Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Belgium Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes (Intended 
reinsurance 
arrangements) 
Yes No 
Spain Yes  Yes Yes No No No 
Finland Yes Yes (pension funds 
only) 
Yes (pension 
insurance 
companies only) 
No Yes (both pension 
funds and pension 
insurance 
companies) 
No 
United Kingdom No No No No No No 
Greece Yes Yes NIA No NIA NIA 
Italy Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes (reinsurance) 
but exemption 
possible 
No No 
Source: OECD-IOPS (2007) 
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4.3 Research Design and Data Collection 
4.3.1 Research design and data collection for hypothesis 1a and 1b 
4.3.1.1 Research design 
To test hypothesis 1a, I investigate the equity investment level of pension plan in 
the sample for the period from 2005 through 2014. In particular, the pairwise 
comparison of means using the Tukey method is applied to test whether the 
means of equity investment in three periods were statistically different with the 
period 1 is from 2005 to 2009, period 2 is from 2010 to 2012 and period 3 is from 
2013 to 2014. These periods are separated based on the development of IAS19R 
through time. In March 2008, IASB published a Discussion Paper that shows 
preliminary views on amendment to IAS19. This publication of Discussion Paper 
aimed on receiving comments from publish. After that, on April 2010, the 
Exposure Draft of IAS19R was published. The Exposure Draft included all the 
proposals developed by the Board, having considered responses to the 
discussion paper. The publication of IAS19R was made in June 2011. However, 
it is not effective until January 2013. Based on this timeline, I identify two 
important events. The first event is when the proposals of IAS19R was made to 
publish in the Exposure Draft in April 2010. And the second event is when the 
IAS19R was mandatory in January 2013. I then separate my sample in three 
different periods and test their mean difference of equity investment level. 
The univariate test is also conducted for the sample of cross sectional test 
described in the next paragraph. This test compared the mean difference of 
equity investment level of the year 2012 and the one in the year 2014. 
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In order to examine hypothesis 1b and directly test the impact of pension 
accounting numbers on pension plan asset allocations, the model specification 
developed by Amir et al. (2010) was used as follows: 
ADOPTi = β0 + β1ΔIMPACTi + β2ΔFUNDi + β3ΔFUNDi2 + β4ΔHORi + 
β5ΔLEVi + β6ΔDIVIDENDi + β7ΔTAXRi + β8ΔSDCFi + β9ΔSIZEi + εi                        
(1) 
where 
ADOPT = EQUITY (Pre-mandatory Year) – EQUITY (Post-mandatory Year) 
with EQUITY= percentage of equity invested in pension plan 
IMPACT measures the potential impact of the new accounting standards on 
company financial statements. In addition to two measures of the size of pension 
plans relative to shareholders’ equity, a third measure was introduced to capture 
the effect of IAS19R on income statements: 
EXPOS1: fair value of pension assets deflated by the book value of 
shareholders’ equity in year t 
EXPOS2: projected benefit obligations (PBO) deflated by the book value of 
shareholders’ equity in year t 
EXPOS3: pension expenses deflated by net income in year t. 
The other control variables were defined as in Model 2 above. 
Model 5 was estimated using country fixed effects across all firms that has data 
available for the period from 2012 through 2014 (this sample consists of 333 
firms, see the next section for the detail of sample selection). Each independent 
variable in the model was the difference between the level of the variable after 
adoption (2014 fiscal year end) and its level before adoption (2012 fiscal year 
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end). The table following shows the description of all the variable in the cross-
sectional test on EU sample 
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Table 5: Description of Variables for Cross-Sectional model on EU sample 
Variable Definition 
  
Equity The percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities 
  
ADOPT 
Equal to equity investment level of the year 2012 minus the equity 
investment of the year 2014 
  
EXPOS1 
Fair value of pension assets deflated by the book value of shareholders’ 
equity 
  
EXPOS2 
Projected benefit obligation deflated by the book value of shareholders’ 
equity 
  
EXPOS3 Pension expenses deflated by net income 
  
SIZE Natural log of firm market capitalization 
  
LEV 
Financial leverage, measured as long-term debt divided by the sum of 
log-term debt and market capitalization 
  
DIVIDEND Dividends pay-out ratio 
  
FUND 
Funding ratio, measured as fair value of pension assets divided by the 
projected benefit obligation 
  
FUND2 Funding ratio squared 
  
HOR 
Investment horizon, measured as the natural log of the ratio of PBO to 
current service cost 
  
TAXR Effective tax rate measured as tax expense divided by pre-tax income. 
  
SDCF 
Operating risk, measured as the standard deviation of the ratio of 
operating cash-flow to book value of equity for 5 years, ending in current 
year. 
 
4.3.1.2 Data Collection 
First, a list was compiled of all active firms in EU countries (26 countries in total). 
This resulted in a list of 6,810 firms classified by Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), including oil and gas, basic materials, industrial, consumer 
goods, healthcare, consumer services, telecommunications, utilities, financials 
and technology. Next, PBO data were collected from the Worldscope database 
for the period 2005 to 2014. Firms that did not have PBOs for the entire period 
were then eliminated. It was assumed that firms did not sponsor DB plans if they 
did not have PBOs for the entire period in the database. This process produced 
1,953 firms with at least one PBO available during the examination period. This 
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sample contained 21 countries. Table 6, Panel A records the sample selection 
for mean difference test  
The sample of 1953 firms is subjected to survivorship bias since the sponsor firms 
report PBO each year changed significantly. To avoid survivorship bias, the mean 
difference test is also performed for the sample that include only firms that report 
PBOs for the entire period from 2005 through 2014, although there were only 102 
firms meet this criterion. 
In relation to cross sectional model (model 1), among the 1953 firms, there were 
only 333 firms that had sufficient data for the model during the period from 2012 
through 2014. Panel B and C of table 6 record the number of firms for cross 
section model and number of firms separated by countries (only 14 countries left). 
Among those 14 countries, the sample is further reduced to include only those 
firms from which their country has highest number of scheme. Moreover, by 
eliminating those countries, this sample is also used in testing hypotheses 3a and 
3b because these countries also have available data for the tests which will be 
explained in sub-section 4.3.3   
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Table 6: Sample selection for univariate test and cross-sectional tests 
Panel A: Sample selection for mean difference test for the EU sample 
Selection criterion  
Number of 
observation 
All firms in Thomson One Banker database across 26 EU countries  6810 
Less   
 
Firms with no PBOs in the database for entire period from 2005 
through 2014 
(4857)  
Firms that report at least one year PBO during the period from 2005 
through 2014 
 1953 
Number of firms that report PBO for entire period from 2005 through 
2014 
 102 
 
Panel B: Sample selection for cross-sectional test (Model 1) 
Selection Criterion 
Number of 
observations 
All sponsor firms across 21 countries in the EU  
 1,953 
Less 
  
 Firms with insufficient data for Model 4 (1620) 
 
Number of firms that have sufficient data for model 1  333 
Less   
 
Firms in countries that has small number of schemes and 
insufficient data for examining hypothesis 3a and 3b 
(80)  
Final sample for cross-sectional test (Model 4) 253 
 
Panel C: Number of firms for 9 countries 
Country 
Number of 
Observations 
Austria 5 
Belgium 9 
Germany 56 
Spain 2 
Finland 13 
United Kingdom 127 
Italy 4 
Netherlands 18 
Sweden 19 
Total  253 
Note: Panel A shows the number of firms for mean difference test (1953 firms that reported at 
least one year PBO during the period from 2005 to 2014 and 102 firms that reported PBO for 
entire period from 2005 to 2014) and number of firms in each country for each year. 
Panel B and C report the number of firms for cross sectional model (Model 1) and number of firms 
in this sample separated by country. 
 
4.3.2 Research design and data collection for hypothesis 2a and 2b 
4.3.2.1 Research design 
The elimination of the “corridor method” would require the sponsor firm to fully 
recognize the net pension asset/liability on balance sheet. Thus, for companies 
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that were using the “corridor method” to keep part of their pension asset/liability 
off balance sheet, they would experience a significant change on their balance 
sheet. This, in turn, endured the sponsor firm to change their asset allocation on 
their pension plan portfolio (Amir et. al. 2010) 
In addition to the elimination of the “corridor method”, the abolition of ERRs on 
pension expense calculation would also cause the asset allocation in pension 
plan portfolio since it removed the manager incentive to over invest to high risk 
asset class (as explained in previous part) 
Although the significant changes of IAS19R affect sponsor firms’ pension 
reporting both in income statements (requiring ERR equal to the discount rate) 
and on the balance sheet (by eliminating the corridor method), the objective of 
this study is to test whether the smoothing-based pension accounting regime in 
income statements tilted plan sponsors toward greater risk taking. For this 
purpose, a decision was made to test the hypothesis on UK data. In UK, most 
sponsor firms (89.57 per cent according to Morais, 2010) were using the OCI 
method to fully recognize the actuarial gains and losses on balance sheet; 
therefore, adoption of IAS19R would have affected them mainly by changing the 
requirement of reporting the pension expenses in income statements.  Therefore, 
by focusing on the UK sample, this research could contribute to previous literature 
by highlighting the income statement channel between the pension accounting 
standard change to the asset allocation of sponsor companies. 
 4.3.2.1.1 Treatment event 
IAS19R was first brought to public attention as a discussion paper in March 2008. 
An ED was issued in April 2010, and on 16 June 2011, IAS19R was officially 
published by the IASB, effective for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 
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2013. Sponsor firms affected by IAS19R had two years (from 2011 to 2013) to 
make preparations for the impact of IAS19R, for example through asset 
reallocations. Therefore, it was assumed that any impact of IAS19R on asset 
allocations would have begun to be visible in 2012. This assumption is consistent 
with previous research by Agrawal (2013), in which a DID research design was 
applied to test the impact of changes in regulations and laws. 
An examining window was selected centred on IAS19R adoption, with fiscal years 
2010 and 2011 as the pre-treatment period, and 2012 and 2013 as the post-
treatment period. This length of window allowed firms sufficient time to adjust 
their pension asset allocations, but might be risky since longer windows might 
capture confounding factors that might also explain different levels of equity 
investment across treatment and control groups (Roberts and Whited, 2012; see 
Appendix B). 
4.3.2.1.2 Multivariate tests 
The first step was to examine whether UK sponsor firms reduced their levels of 
equity investment following the publication/adoption of IAS19R, using the 
following model for UK sponsor firms only: 
Equity = β0 + β1POST12 + ΣControls + ε (2) 
where POST12 is an indicator variable equal to one for 2012 and 2013 fiscal year 
ends. The coefficient of POST12 provides an estimate of the effect of IAS19R, 
after controlling for other known determinant factors. However, this analysis may 
not separate the overall effects of IAS19R from the effects of macroeconomic or 
other time trends, because it may omit unobserved control variable. 
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In order to make reliable inferences about the effects of IAS19R, and separate 
these effects from other macroeconomic or time influences, a DID test was 
conducted using UK sponsor firms (firms affected by IAS19R) and US sponsor 
firms (firms not affected by IAS19R). US firms were used as a control sample due 
to the similarity of institutional settings between the UK and the US in terms of 
pension accounting treatments (as described in chapter 2 section 2.2, sub-
section 2.1.2) . Before the UK adopted IAS19 in 2005, UK sponsor firms followed 
FRS17: Retirement Benefits in reporting their DB pension plans. FRS17 and 
SFAS 158 are similar in terms of full recognition of pension surpluses/deficits on 
the balance sheet and smoothing pension expenses using long-term expected 
returns rather than real returns on pension plans. Moreover, according to Morais 
(2010), prior to the adoption of IAS19R in 2013, most UK sponsor firms chose to 
apply the OCI method (see Appendix A), fully recognising pension 
surpluses/deficits on the balance sheet and actuarial gains and losses in OCI. 
This practice implies the similarity of UK and US sponsor firms in reporting their 
DB pension plans prior to the adoption of IAS19R. 
The control sample of US listed firms was selected using a propensity score-
matching procedure. First, a probit model of differences in plan and sponsor 
characteristics was run across US and UK pension plan sponsors: 
UK = β0 + β1SIZE + β2LEV + β3SDCF + β4NOL + β5DIVP + β6PBO + β7FVPA 
+ β8FUND + β9FUND2 + β10IND + ε                                       (3) 
UK is an indicator variable set to one for UK firms and zero for US firms. Several 
variables were included in the model to reflect plan characteristics, including the 
size of the pension (PBO and FVPA), the plan’s funding ratio (FUND, measured 
by FVPA/PBO), and the square of the funding ratio, to accommodate potential 
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non-linear relationships between funding ratios and asset allocations (Amir et al., 
2010; Bader, 1991). Also included in the model were variables that the previous 
literature suggests may affect pension funding and investing behaviour, including 
firm size (the log of market capitalisation, SIZE), leverage (long-term debt divided 
by the sum of long-term debt and total shareholder equity, LEV), operating risk 
(measured using the five-year standard deviation of the ratio of operating cash 
flows to book value of equity, SDCF), firms’ tax-paying status (an indicator 
variable set at one for firms with a tax loss carry-forward and zero otherwise, 
NOL), the dividend pay-out ratio (DIVP), and industry matching between two 
countries (IND). These variables were chosen as matching criteria following 
previous research on factors that affect sponsor firms’ funding and investment 
decisions (see Amir et al., 2010; Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981; Harrison and 
Sharpe, 1983; Bader, 1991; Friedman, 1983; Bodie et. al., 1984). 
This probit model was run on data for all the UK sponsor firms and the universe 
of all US sponsor firms for the fiscal year ending 2010 in order to match US and 
UK firms using pre-treatment characteristics. Each UK firm was then matched, 
without replacement, to a US firm that had the closest predicted value from the 
model, but within a maximum distance of three per cent. 
After selecting the control group firms using the propensity score-matching 
process, a DID test was conducted to examine more rigorously the impact of 
IAS19R. This DID test compared pre- and post-IAS19R shifts in the asset 
allocations of UK firms affected by IAS19R in relation to US firms that were not 
affected by IAS19R. This test was used with the following specification 
(Anantharaman and Chuck, 2015): 
EQUITY = β0 + β1POST12 + β2UK + β3POST12*UK + ΣControls + ε (4) 
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The main variable of interest was POST12*UK. Its coefficient was expected to be 
negative and significant in order to conclude that UK sponsor firms reduced their 
equity investment levels following the adoption of IAS19R relative to similar US 
sponsor firms. The control variables were drawn from Amir et al. (2010). The 
model controlled for plan sponsor size (SIZE), as larger sponsors may have 
different or wider investment opportunities. LEV was included because firms with 
more rigorous debt covenants may have greater incentives to mitigate volatility in 
pension returns, and thus contributions. In addition, firms with different dividend 
policies may have different incentives to mitigate volatility in pension asset returns 
and pension contributions; thus, dividend-paying status (DIVIDEND) was 
included as a control. Furthermore, as firms with higher operating risks may prefer 
to minimise risk in pension plan assets, operating risk was controlled for by 
including the standard deviation of operating cash flow deflated by total 
shareholder equity over five years (the current year and four previous years, 
SDCF). According to Black (1980) and Tepper (1981), tax-paying firms have an 
incentive to borrow on the corporate balance sheet, fund their plans and invest 
plan assets in the most highly-taxed securities – bonds. Thus, high tax-paying 
firms invest more in bonds. This “tax arbitrage” was controlled for by including an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm carried forward a net operating loss 
(NOL) and zero otherwise. Following the previous literature suggesting a non-
linear relationship between funding levels and asset allocations (see Bader, 
1991; Amir and Benartzi, 1999), the model controlled for both funding ratio 
(FUND) and its square (FUND2). It also controlled for plan horizon (HOR, the 
natural logarithm of PBO/service costs), as longer-horizon plans (with younger 
beneficiaries) invest more in equities because these offer a more effective hedge 
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against salary increases, which are of greater concern for plans with younger 
beneficiaries. 
In order to examine the hypothesis 1b, I separated the treatment sample of UK 
firms into those expected to be less affected by IAS19R adoption versus to the 
other that would be more affected by the adoption. I identified two groups by using 
the ratio of fair value of plan assets to net income, and alternatively the ratio of 
PBO to net income, and apply the following specifications: 
Equity = β0 + β1POST12 + β2HIGH_FVPA + β3POST12*HIGH_FVPA + 
ΣControls + ε             (5a) 
Equity = β0 + β1POST12 + β2HIGH_PBO + β3POST12*HIGH_PBO + 
ΣControls + ε          (5b) 
HIGH_FVPA (HIGH_PBO) is an indicator equal to one if that firm has ratio of 
FVPA (PBO) to net income higher than median ratio of the whole sample. 
The following table shows the Description of Variables in the Difference-in-
Differences research. 
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Table 7: Description of Variables 
Variable Definition 
UK 
An indicator variable equal to one for UK sponsor firms, zero for US 
sponsor firms 
  
Equity The percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities 
  
Bonds The percentage of pension assets invested in fixed income securities 
  
RealEstate The percentage of pension assets invested in real estate 
  
Other 
The percentage of pension assets invested in opaque securities 
(unknown risk characteristics, such as mutual funds, registered 
investment companies, common and collective trusts) 
  
POST12 
Is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year 2012 and after 2012, equal 
to zero for the year before 2012 
  
POST11 
Is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year 2011 and after 2011, equal 
to zero for the year before 2011 
  
POST13 
Is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year 2013 and after 2013, equal 
to zero for the year before 2013 
  
FVPA The fair value of pension plan assets 
  
PBO The projected benefit obligation 
  
SIZE Natural log of firm market capitalization 
  
LEV 
Financial leverage, measured as long-term debt divided by the sum of 
log-term debt and market capitalization 
  
DIVIDEND Dividends pay-out ratio 
  
FUND 
Funding ratio, measured as fair value of pension plan assets divided by 
the projected benefit obligation 
  
FUND2 Funding ratio squared 
HOR 
Investment horizon, measured as the natural log of the ratio of PBO to 
current service cost 
  
NOL 
An indicator variable set equal to one for firms with a tax loss carry-
forward, zero otherwise 
  
SDCF 
Operating risk, measured as the standard deviation of the ratio of 
operating cash-flow to book value of equity for 5 years, ending in current 
year. 
  
HIGH_FVPA 
An indicator variable equal to one for firms with a high ratio of FVPA to 
net income in the year 2010 and 2011 before IAS19R, where a high ratio 
of FVPA to net income is defined as a ratio of FVPA to net income above 
the median ratio of FVPA to net income calculated for the year 2010 and 
2011. I defined the median ratio of FVPA to net income separately for UK 
and US firms. 
  
HIGH_PBO 
An indicator variable equal to one for firms with a high ratio of PBO to net 
income in the year 2010 before IAS19R, where a high ratio of PBO to net 
income is defined as a ratio of PBO to net income above the median ratio 
of PBO to net income calculated for the year 2010 and 2011. I defined 
the median ratio of PBO to net income separately for UK and US firms. 
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4.3.2.1.3 Correcting for potential outliers in DID models 
In a single regression similar to univariate test, it is easy to spot outliers from 
scatterplot. However, in multi-variate regressions such as that in Equation 4, 
some observations may be “outliers” even though they do not show up on 
scatterplot. Moreover, observations that show up as outliers on scatterplot may 
actually be normal once other factors are controlled for in multiple regressions. 
For example, a small company may pay a high audit fee because other 
characteristics of that company make it a complex audit. For these reasons, 
rather than winsorizing variables that might alter some observations, as in 
previous research, Cook’s (1977) method was followed to exclude outlier 
observations from multiple regressions. Specifically, Cook’s distance (Cook’s D) 
was calculated for each firm in the sample of UK and US firms. Values of Cook’s 
D higher than 4/N were considered large, where N was the number of 
observations used in the regression. Eleven observations with large Cook’s D 
were excluded from the sample prior to running the DID model (Equation 4). 
4.3.2.2 Data Collection 
First, data were collected on all UK firms that sponsored DB plans in the year 
ending 2010. The initial sample had 356 UK sponsor firms. Six firms were 
eliminated that did not have exchange tickers and could therefore not be identified 
in the Capital IQ database. Pension plan asset allocations of each sponsor firms 
were then collected. The Capital IQ database classifies plan asset allocations into 
equity, fixed income, real estate and other. A further 96 firms were deleted for 
which insufficient data were available for sample matching and DID models. This 
resulted in 254 UK firms for matching with US firms. The matching process 
removed a further 92 firms where US firms could not be found to match with UK 
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firms within three per cent of the closest predicted value of the propensity score.25 
Two more UK firms were eliminated that cross-listed in the US market. This 
process gave a sample of 160 UK sponsor firms and 160 matched US sponsor 
firms. 
This sample was then used to collect data for the DID model (Equation 4) for the 
period from 2010 through 2013. The data collection of DID model remove further 
37 UK firms due to insufficient of data for the model (the insufficient data in both 
treatment UK firms and control US firms). The final sample for DID test consist of 
123 UK firms and 123 US firms with the total of 984 firm years. Table 8 
summarises the sample selection process. 
  
                                            
25 An alternative threshold at 5% has been applied, it offers 3 more firms to the sample. However, 
given the benefit of 3 more firms added in the sample, I decided to choose 3% to be consistent 
with previous literature and improve the quality of the matched sample (US sample) 
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Table 8: Sample selection 
Selection Criterion 
Number of Firms 
Number of 
Firm Year 
Observations 
UK public firms that sponsored DB pension plans in 
fiscal year ending 2010 
356 1424 
Less: UK firms with no exchange ticker in Capital IQ 
database 
(6) (24) 
Less: UK firms with insufficient data available for 
matching probit model 
(96) (384) 
Less: UK firms for which US matched could not be found 
using propensity scores 
(92) (368) 
Less: UK firms that cross-listed with the US market (2) (8) 
Number of UK firms in treatment group after matching 
process 
160 640 
Less: UK firms with insufficient data for DID model in 
period from 2010 through 2013 
37 148 
Number of UK firms in treatment group for DID model 123 492 
Plus: US firms (control group) matched by propensity 
score 
123 492 
Total firms in the sample 246 984 
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4.3.3 Research design and data collection for hypothesis 3a and 3b 
4.3.3.1 Proxies for employee representative regulation and licensing index 
Information presented in Table 3 (sub-section 4.2.3.1) was used to build a proxy 
for employee representative regulation. Variable BENEFICIARYREP is an 
indicator variable that one if the firm is in a country that only requires the 
appearance of a beneficiary representative on the pension plan board without 
specifying equality between the number of sponsor and beneficiary 
representatives and equals two if the firm is in a country that requires an equal 
number of sponsor and beneficiary (employee) representatives. 
The LICENSING variable represents the rigidity of the licensing process in each 
country. Based on information provided in Table 4 (sub-section 4.2.3.2), in each 
country, for every “Yes” that a country has, it gains one point for the LICENSING 
variable. Greece and France were eliminated from the sample since information 
was unavailable for some criteria. 
Table 9 shows the values of the BENEFICIARYREP and LICENSING variables 
in each country in the sample. The availability of these variables for each country 
depended on information collected from the OECD’s (2007, 2008) research. 
Table 9: Proxy for number of employee representatives, regulation and licensing index 
 Austria Belgium German Spain Finland UK Italy Netherlands Sweden 
BENEFICIARYREP 1 2 1 2  1 2 2 2 
LICENSING 3 3 5 3 4 0 3 4  
 
4.3.3.2 Empirical tests 
In order to test hypothesis 3a, mean difference tests were conducted between 
two groups of firms classified according to the BENEFICIARYREP variable. 
Group 3 included Austria, Germany and the UK, and Group 4 consisted of 
Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
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With regard to hypothesis 3b, the following model was used: 
ADOPTi = β0 + β1 LICENSINGi + ΣControlsi + εi    (6a) 
EQUITYit  =  β0 + β1 LICENSINGit + ΣControlsit + εit   (6b) 
where:  
ADOPT = EQUITY (Pre-mandatory Year) – EQUITY (Post-mandatory Year) 
with EQUITY= percentage of equity invested in pension plan. 
LICENSING is an index constructed based on data from Table 4 (sub-section 
4.2.3.2) for each country: every “Yes” in the table leads to one extra point for the 
LICENSING index. 
Model 6a was run as a cross-sectional model since the ADOPT variable was the 
change in equity investment levels between 2012 and 2014, while Model 6b was 
estimated as panel data. Both models were estimated using OLS because the 
number of countries in the sample was very small (eight countries), which was 
insufficient to run a country fixed-effect model. 
A list of control variables for the model was drawn from previous research, 
controlling for differences in country-level governance environment and 
investment barriers between countries. Sections 4.3.3.3 and 4.3.3.4 define and 
describe the effects of these control variables on pension plan asset allocations. 
4.3.3.3 Country-level governance environment and pension plan equity 
investment 
The macro corporate governance environment may affect country-level pension 
plan investment because of its role in facilitating corporate monitoring. Li et al. 
(2007) argue that broader environmental factors that facilitate effective 
monitoring may also affect the decisions of institutions to become large 
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shareholders. Their study was based on the theoretical framework of large 
shareholder monitoring, which posits that the willingness of institutions to become 
or remain large shareholders may vary with external conditions that affect 
potential monitoring costs and benefits. In particular, a favourable monitoring 
environment may encourage existing large shareholders to maintain their stakes, 
while also enticing the formation of new large shareholding as a way of partially 
capturing monitoring gains (Admati et al., 1994; Kahn and Winton, 1998; Maug, 
1998; Noe, 2002). Therefore, a strong macro governance environment influences 
institutional ownership decisions (and thus institutional investment strategy) by 
providing the necessary infrastructure to increase monitoring effectiveness and 
efficiency. Nevertheless, the above arguments do not suggest that institutions are 
the only investor class with incentives to monitor, nor that they are superior 
monitors. 
This research focuses on institutions, and in particular private pension funds, 
because they are perhaps the most prevalent and identifiable representatives of 
outside minority shareholders, and hence provide a channel through which to 
examine links between pension fund investment decisions and the country-level 
governance environment across EU countries. 
Since the relationship between pension plan investment decisions and country-
level governance environment is based on the theory of large shareholder 
monitoring, measurement of the country-level governance environment was 
based on three key aspects of the macro governance environment. In order to 
monitor management effectively, institutions must be able to: (1) voice their 
opinions (or exert influence); (2) enforce their rights; and (3) obtain information 
necessary for monitoring purposes. The ability of institutions to voice opinions 
depends on the degree to which the macro governance environment protects the 
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voting rights of minority shareholders and offers them avenues to challenge 
insiders in the corporate decision-making process. In order to measure 
shareholder protection, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) construct an anti-director 
rights index (ADRI), which quantifies the presence of six important provisions 
relating to shareholder rights in a country’s company law or commercial code. 
These components of ADRI are as follows: (1) pre-emptive rights to new issues; 
(2) cumulative voting or proportional representation; (3) shares not blocked 
before meeting; (4) proxy by mail allowed; (5) percentage of share capital to call 
an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting; and (6) oppressed minorities 
mechanism. Since this index was constructed in 1993, it was likely to be out of 
date for the purposes of this study, as many countries have since improved their 
corporate laws. Thus, a modified ADRI index constructed by Spamann (2010) 
was used. Compared with La Porta et al.’s (1997, 1998) original ADRI, 
Spamann’s (2010) ADRI index consists of the following components: (1) proxy by 
mail allowed; (2) shares not deposited before meeting; (3) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation; (4) oppressed minorities mechanism; (5) pre-
emptive right to new issues; (6) percentage of share capital to call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting and two additional variables (1) one share, 
one vote; and (2) mandatory dividend. 
While shareholder rights are an important feature of the governance environment, 
their effect is weakened if they are not effectively enforced. In order to compute 
enforcement at country level, research by Kaufmann et al. (2003) was followed 
to construct an enforcement index based on the following factors: 
(1) Rule of Law: This captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
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as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimation gives the country's 
score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, 
i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
(2) Regulatory Quality: This captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private-sector development. Estimation gives the 
country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal 
distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
(3) Control of Corruption: This captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private 
interests. Estimation gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, 
in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
An enforcement index (ENFORCE) was calculated as an average of these three 
factors. Data on these factors were downloaded from the World Bank database.26 
Ability to access information relevant to monitoring decisions depends on the 
extent to which regulations mandate sufficient, accurate and timely corporate 
disclosure. Several alternative measures were used for the extensiveness of 
reporting requirements. One variable (corporate disclosure) used Bushman et 
al.’s (2004) corporate disclosure index (CORDIS), created by rating companies’ 
annual reports based on their inclusion or omission of 90 items in seven 
                                            
26 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicator. 
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categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow 
statements, accounting standards, stock data and special items). Another 
variable, governance disclosure (GOVDIS), also from Bushman et al. (2004), 
measured the extent of governance-related disclosure (e.g. remuneration and 
share ownership of managers, board members, etc.). In order to overcome the 
problem of outdated data, a measurement of corporate transparency built by 
Francis et al. (2009) was used. This also applies Bushman et al.’s (2004) 
framework, but Francis et al. measure corporate transparency according to three 
factors: information environment, earnings opacity and synchronicity. 
4.3.3.4 Investment barriers for pension plans 
Regulations limiting investments by pension plans may have a significant impact 
on pension plan investment decision making. In general, investment barrier 
regulations on pension plans can be divided into: (1) portfolio limits on pension 
plan investments in selected domestic asset categories; (2) portfolio limits on 
pension fund investments in selected foreign asset categories; and (3) 
investment limits on pension fund investments in a single issuer/issue. This 
research focuses on limitations on equity investments by pension plans. The 
EQUITYLIMIT variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a country regulates 
investments in both domestic and foreign equities, and zero otherwise. Another 
indicator variable, SINGLEISSUELIMIT, equals one if a country regulates limits 
on investments in a single issuer/issue, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 10: Control variables for cross-country tests 
 Austria Belgium Germany Spain Finland UK Italy Netherlands Sweden 
ADRI 4 2 4 5 4 4 2 4 4 
ENFORCE 1.605 1.441 1.648 0.914 1.989 1.707 0.363 1.874 2.043 
CORDIS 70.29 92.75 100 92.75 100 100 100 100 100 
GOVDIS 78.99 76.45 72.83 79.71 89.49 94.57 65.58 85.87 96.74 
EQUITYLIMIT 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
SINGLEISSUELIMIT 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
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4.3.4.5 Sample selection and empirical results 
A univariate test was applied to the sample of 1,953 firms, as shown in Table 6 
(sub-section 4.3.1.2). 
Regarding the multivariate test, Model 6a with the dependent variable ADOPT 
included only 316 firms across eight countries (two countries were omitted 
because the LICENSING variable was missing). There were 5,008 firm-years 
available for Model 6b (panel data). 
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4.4 Descriptive Statistics  
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics for EU sample 
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of cross sectional model 
(Model 1). Panel A presents the descriptive statistic for the sample in the year 
2012, before the mandatory of IAS19R in January 2013. The equity investment 
level was on average at 33.31 % with the range from 0.8% to 83.60%. 
Additionally, the funding ratio had mean at 73 %, this suggests that on average, 
pension plans in the sample were under funded. Therefore, the pension asset 
relative to equity were less than the pension liability relative to equity (EXPOS1 
is less than EXPOS2, on average). Furthermore, the descriptive statistic of 
EXPOS3 shows that the pension expense amount is on average at 11.4% of net 
income with median is at about 4.9%. This suggests that the pension expense 
could significantly affect the reporting net income number. Panel B reports the 
descriptive statistic of the sample in the Year 2014, after the mandatory of 
IAS19R in 2013. In comparison, the equity investment level was lower for the 
year 2014, on average, but the range of this number increased (between 0.011% 
and 92.80%). The funding level of this period was quite similar to the year 2012. 
However, both the amount of pension asset and pension liability relative to equity 
were increase on average. Moreover, the mean and volatility of pension expense 
relative to net income was significantly increase (mean of EXPOS3 increased 
from 0.114 to 3.321 and the standard deviation of EXPOS3 increased from 0.322 
to 2.669). This change suggests that the reporting of pension expense relative to 
net income would be significant effected by the new pension accounting standard. 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics for cross-sectional tests 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the cross-sectional sample for the year 2012 
         
VARIABLES N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
         
Equity 253 33.31 17.50 0.800 22.70 34.29 46.40 83.60 
EXPOS1 253 0.568 1.127 0.001 0.083 0.220 0.626 15.00 
EXPOS2 253 0.710 1.253 0.013 0.122 0.342 0.749 17.86 
EXPOS3 253 0.114 0.322 -0.551 0.019 0.148 0.089 1.852 
FUND 253 0.726 0.390 0.021 0.586 0.759 0.880 2.822 
FUND2 253 0.526 0.845 0.000 0.344 0.562 0.775 7.964 
HOR 253 4.371 1.059 1.614 3.729 4.131 4.655 12.29 
LEV 253 0.243 0.161 0.000 0.110 0.126 0.326 0.926 
DIVP 253 0.639 1.321 0.000 0.300 0.444 0.635 13.51 
TAXR 253 0.267 0.236 0.004 0.201 0.243 0.305 4.078 
SIZE 253 21.77 1.864 16.01 20.66 21.79 23.15 24.25 
SDCF 253 0.172 0.488 0.007 0.046 0.067 0.143 7.722 
         
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the cross-sectional sample for the year 2014 
         
VARIABLES N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Equity 253 29.28 17.29 0.007 20.00 29.10 40.26 92.80 
EXPOS1 253 0.623 1.246 0.011 0.084 0.220 0.656 13.85 
EXPOS2 253 0.755 1.458 0.004 0.125 0.339 0.840 15.56 
EXPOS3 253 3.321 2.669 -6.463 0.024 0.049 0.133 6.528 
FUND 253 0.634 0.257 0.014 0.584 0.763 0.902 1.609 
FUND2 253 0.631 0.328 0.000 0.341 0.623 0.814 2.327 
HOR 253 4.405 1.016 1.983 3.802 4.270 4.835 8.565 
LEV 253 0.226 0.161 0.000 0.104 0.167 0.285 0.803 
DIVP 253 0.721 0.830 0.000 0.353 0.531 0.735 8.039 
TAXR 253 0.266 0.226 0.004 0.201 0.233 0.305 4.078 
SIZE 253 22.23 1.835 16.53 20.94 22.19 23.42 26.73 
SDCF 253 0.120 0.164 0.009 0.033 0.047 0.112 1.547 
Note: The table presents the descriptive statistic for the cross-sectional sample consist of 333 
firms. Panel A is the descriptive statistic of the sample for the year 2012 and Panel B is for the 
year 2014 
All variables are defined in Table 5 
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The table 12 provides the mean and median difference test to compare the mean 
and median of all the variable between two periods. The results show that the 
equity investment level in the year 2014 was significantly lower than the one in 
the year 2012 (significant at 0.01 level). The median test shows the similar result. 
In addition, the tests show negative sign for all EXPOS1, EXPOS2 and EXPOS3 
suggest the increase of these variable between 2012 and 2014. However, these 
differences are not significant, except for the median of EXPOS3 (significant at 
0.05 level). The dividend pay-out ratio was not different on average, however, the 
median test shows that the dividend pay-out ratio was significant lower for the 
year 2014 compare to the one in year 2012. The variable SIZE indicates the 
market capitalization for the sponsor firm, had significant lower for the year 2012 
compare to the year 2014 both for the mean test and median test at 0.1 level. 
Vice versa, the operation risk measured by variable SDCF were significantly 
lower for the year 2014 compared to the year 2012 at 0.1 level for the mean test 
and 0.01 level for the median test. 
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Table 12: Mean and Median different test between pre and post adoption of IAS19R 
 
 EU sample (2012) EU sample (2014) Mean 
t-test (p value) 
Median 
w-test (p value) Variable mean median sd Mean Median sd 
Equity 33.31 34.29 17.50 29.28 29.10 17.29 2.7802(0.0056)*** 2.889(0.0039)*** 
EXPOS1 0.568 0.220 1.127 0.623 0.220 1.246 -0.6706(0.5027) -0.830(0.4066) 
EXPOS2 0.710 0.342 1.253 0.755 0.339 1.458 -0.8906(0.3735) -0.939(0.3479) 
EXPOS3 0.114 0.148 0.322 3.321 0.049 2.669 -1.0651(0.2872  ) -2.495(0.0126)** 
FUND 0.726 0.759 0.390 0.634 0.763 0.257 0.1053(0.9162) -0.773(0.4394) 
FUND2 0.526 0.562 0.845 0.631 0.623 0.328 0.5312(0.5955) -0.773(0.4394) 
HOR 4.371 4.131 1.059 4.405 4.270 1.016 -1.7093(0.0879)* -2.150(0.0315)** 
LEV 0.243 0.126 0.161 0.226 0.167 0.161 1.2069(0.2279) 1.242(0.2142) 
DIVP 0.639 0.444 1.321 0.721 0.531 0.830 -0.1459(0.8840) -2.454(0.0141)** 
TAXR 0.267 0.243 0.236 0.266 0.233 0.226 0.156(0.5671) 0.1184(0.6247) 
SIZE 21.77 21.79 1.864 22.23 22.19 1.835 -1.7847(0.0748)* -1.735(0.0827)* 
SDCF 0.172 0.067 0.488 0.120 0.047 0.164 1.9280(0.0543)* 4.258(0.0000)*** 
Note: This table provides mean and median difference test to compare the mean and median difference of the EU sample before and after the adoption of IAS19R 
(between the year 2012 and 2014).  
The mean difference test column record the t-statistic and p-value in the bracket. The median difference test column records the Wilcoxon statistic and p-value in 
the bracket 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively 
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Table 13 records the correlation matrix. This table shows a highly significant 
correlation coefficient between EXPOS1, EXPOS2 and EXPOS3. This suggests 
these three variables are reliable proxy for the size of pension plan in each firm. 
Moreover, HOR variable show significant positive relationship with EXPOS1 and 
EXPOS2, suggest that the bigger the pension plan size the longer the investment 
horizon of the pension plan. In the other words, there are more active member in 
these pension plans (the pension plan with bigger size). In addition, the funding 
level has significant positive sign with EXPOS1 and EXPOS2 suggests that the 
bigger of the pension plan the better funding. Finally, the operation risk of the firm 
(SDCF) is positive significant with EXPOS1 and EXPOS2. This indicates that the 
bigger their pension plan has, the more operating risk they were bearing. 
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Table 13 shows a correlation matrix for these independent variables. 
 EXPOS1 EXPOS2 EXPOS3 FUND FUND2 HOR LEV DIVP TAXR SIZE SDCF 
EXPOS1 1           
EXPOS2 0.977*** 1          
EXPOS3 0.147*** 0.165*** 1         
FUND 0.054*** 0.035** 0.004 1        
FUND2 0.022 0.014 0.000 0.686*** 1       
HOR 0.070*** 0.067*** -0.010 0.182*** 0.047*** 1      
LEV -0.013 -0.009 -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 0.051*** 1     
DIVP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.023 -0.009 -0.004 0.042** 1    
TAXR 0.013 0.011 0.015 -0.003 -0.001 -0.021 0.045*** -0.003 1   
SIZE -0.026* -0.024 -0.030* 0.057*** -0.003 -0.072*** 0.009 -0.028* -0.026* 1  
SDCF 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.001 0.047*** 0.021 -0.003 0.089*** -0.001 -0.011 -0.008 1 
Note: This table records the correlation matrix of the cross-sectional sample for the entire period include year 2012 and Year 2014 
All variables are defined in Table 5 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively 
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4.4.2 Descriptive statistics for UK sample 
Table 14, Panels A and B show the descriptive statistics for UK sponsor firms 
pre- and post-IAS19R respectively. During the pre-IAS19R period, UK sponsor 
firms invested more in equities, with an interquartile range from 34 to 58 per cent, 
and a mean and median of 45.58 and 47.11 per cent respectively. In the post-
IAS19R period, UK sponsor firms showed a decrease in risky asset investments, 
with reductions in both mean and median, down to 40.17 and 39.00 per cent 
respectively. The FVPA was less than the PBO in both pre- and post-treatment 
periods. This indicates a deficit funding status in the UK during the period under 
examination (2010 to 2013). Between the two periods the deficit level increased, 
on average, by 47 per cent (from 287 to 422 million). However, the funded status, 
defined as the ratio of FVPA to PBO, did not change much between the two 
periods (from 86.3 to 86.6 per cent). The descriptive statistics for both periods 
show that, on average, pension plans in the UK have investment horizons longer 
than pension plans in the USA. 
Panels C and D of Table 14 show the descriptive statistics for the control group 
of US sponsor firms. The mean and median equity investment of these firms 
decreased slightly between pre- and post-IAS19R periods, from 53.56 to 52.53 
per cent and from 55.27 to 55.52 per cent respectively. The interquartile ranges 
of their equity investment levels were 46.78 to 64.00 per cent in the pre-adoption 
period and 42.96 to 64.00 per cent in the post-adoption period. Pension deficits 
for DB pension plans in the USA increased slightly over the two periods, from 740 
to 891 million dollars (an increase of about 20 per cent). However, their funded 
status remained the same between the two periods.  
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: UK sample – Pre-treatment period (2010, 2011) 
VARIABLE N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Equity 246 45.68 16.89 0.782 34.00 47.11 58.00 94.76 
FVPA 246 2,333 5,237 1.579 143.0 405.5 2,256 34,223 
PBO 246 2,620 5,899 5.787 158.3 484.3 2,638 38,755 
SIZE 246 21.39 1.877 16.63 20.09 21.41 22.51 26.12 
LEV 246 0.242 0.168 0.001 0.116 0.217 0.326 0.949 
DIVIDEND 246 0.022 0.015 0.001 0.012 0.021 0.028 0.087 
FUND 246 0.863 0.138 0.028 0.797 0.874 0.933 1.190 
FUND2 246 0.764 0.214 0.000 0.635 0.764 0.871 1.417 
HOR 246 4.717 1.103 0.635 4.039 4.548 5.244 11.09 
NOL 246 0.0075 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SDCF 246 0.445 1.845 0.006 0.047 0.087 0.187 17.49 
         
Panel B: UK sample – Post-treatment period (2012, 2013) 
VARIABLE N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 Max 
Equity 246 40.17 16.57 3.054 28.12 39.00 51.28 87.10 
FVPA 246 2,918 6,364 2.473 166.6 514.0 2,750 43,131 
PBO 246 3,340 7,462 9.456 186.2 622.0 3,291 49,436 
SIZE 246 21.84 1.738 16.68 20.76 22.02 22.81 25.97 
LEV 246 0.218 0.152 0.000 0.114 0.188 0.284 0.922 
DIVIDEND 246 0.026 0.016 0.000 0.015 0.024 0.033 0.097 
FUND 246 0.866 0.149 0.047 0.805 0.875 0.953 1.169 
FUND2 246 0.772 0.225 0.002 0.647 0.765 0.909 1.367 
HOR 246 4.890 1.212 1.163 4.192 4.715 5.507 11.29 
NOL 246 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SDCF 246 0.562 3.339 0.004 0.041 0.071 0.134 33.22 
         
Panel C: US sample – Pre-treatment period (2010, 2011) 
VARIABLE N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Equity 246 53.56 15.58 1.491 46.78 55.27 64.00 90.00 
FVPA 246 2,993 7,693 1.794 26.08 215.5 1,652 51,051 
PBO 246 3,733 9,751 3.059 37.26 266.5 1,949 67,651 
SIZE 246 21.26 2.382 15.96 19.37 21.53 23.05 26.73 
LEV 246 0.238 0.176 0.000 0.109 0.190 0.327 0.901 
DIVIDEND 246 0.022 0.023 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.029 0.135 
FUND 246 0.824 0.198 0.504 0.702 0.786 0.898 2.345 
FUND2 246 0.718 0.445 0.254 0.492 0.618 0.807 5.500 
HOR 246 3.907 0.909 2.286 3.306 3.739 4.235 7.667 
NOL 246 0.004 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SDCF 246 0.367 3.508 0.013 0.043 0.070 0.119 56.91 
         
Panel D: Us sample – Post-treatment period (2012, 2013) 
VARIABLE N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Equity 246 52.53 16.13 6.938 42.96 55.52 64.00 88.84 
FVPA 246 3,872 9,137 3.366 55.39 291.7 2,285 58,131 
PBO 246 4,763 11,594 5.798 72.93 377.1 2,714 75,895 
SIZE 246 21.74 2.262 16.78 20.16 21.87 23.36 26.81 
LEV 246 0.209 0.145 0.004 0.103 0.166 0.300 0.727 
DIVIDEND 246 0.025 0.025 0.000 0.008 0.018 0.033 0.150 
FUND 246 0.864 0.226 0.481 0.726 0.829 0.950 2.368 
FUND2 246 0.797 0.534 0.231 0.528 0.687 0.902 5.608 
HOR 246 3.943 0.880 2.192 3.382 3.781 4.299 6.878 
NOL 246 0.008 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SDCF 246 0.285 1.594 0.012 0.044 0.068 0.113 17.17 
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Panel E: UK sample – Entire period (From 2010 to 2013) 
VARIABLE N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Equity 492 43.19 16.95 0.782 30.90 42.69 54.95 94.76 
FVPA 492 2,597 5,774 1.579 149.1 452.8 2,471 43,131 
PBO 492 2,945 6,653 5.787 171.6 539.7 2,841 49,436 
SIZE 492 21.59 1.828 16.63 20.40 21.65 22.73 26.12 
LEV 492 0.231 0.161 0.000 0.116 0.203 0.298 0.949 
DIVIDEND 492 0.024 0.016 0.000 0.013 0.022 0.031 0.097 
FUND 492 0.865 0.143 0.028 0.803 0.874 0.942 1.190 
FUND2 492 0.768 0.219 0.001 0.645 0.765 0.888 1.417 
HOR 492 4.795 1.156 0.635 4.101 4.608 5.354 11.29 
NOL 492 0.004 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SDCF 492 0.498 2.625 0.004 0.044 0.0788 0.158 33.22 
         
Panel F: US Sample – Entire period (From 2010 to 2013) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Equity 492 53.07 15.84 1.491 44.72 55.27 64.00 90.00 
FVPA 492 3,409 8,411 1.794 38.33 261.9 1,861 58,131 
PBO 492 4,221 10,665 3.059 48.15 332.8 2,275 75,895 
SIZE 492 21.49 2.336 15.96 19.75 21.68 23.19 26.81 
LEV 492 0.224 0.163 0.000 0.107 0.179 0.314 0.901 
DIVIDEND 492 0.0235 0.0237 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.031 0.150 
FUND 492 0.843 0.213 0.481 0.711 0.810 0.924 2.368 
FUND2 492 0.755 0.490 0.231 0.505 0.656 0.854 5.608 
HOR 492 3.924 0.895 2.192 3.343 3.760 4.268 7.667 
NOL 492 0.006 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SDCF 492 0.328 2.770 0.012 0.043 0.069 0.115 56.91 
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics for sample of UK firms (492 firm/year 
observations) and US firms (492 firm/year observations) with defined benefit pension plans 
for which financial and pension asset allocation data are available during 2010 through 
2013. Panel A and B record the descriptive statistic for UK firms in pre-treatment period 
(2010 and 2011) and in post-treatment period (2012 and 2013) respectively. Panel C and 
D record the descriptive statistic for US firms in pre-treatment period (2010 and 2011) and 
in post-treatment period (2012 and 2013) respectively. Panel E and F show the descriptive 
statistic for entire period of UK firms and US firms respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 7. 
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The table following (table 15) records the mean and median difference tests to 
compare all variable between two sub-samples as following. Panel A is between 
UK pre-treatment and UK post treatment. Panel B is between US pre-treatment 
and US post-treatment. Panel C is between UK pre-treatment and US pre-
treatment. And finally, Panel D is between UK post-treatment and US post-
treatment. The results of these tests suggest the following implication. 
Firstly, both the mean and median test in the UK sample show that the equity 
investment level was significantly lower for the post-treatment event compared to 
the pre-treatment event. However, the result does not the same for the US 
sample. Following the year 2012, the US sponsor firms had similar equity 
investment level (not significant). Furthermore, in the US sample, the funding ratio 
mean and median test indicate that after year 2012, the funding ratio for these 
pension plan had been improved (negative and significant at 0.01 level). The UK 
sample only shows the improvement of the funding ratio in median test and only 
significant at 0.1 level. 
Secondly, in comparison between UK sample and US sample, the tests show 
that compare to US, the UK sponsor firms invest less in equity for the pre-
treatment period and post-treatment period. However, the magnitude of both 
mean difference and median difference is extended after the treatment event 
(after the year 2012). However, the size of pension plan in UK sample were 
significantly bigger than the one in US sample that indicated by the variable FVPA 
and PBO. However, this is consistent with the other variable of the UK sample 
firms are also larger the one of the US sample firms (SIZE, LEV, etc) 
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Table 15: Mean and median difference test between sub-sample 
 
Panel A: Mean and Median difference test of UK sample pre-treatment vs post-treatment 
  UK pre-treatment UK-post treatment Mean  
t-test (p value) 
Median 
w-test (p value) Variable mean median sd Mean Median sd 
Equity 45.68 47.11 16.89 40.17 39 16.57 2.9318(0.0036)*** 2.813(0.0049)*** 
FVPA 2,333 405.5 5,237 2,918 514 6,364 -0.7240(0.4697) -1.072(0.2835) 
PBO 2,620 484.3 5,899 3,340 622 7,462 -0.6017(0.5478) -1.002(0.3161) 
SIZE 21.39 21.41 1.877 21.84 22.02 1.738 -1.6526(0.0995)* -1.800(0.0719)* 
LEV 0.242 0.217 0.168 0.218 0.188 0.152 1.0691(0.2859) 1.364(0.1725) 
DIVIDEND 0.022 0.021 0.015 0.026 0.024 0.016 -1.6226(0.1058) -1.670 (0.0950)* 
FUND 0.863 0.874 0.138 0.866 0.875 0.149 -0.8919(0.3732) -1.860(0.0628)* 
FUND2 0.764 0.764 0.214 0.772 0.765 0.225 -1.1121(0.2670) -1.860(0.0628)* 
HOR 4.717 4.548 1.103 4.89 4.715 1.212 -1.5227(0.1290) -1.672(0.0945)* 
NOL 0.0075 0 0.087 0 0 0   
SDCF 0.445 0.087 1.845 0.562 0.071 3.339 -0.0580(0.9538) 1.385(0.1659) 
 
Panel B: Mean and Median difference test of US sample pre-treatment vs post-treatment 
 US pre-treatment US post-treatment Mean 
t-test (p value) 
Median 
w-test (p value) Variable mean median sd Mean Median sd 
Equity 53.56 55.27 15.58 52.53 55.52 16.13 0.7318(0.4649) 0.425(0.6705) 
FVPA 2,993 215.5 7,693 3,872 291.7 9,137 -0.5387(0.5905) -0.829(0.4069) 
PBO 3,733 266.5 9,751 4,763 377.1 11,594 -0.2443(0.8072) -0.262(0.7935) 
SIZE 21.26 21.53 2.382 21.74 21.87 2.262 -1.7572(0.0800)* -1.960(0.0500)** 
LEV 0.238 0.19 0.176 0.209 0.166 0.145 1.9189(0.0560)* 2.026(0.0427)** 
DIVIDEND 0.022 0.016 0.023 0.025 0.018 0.025 -0.5073(0.6123) -0.508(0.6116) 
FUND 0.824 0.786 0.198 0.864 0.829 0.226 -3.7297(0.0002)*** -4.723(0.0000)*** 
FUND2 0.718 0.618 0.445 0.797 0.687 0.534 -3.1149(0.0020)*** -4.723(0.0000)*** 
HOR 3.907 3.739 0.909 3.943 3.781 0.88 -0.1435(0.8860) -0.070(0.9441) 
NOL 0.004 0 0.061 0.008 0 0.091 1.0000(0.3182) 1.000(0.3173) 
SDCF 0.367 0.07 3.508 0.285 0.068 1.594 1.1962(0.2326) 1.703(0.0886)* 
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Panel C: Mean and Median difference test of UK sample pre-treatment vs US sample pre-treatment 
  UK pre-treatment US pre-treatment Mean 
t-test (p value) 
Median 
w-test (p value) Variable mean median sd Mean Median sd 
Equity 45.68 47.11 16.89 53.56 55.27 15.58 -4.9598(0.0000)*** -5.284(0.0000)*** 
FVPA 2,333 405.5 5,237 2,993 215.5 7,693 1.9932(0.0472)** 2.815(0.0049)*** 
PBO 2,620 484.3 5,899 3,733 266.5 9,751 1.6917(0.0918)* 2.652(0.0080)*** 
SIZE 21.39 21.41 1.877 21.26 21.53 2.382 1.7778(0.0765)* 1.814(0.0697)* 
LEV 0.242 0.217 0.168 0.238 0.19 0.176 0.9530(0.3414) 0.918(0.3584) 
DIVIDEND 0.022 0.021 0.015 0.022 0.016 0.023 4.9672(0.0000)*** 4.998(0.0000)*** 
FUND 0.863 0.874 0.138 0.824 0.786 0.198 1.7837(0.0755)* 4.361(0.0000)*** 
FUND2 0.764 0.764 0.214 0.718 0.618 0.445 1.2301(0.2197) 4.361(0.0000)*** 
HOR 4.717 4.548 1.103 3.907 3.739 0.909 5.0929(0.0000)*** 6.041(0.0000)*** 
NOL 0.0075 0 0.087 0.004 0 0.061 -1.0000(0.3182) -1.000(0.3173) 
SDCF 0.445 0.087 1.845 0.367 0.07 3.508 1.4531(0.1473) 1.975(0.0482)** 
         
Panel D: Mean and Median difference test of UK sample post-treatment vs US sample post-treatment 
  UK post-treatment US post-treatment Mean 
t-test (p value) 
Median 
w-test (p value) Variable mean median sd Mean Median sd 
Equity 40.17 39 16.57 52.53 55.52 16.13 -6.6610(0.0000)*** -6.691(0.0000)*** 
FVPA 2,918 514 6,364 3,872 291.7 9,137 2.0643(0.0399)** 2.944(0.0032)*** 
PBO 3,340 622 7,462 4,763 377.1 11,594 1.9459(0.0527)* 3.172(0.0015)*** 
SIZE 21.84 22.02 1.738 21.74 21.87 2.262 1.5842(0.1143) 1.673(0.0944)* 
LEV 0.218 0.188 0.152 0.209 0.166 0.145 1.6360(0.1029) 1.312(0.1896) 
DIVIDEND 0.026 0.024 0.016 0.025 0.018 0.025 4.4768(0.0000)*** 6.009(0.0000)*** 
FUND 0.866 0.875 0.149 0.864 0.829 0.226 -1.9056(0.0577)* 0.529(0.5968) 
FUND2 0.772 0.765 0.225 0.797 0.687 0.534 -2.1728(0.0306)** 0.530(0.5963) 
HOR 4.89 4.715 1.212 3.943 3.781 0.88 6.1963(0.0000)*** 6.968(0.0000)*** 
NOL 0 0 0 0.008 0 0.091   
SDCF 0.562 0.071 3.339 0.285 0.068 1.594 1.4789(0.1403) 2.276(0.0228)** 
Note: Table provide the mean and median difference test between sub-samples. Panel A: between UK pre-treatment and UK post –treatment event. Panel B: 
between US pre-treatment and US-post treatment event. Panel C: between UK pre-treatment and US pre-treatment. Panel D: between UK post-treatment and US 
post-treatment. 
The mean difference test column record the t-statistic and p-value in the bracket. The median difference test column records the Wicoxon statistic and p-value in 
the bracket 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively 
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Table 16 shows a correlation matrix between model variables, with Panel A for 
UK sponsor firms and Panel B for US sponsor firms. In the UK sample, the table 
shows that the bigger the company’s market capitalisation (SIZE) and pension 
plans (FVPA and PBO), the less they invested in equities. 
In addition, there is a positive relationship between entities’ equity investment 
levels and cash flow risk levels (SDCF). This suggests that firms with more cash 
flow volatility tended to invest more in equity (SDCF versus Equity). This 
implication is similar to that of research by Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977). 
Sharpe (1976) argues that, while a firm sponsoring a plan is required to set aside 
assets to fund pension obligations as they fall due, beneficiaries are bound to 
accept whatever payments they can get if the firm goes bankrupt with an under-
funded plan. Hence, the firm sponsoring the plan essentially owns the right to sell 
pension assets to beneficiaries at a price equal to the value of pension liabilities. 
Sharpe (1976) characterises this contract as a put option on pension assets, 
written by the beneficiaries, at a strike price equal to the value of the pension 
liabilities. Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) show that it is value-maximising for 
stockholders to increase pension risk to maximise the value of this option, 
transferring wealth from beneficiaries to stockholders. 
Interestingly, both in the Panel A and Panel B show the negative significant 
correlation between the HOR and Equity investment level at 95% and 90% of 
confident interval respectively. According to Amir et al (2010), they argued that 
pension obligation to retirees are relatively short term and primarily affected by 
interest rates. Vice versa, obligations to active employees are relatively long-term 
and are primarily affected by salary increases. In addition, value changes for 
bonds are more correlated with interest rate changes, and value changes for 
stocks are more correlated with salary increases. Thus, companies with relatively 
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young (mature) workforces should invest more in stocks (bonds). Consequently, 
there should be a positive correlation between investment horizon, HOR, and 
equity investment level. The negative significant sign at 0.05 and 0.1 level might 
be due to measurement error of the variable HOR as it might not be a perfect 
proxy for the investment horizon of a defined benefit pension plan.  
Similarly, the correlation matrix for the US sample (Table 16, Panel B) shows a 
significantly negative relationship between size of pension plan (FVPA and PBO) 
and level of equity investment. 
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Table 16: Correlation matrix 
            
Panel A: UK sample 
Variable Equity FVPA PBO SIZE LEV DIVIDEND FUND FUND2 HOR NOL SDCF 
Equity 1           
FVPA -0.102* 1          
PBO -0.0753 0.994*** 1         
SIZE -0.205*** 0.515*** 0.510*** 1        
LEV 0.038 0.126** 0.120** -0.129** 1       
DIVIDEND -0.046 -0.004 -0.002 0.295*** -0.387*** 1      
FUND -0.120** 0.092* 0.054 0.070 -0.012 0.130** 1     
FUND2 -0.174*** 0.084 0.041 0.083 -0.007 0.131** 0.968*** 1    
HOR -0.124** -0.066 -0.071 -0.298*** 0.018 -0.168*** 0.061 0.013 1   
NOL -0.067 0.302*** 0.293*** 0.129** 0.170*** -0.092* 0.013 0.009 -0.037 1  
SDCF 0.099* -0.030 -0.027 -0.103* 0.145** -0.030 -0.122** -0.127** -0.060 0.014 1 
            
Panel B: US sample 
Variable Equity FVPA PBO SIZE LEV DIVIDEND FUND FUND2 HOR NOL SDCF 
Equity 1           
FVPA -0.108* 1          
PBO -0.112* 0.993*** 1         
SIZE -0.0587 0.563*** 0.553*** 1        
LEV 0.065 -0.162*** -0.157*** -0.330*** 1       
DIVIDEND 0.086 0.189*** 0.177*** 0.566*** -0.306*** 1      
FUND 0.062 -0.040 -0.065 -0.063 0.002 -0.113* 1     
FUND2 0.089* -0.056 -0.074 -0.079 -0.014 -0.127** 0.966*** 1    
HOR -0.099* -0.001 -0.009 0.121** -0.081 0.026 -0.088* -0.114* 1   
NOL -0.108* -0.030 -0.029 0.012 0.035 -0.062 0.088* 0.076 0.169*** 1  
SDCF 0.025 0.083 0.092* 0.067 -0.062 0.046 -0.033 -0.031 -0.010 -0.008 1 
Note: The table records Pearson coefficients with all variables are defined in Table 7. Panel A records the correlation matrix for UK sample consist of 
492 firm years and the Panel B records the correlation matrix for US sample consist of 492 firm years. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. 
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4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Empirical results for EU sample 
4.5.1.1 Univariate test results 
Table 17, Panel A and Figure 1 provide analyses of changes in EU firms’ pension 
asset allocations during the period 2005 to 2014. In general, investment levels in 
equities by DB sponsor firms in the EU decreased over time, while investments 
in bonds increased over time. On average, equity investments decreased from 
56.48 to 32.49 per cent in 2014, and bond investment levels increased by about 
10 per cent, from 32.67 to 42.70 per cent, in the same period. The levels of 
investment in property did not change much during the period under examination, 
while investments in the opaque category labelled “Other” increased significantly, 
from 8.19 to 22.18 per cent for the 10-year period from 2005 to 2014. 
Table 17: Equity levels across time and univariate test results for the sample of 1953 
firms that at least report one year of PBO during the period from 2005 through 2014 
Panel A: Equity investment level of whole sample across time on average 
Asset 
category 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
%Equity 56.48 52.95 48.93 41.36 40.69 39.78 36.56 34.86 33.64 32.49 
%Bonds 32.67 34.68 37.87 42.29 43.29 43.06 44.69 44.37 43.23 42.70 
%Property 5.89 6.40 7.12 7.22 6.57 6.83 7.14 6.77 6.57 6.31 
%Other 8.19 8.67 9.94 12.78 13.40 13.78 14.84 17.73 20.54 22.18 
 
Panel B: Univariate tests of changes in pension asset allocation 
 Period1 Period2 Period3 t-test 1 vs. 2 t-test 2 vs. 3 
%Equity 47.27 37.07 33.07 10.2*** 4.00*** 
Note: Panel A presents asset allocation in each year for the sample consist of 1953 firms that 
report at least one year of PBO during the period from 2005 through 2014. Panel B records the 
mean difference test of this sample among three period (period1 from 2005 to 2009, period2 
from 2010 to 2012 and period3 from 2013 to 2014) using Tukey method 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the decrease in equity investment levels in the period from 2005 
to 2014 across EU countries. In addition, Table 17, Panel B provides the results 
of mean difference test equity investment level in three periods (Period 1: 2005 
to 2009; Period 2: 2010 to 2012; Period 3: 2013-2014). Between Periods 1 and 
2, equity investment levels decreased by 10 per cent, on average, and had means 
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were significantly different from 0 at the 0.01 level. Between Periods 2 and 3, 
equity levels continued to decrease, by 4.00 per cent on average and also had 
means were significantly different from 0 at 0.01 level. Both the table and graph 
show a trend to reduce equity investment level that begin from the year 2005, 
especially there were two significant decrease of equity investment level in the 
year of 2007-2008 and 2010 and 2011. These reductions were at the height of 
financial crisis in 2008 and the publication of IAS19R Exposure Draft in 2010. 
This suggests the impact of IAS19R ED on equity investment level. However, it 
might also be an effect of financial crisis drift since 2008. Furthermore, in figure 
1, the movement of equity level and bond level show a shift from equity to bond 
investment overtime. The opaque investment asset class (as a percentage of 
%Other) also increased during this period. Therefore, the reduction of equity was 
not entirely shifted to bond investment, but also opaque asset class that is not 
specified in term of risk profile.  
Figure 1: Asset allocations of DB plans of EU sponsor firms across time 
 
As described above, the sample of 1953 firms is highly subjected to survivorship 
bias due to missing value from data base or pension plan termination. The 
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following table (table 18) panel A and B present the asset allocation in each year 
of the sample consist of 102 firms that report PBO for entire period from 2005 to 
2014 and the mean difference test using Tukey method, respectively. The result 
is still consistent with the result of the bigger sample (consist of 1953 firms). It 
suggests that the equity investment level was gradually decreased over time 
during the period from 2005 through 2014. 
Table 18: Mean difference test using sample of 102 that reported PBO for the entire 
period from 2005 through 2014 
Panel A: Equity investment level of whole sample across time on average 
Asset 
category 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
%Equity 52.35 52.74 49.56 42.18 41.42 42.14 39.69 38.68 33.89 33.89 
%Bonds 35.47 35.19 36.75 39.72 43.81 41.91 43.15 43.68 43.26 42.19 
%Property 5.23 6.30 6.04 5.77 5.01 5.09 5.34 5.21 4.40 4.32 
%Other 6.95 5.78 7.65 12.33 9.76 10.86 11.82 12.43 18.45 19.60 
 
Panel B: Univariate tests of changes in pension asset allocation 
 Period1 Period2 Period3 t-test 1 vs. 2 t-test 2 vs. 3 
%Equity 49.40 39.79 34.01 9.62*** 5.77*** 
Note: Panel A presents asset allocation in each year for the sample consist of 102 firms that 
report PBO for entire period from 2005 through 2014. Panel B records the mean difference test 
of this sample among three period (period1 from 2005 to 2009, period2 from 2010 to 2012 and 
period3 from 2013 to 2014) using Tukey method 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively 
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The following table reports the results of univariate test on the sample of 253 
firms to compare the equity investment level of the year 2012 and the year 2014. 
The result shows that on average, sponsor firms in the sample invested 33.31 
per cent of their asset in pension plan in equity in the year 2012. This level was 
4.03 per cent higher than the one in the year 2014. The t-test outcomes show the 
p-value equal to 0.0056, indicates that, on average, the equity investment level 
of the year 2012 was significant higher than the equity investment level of the 
year 2014. It suggests there was a decrease in equity investment level following 
the adoption of IAS19R in 2013 which supports the hypothesis 1a. 
Table 19: Univariate Test compare the means of equity investment level between the 
year 2012 and 2014 
 Observation Year 2012 Year 2014 t- test 2012 
minus 2014 
W-test (p-
value)   Mean Median Mean Median 
Equity 253 33.31 34.29 29.28 29.10 2.7802(0.0056) 2.889(0.0039) 
Note: The table shows the test result of mean and median difference in equity investment level 
between the year 2012 and 2014. The t-test column records the t-statistic and the p-value in 
bracket. The median test column records the Wilcoxon statistic and p-value in bracket.  
 
While the results shown in Table 17, 18 and 19 support the hypothesis 1a that 
equity investment levels decreased over time and follow the adoption of IAS19R, 
the outcomes do not indicate the effects of IAS19R on pension plan asset 
allocations. In order to separate these effects from other macroeconomic or time 
influences, a cross-sectional test was conducted using the model specified above 
(Model 1). The next section reports the results of this test. 
4.5.1.2 Result of cross-sectional test 
Table 20 shows the country fixed-effect Model 1 across EU countries in the 
sample. This shows that, across countries, the decrease in equity investment 
levels between 2012 and 2014 was significantly positive in relation to EXPOS1, 
which captures the exposure of shareholders’ equity to volatility in the market 
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value of pension assets, and EXPOS2, which captures the exposure of 
shareholders’ equity to volatility in the discount rate. This outcome supports 
Hypothesis 1b and indicates that EU sponsor firms with larger pension plans 
relative to shareholders’ equity shifted more funds from equities to bonds 
following the adoption of IAS19R. This is consistent with the argument that 
companies with larger pension plans would have larger actuarial gains/losses. 
And in turn, compare to companies with smaller pension plans, these firms have 
more incentive to move investment from equity to bond in order to mitigate the 
volatility effect of actuarial gains/losses on shareholders’ equity (Fernandez, 
2002; Amir et al, 2010)  
Moreover, this result also supports hypothesis 1a, that is, the decrease in equity 
investment between 2012 and 2014 was significantly associated with the change 
of shareholders’ equity exposed to the volatility of pension asset and pension 
liability. These associations suggest that the way a firm report pension accounting 
information might have impact on investment strategy of pension plan. Therefore, 
the change in pension accounting standard would also have effect on asset 
allocation of pension plan. This finding is consistent with research of Amir et al 
(2010) that suggest the requirement of full recognition of pension items on 
balance sheet would have driven asset allocation of pension plan from equity to 
bond in order to mitigate the effect of accounting standard on financial statement 
of sponsor firm. 
In addition, the results for Model 1 show a significant positive relationship 
between changes in equity investment and changes in pension expenses relative 
to net income. This result also support hypothesis 1b and indicates that the larger 
the pension expense in relation with net income, the more equity investment 
decrease from year 2012 thought the year 2014. In the other words, the bigger 
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the pension plan, the more sponsor firm reduce the risk in pension plan portfolio 
following the adoption of IAS19R. 
This also supports the argument specified in hypotheses 2a and 2b that 
managers under the IAS19 had incentives to over-invest in risky assets due to 
asymmetric recognition of the risks and benefits of risky investment strategies 
under IAS19, and that adoption of IAS19R removed that asymmetric recognition, 
thereby removing managers’ incentives to over-invest in high-risk securities such 
as equities. This illustrates that boosting net income was indeed a driver of 
sponsors’ investment decisions and confirms previous research in this area (see 
Bergstresser et al., 2006; Chuk, 2013; Comprix and Muller, 2006). 
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Table 20: Cross-sectional test results for whole sample 
ADOPTi = β0 + β1ΔIMPACTi + β2ΔFUNDi + β3ΔFUNDi2 + β4ΔHORi + β5ΔLEVi + β6ΔDIVIDENDi + 
β7ΔTAXRi + β8ΔSDCFi + β9ΔSIZEi + εi 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c 
    
Constant 4.121*** 4.102*** 4.352*** 
 (0.658) (0.662) (0.278) 
EXPOS1CHN2014 3.119***   
 (1.066)   
EXPOS2CHN2014  2.226***  
  (0.873)  
EXPOS3CHN2014   0.036** 
   (0.023) 
FUNDCHN2014 8.573 12.31 9.641 
 (10.43) (10.25) (10.72) 
FUND2CHN2014 -1.675 -2.216 -1.834 
 (2.834) (2.862) (2.913) 
HORCHN2014 -0.337 -0.283 -0.068 
 (1.214) (1.221) (1.235) 
LEVCHN2014 -4.384 -4.416 -5.234 
 (7.853) (7.767) (7.977) 
DIVPCHN2014 0.844* 0.849* 0.843* 
 (0.455) (0.446) (0.464) 
TAXRCHN2014 0.156 0.146 0.335 
 (1.543) (1.449) (1.823) 
SDCFCHN2014 2.134 2.131 2.124 
 (1.763) (1.765) (1.819) 
SIZECHN2014 -2.323 -2.339 -3.364 
 (2.171) (2.169) (2.181) 
    
Observations 253 253 253 
R-squared 0.048 0.045 0.037 
Number of contries 9 9 9 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Note: the table shows the regression result of change in Equity (ADOPT) on the changing of 
EXPOS1, EXPOS2 and EXPOS3 separately in column (1), (2) and (3) respectively. All of three 
models are controlled by the change of variable that are defined by table 5. 
 *, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively 
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4.5.2 Empirical results for UK sample 
4.5.2.1 Within-country analysis 
Table 21 presents the results of Equation 2, examining the responses of UK 
sponsor firms following the adoption of IAS19R. The coefficient of POST12 is 
negative and strongly significant at the one per cent level, suggesting that, 
following the publication and adoption of IAS19R, UK sponsor firms reduced their 
levels of equity investment in pension plan assets. 
For comparison, the same test was run on the US sample. The results show that, 
in contrast to the UK sample, US sponsor firms did not reduce their levels of 
equity investment following the publication and adoption of IAS19R. The 
coefficient of the POST12 variable for the US sample is negative but not 
significant. 
Moreover, regressions for both the UK and the US samples show a significantly 
negative relationship between equity levels and tax-paying status (NOL). This 
confirms Amir et al.’s (2010) argument that companies subject to higher tax rates 
have greater incentives to allocate pension assets to bonds, as bonds are more 
heavily taxed. 
Both regressions indicate a significantly negative relationship between equity 
investment levels and firm size, suggesting that sponsors with smaller pension 
plans tended to invest more in equity securities than those with larger plans. 
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Table 21: Within-country test: Regression of Equity on Post12 
and Other Determinants of Asset Allocation 
Equity = β0 + β1POST12 + ΣControls + ε 
   
VARIABLE UK sample US sample 
POST12 -0.0425*** -0.0051 
 (0.0119) (0.0087) 
SIZE -0.0208*** -0.0109** 
 (0.0060) (0.0051) 
LEV 0.0434 0.0936 
 (0.0726) (0.0592) 
DIVIDEND 0.584 1.675*** 
 (0.810) (0.558) 
FUND 0.316 -0.236 
 (0.563) (0.152) 
FUND2 -0.352 0.107* 
 (0.325) (0.0590) 
HOR -0.0274*** -0.0223* 
 (0.0098) (0.0133) 
NOL -0.141*** -0.135*** 
 (0.0491) (0.0343) 
SDCF 0.0019 -0.0027 
 (0.0027) (0.0026) 
Constant 1.005*** 0.922*** 
 (0.297) (0.133) 
Observations 492 492 
R-squared 0.161 0.094 
Notes: Table shows the result of Linear Regression with first column 
for UK data and the second column is for US data. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm. All variables are defined in Table 7. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, 
respectively. 
For the UK data, I predict that POST12<0 and for the US data, I predict 
that POST12 is not different from zero. 
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I tabulate results of equation (5a) and (5b) in Panel A and Panel B of table 22 
respectively. For the UK sample, POST12 continues to remain negative and 
significant, similar to table 21, when partitioning on both HIGH_FVPA and 
HIGH_PBO. Although the effects of HIGH_FVPA and HIGH_PBO are 
insignificant, the coefficients on the interaction terms POST12*HIGH_FVPA and 
POST12*HIGH_PBO are negative and significant at <0.05 level, suggesting that 
UK firms tends to reduce equity investment level following the adoption of IAS19R 
more when ERR assumptions have an economically significant impact on the net 
income. Thus, these results support hypothesis 2b. In contrast, for US sample, 
the results show insignificant coefficient on POST12, HIGH_FVPA*POST12 and 
HIGH_PBO*POST12, as it is expected in a sample that not affected by IAS19R. 
Table 22 result suggests that the reduction in equity investment level is 
predictably stronger for firms expected to experience a stronger impact from 
IAS19R. That is, for firms with larger pension plan would experience a stronger 
impact from accounting standards. These impacts include “one time impact” on 
the firms’ financial statement as the disclosure items are fully recognized on 
balance sheet. And for the subsequence period, the full recognition would 
increase the volatility of balance sheet inherited from the volatility of actuarial 
gains and losses (Amit et al 2010).  
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Table 22: Within Country Test 
 
Panel A: Regression of Equity on POST12, HIGH_FVPA and 
POST12*HIGH_FVPA 
Equity = β0 + β1POST12 + β2HIGH_FVPA + β3POST12*HIGH_FVPA 
+ ΣControls + ε 
   
VARIABLES UK US 
POST12 -0.0456** -0.0098 
 (0.0177) (0.0129) 
HIGH_FVPA -0.0433 -0.0861 
 (0.0374) (0.0406) 
POST12intHIGH_FVPA -0.0118** 0.0014 
 (0.0217) (0.0149) 
SIZE -0.0130 0.0082 
 (0.0100) (0.0085) 
LEV 0.0369 0.129* 
 (0.0800) (0.0678) 
DIVIDEND 0.141 0.997 
 (0.870) (0.641) 
FUND 1.071*** -0.168 
 (0.145) (0.209) 
FUND2 -0.784*** 0.107 
 (0.124) (0.0903) 
HOR -0.0306*** -0.00501 
 (0.0113) (0.0144) 
NOL -0.168*** -0.200*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0382) 
SDCF 0.0025 0.0008 
 (0.0031) (0.0008) 
Constant 0.563** 0.430** 
 (0.222) (0.203) 
Observations 492 492 
R-squared 0.173 0.090 
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Panel B: Regression of Equity on POST12, HIGH_PBO and 
POST12*HIGH_PBO 
Equity = β0 + β1POST12 + β2HIGH_PBO + β3POST12*HIGH_PBO + 
ΣControls + ε 
   
VARIABLES UK US 
   
POST12 -0.0402** -0.00650 
 (0.0180) (0.0135) 
HIGH_PBO -0.0304 -0.0972 
 (0.0396) (0.0407) 
POST12intHIGH_PBO 0.0021** -0.0006 
 (0.0213) (0.0165) 
SIZE -0.0148 0.0107 
 (0.0102) (0.0085) 
LEV 0.0314 0.133* 
 (0.0813) (0.0679) 
DIVIDEND 0.137 0.920 
 (0.873) (0.639) 
FUND 1.070*** -0.178 
 (0.144) (0.208) 
FUND2 -0.787*** 0.109 
 (0.124) (0.0897) 
HOR -0.0311*** -0.0033 
 (0.0114) (0.0143) 
NOL -0.165*** -0.203*** 
 (0.0550) (0.0378) 
SDCF 0.0025 0.0007 
 (0.0032) (0.0008) 
Constant 0.604*** 0.383* 
 (0.229) (0.203) 
Observations 492 492 
R-squared 0.170 0.097 
Notes: Table shows the result of Linear Regression with first column 
for UK data and the second column is for US data. Panel A shows the 
result of regression of Equity with POST12, HIGH_FVPA and 
POST12*HIGH_FVPA. Panel B shows the result of regression of 
Equity with POST12, HIGH_PBO and POST12*HIGH_PBO. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. All variables are defined in 
Table 7. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, 
respectively. 
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4.5.2.2 Difference-in-differences test 
Table 23 shows the results of the DID specification test with UK and US firms, 
pre- and post-IAS19R. Column 1 shows the original model as presented in 
Equation 4. The main variable of interest is POST12intUK. As shown, the 
coefficient of POST12intUK is negative and significant at the one per cent level. 
This result suggests that UK sponsor firms, on average, reduced their equity 
investment levels post IAS19R more than US sponsor firms, which were not 
affected by IAS19R. This result provides more direct evidence supporting 
hypothesis 2a. A coefficient of POST12intUK equal to -0.0528 indicates that UK 
sponsor firms reduced their equity investment by 5.2 per cent more than the US 
control firms, after controlling for other determinants of asset allocation. 
In addition, the coefficient of the SDCF variable is positive and significant, 
indicating that firms with higher cash flow risks also invested more in equities. 
These results are interesting since they are consistent with the “risk-shifting 
theorem” documented in previous literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers 
1977), empirical evidence for which has been scarce. For example, Cocco and 
Volpin (2007), who examined 90 firms in the UK, find a positive relationship 
between firm leverage and allocation to risky assets, consistent with risk shifting. 
However, more recent research tends to provide results consistent with “risk 
management” (Rauh, 2009). Based on the US sample, the results of this study 
suggest that risk management incentives to avoid costly financial distress tend to 
dominate risk shifting in pension fund investment. These results contrast with 
Cocco and Volpin’s (2007) findings. However, this is probably because the 
institutions governing the UK system are different from those of the US system. 
In particular, Rauh (2009) argues that the system of mandatory contributions may 
not be as punishing if a pension becomes under-funded, allowing firms in the UK 
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system more leeway to take risk. The results of this research support the “risk 
shifting” theory based on examination of both UK and US sponsor firms, with US 
firms chosen as the best matches with UK firms. This suggests that the difference 
from the results of previous research may be due to differences between firm and 
plan characteristics. 
Table 23, Column 2 presents the results of a modified version of Equation 4 into 
which more interaction variables are added between POST12 and other control 
variables. While the original model (Equation 3) constrains the coefficients of 
control variables to being identical pre- and post-IAS19R, this version allows 
these coefficients to vary. This is because, since IAS19R reduced the importance 
of accounting-based asset allocation incentives, the relative importance of other 
driving factors of asset allocation may also have changed. Similarly, Table 23, 
Column 3 includes an interaction term between UK and other control variables to 
account for the possibility that the drivers of asset allocation may vary in 
importance between the UK and US. 
Table 23, Column 4 presents the results of a model that includes all the control 
variables, interaction terms between POST12 and controls and interaction terms 
between the UK and control samples. 
Across all four columns, the coefficient of POST12intUK remains negative and 
significant, supporting hypothesis 2a. The coefficient of variable SDCF is also 
significant and remains positive across all four columns. 
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Table 23: DID test with four-year window surrounding event year 2012: Regression of 
Equity using UK and US Firms 
EQUITY = β0 + β1POST12 + β2UK + β3POST12*UK + ΣControls + ε 
VARIABLE 
Diff-in-Diff 
Diff-in-Diff with 
POST12 * 
Controls 
Diff-in-Diff with 
UK*Controls 
Diff-in-Diff with 
POST12* 
Controls, 
UK*Controls 
POST12 -0.0003 -0.0128 -0.0031 -0.0166 
 (0.0083) (0.1170) (0.0085) (0.1040) 
UK -0.0611*** -0.0638*** -0.0811 -0.0957 
 (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.2300) (0.2320) 
POST12intUK -0.0528*** -0.0456*** -0.0388*** -0.0292** 
 (0.0129) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0146) 
SIZE -0.0128*** -0.0133*** -0.0089 -0.0087 
 (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0058) (0.0060) 
LEV 0.0591 0.0570 0.0915 0.0942 
 (0.0513) (0.0502) (0.0632) (0.0632) 
FUND -0.1380 -0.1390 -0.2040 -0.2640 
 (0.1870) (0.2370) (0.1890) (0.2090) 
FUND2 0.0586 0.0447 0.1130 0.1290 
 (0.0769) (0.1020) (0.0738) (0.0864) 
DIVIDEND 1.1200** 1.2000** 1.4480** 1.4820** 
 (0.4990) (0.5290) (0.6330) (0.6670) 
HOR -0.0154* -0.0110 -0.0114 -0.0054 
 (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0145) (0.0147) 
NOL -0.1870*** -0.1980*** -0.2240*** -0.3040*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0473) (0.0383) (0.0462) 
SDCF 0.0028*** 0.0030*** 0.0017* 0.0021*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
POST12intSIZE  0.0011  -0.0007 
  (0.0035)  (0.0035) 
POST12intLEV  0.0087  0.0020 
  (0.0531)  (0.0519) 
POST12intFUND  0.0139  0.1280 
  (0.1500)  (0.1080) 
POST12intFUND2  0.0211  -0.0375 
  (0.0635)  (0.0478) 
POST12intDIV  -0.1500  -0.0128 
  (0.3290)  (0.3360) 
POST12intHOR  -0.0092  -0.0130* 
  (0.0066)  (0.0066) 
POST12intSDCF  -0.0004  -0.0027 
  (0.0011)  (0.0019) 
POST12intNOL  0.0427  0.1440*** 
  (0.0515)  (0.0373) 
UKintSIZE   -0.0110 -0.0109 
   (0.0087) (0.0088) 
UKintLEV   -0.0704 -0.0752 
   (0.0989) (0.0997) 
UKintFUND   1.1860*** 1.2060*** 
   (0.2420) (0.2470) 
UKintFUND2   -0.8450*** -0.8570*** 
   (0.1430) (0.1450) 
UKintDIV   -1.2360 -1.2660 
   (1.0730) (1.0780) 
UKintHOR   -0.0175 -0.0172 
   (0.0180) (0.0180) 
UKintNOL   0.0725 0.1560** 
   (0.0641) (0.0692) 
UKintSDCF   0.00068 0.0023 
   (0.0028) (0.0035) 
Constant 0.9000*** 0.9030*** 0.8040*** 0.8120*** 
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 (0.1430) (0.1600) (0.1610) (0.1690) 
Observations 984 984 984 984 
R-squared 0.148 0.150 0.191 0.194 
Note: The table shows the regression results of difference-in-differences test using treatment 
group of the 123 UK sponsor firms and control group of the 123 US sponsor firms for the 
period from 2010 through 2013. The first column shows the regression result of original DID 
model (equation 4). The second column shows the regression result of original DID model but 
include interaction terms between POST12 and control variables. The third column shows the 
regression result of original DID model but include interaction terms between UK and control 
variables. And finally, the fourth column shows the regression result of original DID model but 
include interaction terms between POST12 and UK with control variables. Standard errors are 
clustered by firms. 
All variables are defined in Table 7 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. 
In this table, I predict that UK*POST12 <0 
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4.5.3 Empirical Result for Hypothesis 3a and 3b 
Table 24, Panel A documents univariate tests on two groups of 
BENEFICIARYREP. The test compares the mean difference in equity levels and 
changes in equity investment between 2012 and 2014 (variable ADOPT) 
between these groups. The outcomes suggest that the equity investment levels 
of Group 2 were less significant than for Group 1. A value of 2 means that 
regulation is more rigid on employee protection. This suggests that regulation of 
the number of beneficiary representatives on a pension plan board may prevent 
managers from over-investing in high-risk securities, thus shifting the risk from 
shareholders to employees. Unfortunately, the results of the univariate test to 
compare changes in equity investment levels for 2012 and 2014 between Groups 
1 and 2 are unclear. The difference has a positive sign but is insignificant. 
Table 24, Panel B shows the results of multivariate tests between equity 
investment levels and licensing regulations (LICENSING), as well as changes in 
equity investment levels in 2012 and 2014 with licensing regulations. With equity 
investment level as the dependent variable, the results suggest that the more 
rigid the licensing process, the less equity was invested. Again, this outcome 
suggests that more rigid licensing processes may improve pension plan 
governance, and thus prevent managers from shifting risk from shareholders to 
employees. 
The results for the test using changes in equity investment levels between 2012 
and 2014 (variable ADOPT) as a dependent variable is insignificant and unclear. 
One reason for this outcome may be that the available data on institutional factors 
and regulation were sticky over time and missing for some countries. This led to 
insufficient variation in the variables to provide reliable inferences. This problem 
might be solved if country samples were enlarged or data on pension plan 
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governance were collected at firm level. Therefore, further research is proposed 
to collect additional data in order to run reliable tests for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
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Table 24: Univariate test of BENEFICIARY and multivariate test of LICENSING 
Panel A: Univariate test of variable BENEFICIARYREP 
       Mean  
 BENEFICIARYREP=1 BENEFICIARYREP=2 t-test 
VARIABLE mean median sd mean median sd mean (1) - mean (2)  
         
Equity 44.71 45.39 21.07 33.81 33.00 18.70 10.89***  
ADOP2014 3.469 1.336 13.37 2.110 0.421 11.22 1.359  
         
 
Panel B: Multivariate test of main independent variable LICENSING 
ADOPTi = β0 + β1 LICENSINGi + ΣControlsi + εi 
EQUITYit  =  β0 + β1 LICENSINGit + ΣControlsit + εit 
 Model 5a Model 5b 
VARIABLE With ADOPT as dependent 
variable 
With Equity as dependent variable 
   
LICENSING -0.338 -4.115*** 
 (1.519) (0.922) 
ADRI -1.527 -5.831*** 
 (1.273) (1.497) 
ENFORCE -0.929 15.85*** 
 (3.266) (5.124) 
CORDIS 0.299*** 0.316*** 
 (0.107) (0.0996) 
GOVDIS 0.197 0.360 
 (0.129) (0.231) 
EQUITYLIMIT -0.392 -7.557*** 
 (2.583) (2.843) 
SINGLEISSUELIMIT 2.498 13.72*** 
 (2.392) (2.895) 
Constant -35.35*** -19.78 
 (10.26) (15.65) 
Observations 316 5,008 
R-squared 0.025 0.206 
Note: Panel A record the result of t-test between two groups BENEFICIARYREP. The test 
compares the mean difference in equity levels and changes in equity investment between 
2012 and 2014 between these groups. 
Panel B shows the results of multivariate tests between changes in equity investment levels 
in 2012 and 2014 with licensing regulations (LICENSING) in the first column, and equity 
investment levels and licensing regulations in the second column. 
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4.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
4.6.1 Opaque asset class 
Both IAS19R and US GAAP require plan sponsors to disaggregate the FVPA into 
classes that distinguish the nature and risks of those assets. The data collected 
from the Capital IQ database consisted of four asset categories; equity, fixed 
income, real estate and “other”. 
The “other” asset category is defined as the percentage of investment in any other 
asset classes apart from equities, fixed income and real estate. These assets 
differ from other asset categories since they include descriptions of the legal 
structure of the investments that are uninformative about their risk-return profiles, 
for example “mutual funds”, “registered investment companies” and “common 
and collective trusts”. For this reason, in order to robustly test the main results, I 
follow the research of Anatharaman and Chuck (2015) to exclude the UK sponsor 
firms with more than 20 per cent invested in opaque asset categories according 
to the Capital IQ database from the sample. 
This reduced the sample from 123 to 88 UK sponsor firms. The matching process 
was then repeated to find 88 US sponsor firms as a control group. 
Table 25 shows the results of the DID specification test for the new sample. As 
for the main tests, Column 1 shows the original model as presented in Equation 
4 and the other columns present the results of the modified versions. Across all 
four columns, the coefficient of POST12intUK remains negative and significant, 
supporting hypothesis 2a. 
In addition, the coefficient of the LEV variable is positive and significant, indicating 
that firms with higher leverage tended to invest more in equities. Once again, the 
results show that firms with higher cash flow risks also invest more in equities.  
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Table 25: DID test with four-year examining window surrounding event year 2012 
(sample without opaque sponsors) 
EQUITY = β0 + β1POST12 + β2UK + β3POST12*UK + ΣControls + ε 
     
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST12 -0.00854 0.151 -0.00940 0.142 
 (0.0101) (0.123) (0.0102) (0.115) 
UK -0.0468** -0.0496** -0.302 -0.297 
 (0.0218) (0.0221) (0.274) (0.277) 
POST12intUK -0.0440*** -0.0375** -0.0421*** -0.0351** 
 (0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0160) 
SIZE -0.0168*** -0.0148*** -0.00970* -0.00713 
 (0.00428) (0.00445) (0.00562) (0.00590) 
LEV 0.123** 0.101* 0.183*** 0.158** 
 (0.0560) (0.0548) (0.0665) (0.0692) 
FUND 0.171 0.238 -0.510 -0.487 
 (0.296) (0.320) (0.521) (0.518) 
FUND2 -0.112 -0.166 0.303 0.277 
 (0.175) (0.204) (0.280) (0.284) 
DIVIDEND 0.870 0.869 0.491 0.419 
 (0.572) (0.595) (0.716) (0.738) 
HOR -0.00694 -0.00304 -0.00699 -0.00169 
 (0.00786) (0.00854) (0.0116) (0.0124) 
NOL -0.0943* -0.0955* -0.0346 -0.0425 
 (0.0497) (0.0498) (0.0572) (0.0588) 
SDCF 0.00229** 0.00265*** 0.00189 0.00225*** 
 (0.00101) (0.000806) (0.00118) (0.000833) 
POST12intSIZE  -0.00439  -0.00550 
  (0.00381)  (0.00397) 
POST12intLEV  0.0663  0.0747 
  (0.0601)  (0.0585) 
POST12intFUND  -0.169  -0.0689 
  (0.224)  (0.181) 
POST12intFUND2  0.130  0.0661 
  (0.150)  (0.116) 
POST12intDIV  0.0450  0.209 
  (0.387)  (0.395) 
POST12intHOR  -0.00781  -0.0102 
  (0.00880)  (0.00880) 
POST12intSDCF  -0.00104  -0.00268 
  (0.000999)  (0.00254) 
UKintSIZE   -0.0107 -0.0111 
   (0.00824) (0.00831) 
UKintLEV   -0.0951 -0.101 
   (0.111) (0.112) 
UKintFUND   1.524*** 1.530*** 
   (0.550) (0.557) 
UKintFUND2   -1.050*** -1.053*** 
   (0.319) (0.323) 
UKintDIV   0.671 0.663 
   (1.000) (1.008) 
UKintHOR   -0.00432 -0.00484 
   (0.0155) (0.0157) 
UKintNOL   -0.122 -0.108 
   (0.0738) (0.0753) 
UKintSDCF   0.000221 0.00175 
   (0.00286) (0.00391) 
Constant 0.796*** 0.727*** 0.905*** 0.835*** 
 (0.149) (0.152) (0.228) (0.225) 
Observations 704 704 704 704 
R-squared 0.137 0.145 0.182 0.189 
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Note: The table shows the regression results of difference-in-differences test using treatment 
group of the 88 UK sponsor firms that have opaque asset class less than 20% and matched 
control group of the 88 US sponsor firms for the period from 2010 through 2013. The first column 
shows the regression result of original DID model (equation 4). The second column shows the 
regression result of original DID model but include interaction terms between POST12 and 
control variables. The third column shows the regression result of original DID model but include 
interaction terms between UK and control variables. And finally, the fourth column shows the 
regression result of original DID model but include interaction terms between POST12 and UK 
with control variables. Standard errors are clustered by firms. 
All variables are defined in Table 7 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. 
In this table, I predict that UK*POST12 <0 
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4.6.2 Alternative treatment events 
This section describes several additional tests conducted to examine the impact 
of IAS19R on asset allocations, but with different treatment events. Since IAS19R 
was published in June 2011 and became mandatory on 1 January 2013, the test 
was re-run with two different window periods: (1) four years centred around 2011, 
the year of publication; and (2) four years centred around 2013, the year of 
adoption (Sensitivity Tests 2A and 2B in Appendix B). 
Table 26 shows the results of DID tests. Column 1 presents the outcome of the 
Equation 3 model but with a POST11 variable for the four-year period surrounding 
Year 2011. Column 2 shows the outcomes of the Equation 3 model but with a 
POST13 variable for the four-year period surrounding Year 2013. 
For the period surrounding the year of publication (2011), there was a significant 
decrease in both UK and US sponsor firms following publication. However, the 
variable of interest, POST11intUK, has an insignificant coefficient, suggesting 
that, following the publication of IAS19R in 2011, UK sponsor firms, on average, 
did not reduce their equity investment levels compared with US sponsor firms. 
Similarly, no reduction is observed in equity investments by UK sponsor firms 
relative to US sponsor firms following the year of adoption, since the coefficient 
of the POST13intUK variable is not significant. 
Across the different period analyses, positive coefficients are still seen for the 
SDCF variables, which remain significant at the one per cent and ten per cent 
levels respectively. 
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Table 26: DID test with four-year window 
surrounding event years 2011 and 2013 
EQUITY = β0 + β1POST11 + β2UK + β3POST11*UK + 
ΣControls + ε 
EQUITY = β0 + β1POST13 + β2UK + β3POST13*UK + 
ΣControls + ε 
   
VARIABLE Eent Year 2011 Event Year 2013 
POST11 -0.0295***  
 (0.0081)  
POST11intUK -0.0218  
 (0.0133)  
POST13  0.0254** 
  (0.0122) 
POST13intUK  -0.0586*** 
  (0.0154) 
UK -0.0547*** -0.0735*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0234) 
SIZE -0.0118*** -0.0137*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0046) 
LEV 0.0613 0.0322 
 (0.0443) (0.0598) 
FUND -0.170 -0.185 
 (0.267) (0.201) 
FUND2 0.0470 0.0882 
 (0.125) (0.0836) 
DIVIDEND 1.310*** 0.832* 
 (0.424) (0.491) 
HOR -0.0176** -0.0208** 
 (0.0083) (0.0087) 
NOL -0.191*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0324) 
SDCF 0.0022*** 0.0043* 
 (0.0008) (0.0022) 
Constant 0.930*** 0.952*** 
 (0.163) (0.154) 
Observations 980 980 
R-squared 0.127 0.155 
Notes: The table shows the result of DID test with different 
treatment even of the Year 2011 and Year 2013. The first 
column shows the regression result of DID test using the 
treatment event of the Year 2011 (POST11) with the data 
of 123 UK sponsor firms and 123 US firms for the period 
from 2009 through 2012. And the second column shows 
the regression result of DID test using the treatment event 
of the Year 2013 (POST13) with the data of 123 UK 
sponsor firms and 123 US firms for the period from 2011 
through 2014. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
All variables are defined in Table 7 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and 
p<0.01, respectively. 
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4.6.3 Narrower examining window 
For both the main test and the tests with different treatment events, the examining 
window was four years. This section describes the results of a DID test using a 
narrower window of two years surrounding the event for 2011, 2012 and 2013 
(Sensitivity Tests 3A, 3B and 3C in Appendix B). It was hoped that using a 
narrower window would strengthen the results by ruling out other confounding 
factors that might explain changes in equity investment levels. However, it might 
be difficult to capture changes in equity levels with the narrower window since 
asset reallocations take time due to liquidity costs. Also, if the immediate impact 
of IAS19R was not stark enough to justify the transaction costs, the results might 
not show any significance. 
Table 27 records the outcomes of DID tests for three separate two-year periods 
surrounding the years 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
In each version of the model across the three separate periods, the coefficients 
of the POST11intUK, POST12intUK and POST13intUK variables are not 
significant. These outcomes may be because UK sponsor firms had two years to 
prepare for the adoption of IAS19R (from June 2011 to 1 January 2013); thus, 
they may have gradually changed the asset allocations in their pension plans to 
avoid liquidity costs. 
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Table 27: DID test with two-year window surrounding event years 
2011 and 2013 
EQUITY = β0 + β1POST11 + β2UK + β3POST11*UK + ΣControls + ε 
EQUITY = β0 + β1POST12 + β2UK + β3POST12*UK + ΣControls + ε 
EQUITY = β0 + β1POST13 + β2UK + β3POST13*UK + ΣControls + ε 
    
VARIABLE Event Year 2011 Event Year 2012 Event Year 2013 
POST12 0.0088   
 (0.0098)   
POST12intUK -0.0330**   
 (0.0163)   
POST11  -0.0374***  
  (0.0106)  
POST11intUK  -0.0094  
  (0.0158)  
POST13   0.0353** 
   (0.0159) 
POST13intUK   -0.0463** 
   (0.0186) 
UK -0.0601** -0.0591*** -0.0868*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0202) (0.0246) 
SIZE -0.0150*** -0.0132*** -0.0127** 
 (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0051) 
LEV 0.0492 0.0796* 0.0699 
 (0.0566) (0.0456) (0.0692) 
FUND -0.377 -0.199 -0.165 
 (0.446) (0.195) (0.173) 
FUND2 0.169 0.0435 0.0757 
 (0.252) (0.0804) (0.0655) 
DIVIDEND 1.493*** 1.395*** 1.084** 
 (0.513) (0.467) (0.528) 
HOR -0.0165* -0.0133 -0.0201** 
 (0.00851) (0.00823) (0.00944) 
NOL -0.122*** -0.222*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0446) (0.0359) 
SDCF 0.00363 0.00250*** 0.00237* 
 (0.00306) (0.000897) (0.00134) 
Constant 1.042*** 0.971*** 0.907*** 
 (0.207) (0.141) (0.159) 
    
Observations 492 492 492 
R-squared 0.110 0.137 0.167 
Notes: This table shows the DID test with narrower examining windows (only 
1 year before and 1 year after the treatment event). The first column shows 
the regression results using the sample of 123 UK sponsor firm and 123 US 
sponsor firms for the period from 2011through 2012. The second column 
shows the regression results using the sample of 123 UK sponsor firm and 
123 US sponsor firms for the period from 2012through 2013. The third column 
shows the regression results using the sample of 160 UK sponsor firm and 
123 US sponsor firms for the period from 2013through 2014. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm. 
All variables are defined in Table 7 
*, **, *** indicates significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. 
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4.6.4 Using Vector of Control to conduct Difference-in-Differences Test 
This part provide the difference-in-differences test similar to the main test in 
section 4.5.2.2 with the full sample of 123 UK treatment firms and 123 US control 
firms and treatment event is in 2012. However, in order to improve the control of 
the model, instead of using the control variables similar to the test in table 23, the 
test is conducted as 2 stage regression (2SLS) by using a vector of control to 
include in the model as an independent variable.  
The following table shows the test for the regression. The result confirms the 
difference-in-differences test as the variable of interest POST12intUK is negative 
and significant at 0.01 level, indicate that, compare to the US control sample, on 
average, the UK sponsor firms reduce their equity investment level following the 
adoption of IAS19R in 2012. 
Table 28:Difference in-Differences 
Test using vector of control 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Model 1 
  
POST12 -0.00617 
 (0.00925) 
UK -0.0350* 
 (0.0200) 
POST12intUK -0.0478*** 
 (0.0143) 
VectorControl 0.867*** 
 (0.188) 
Constant 0.0925 
 (0.0926) 
  
Observations 984 
R-squared 0.126 
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4.7 Discussion of Further Research Opportunities 
4.7.1 Risk shifting from shareholders to pension plan beneficiaries 
The previous literature shows that DB pension plans create obligations similar to 
long-term debt (Oldfield, 1977; Feldstein and Seligman, 1981). While sponsor 
firms must set aside assets to fund these obligations as they fall due, 
beneficiaries are bound to accept whatever payments they can get if a firm goes 
bankrupt with an under-funded plan. Therefore, according to Sharpe (1976), 
sponsor firms essentially own put options on pension assets as a right to sell 
pension assets to beneficiaries at a price equal to the value of pension liabilities. 
Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) show that it is value-maximising for 
stockholders to increase pension risk to maximise the value of put options, thus 
transferring wealth from beneficiaries to stockholders. Pension risk may be 
increased by either increasing the plan’s leverage (under-funding the plan) or 
investing the plan’s assets in risky securities (increasing the plan’s underlying 
asset risk). In both cases, risk is shifted from stockholders to employees. 
Moreover, according to Sharpe (1976), in countries where there are pension 
guarantees, such as the PBGC in the US and the PPF in the UK, stockholders 
also have incentives to transfer risk to pension guarantees. The PBGC (or similar 
institutions in other countries) guarantees pension payments from DB pension 
plans (often subject to some limits) if they terminate with insufficient funds and 
sponsors fail to meet their obligations. Thus, effectively, the PBGC sells a put 
option to the companies’ owners (Sharpe, 1976). In situations of extreme financial 
distress where PBGC insurance premiums are not fully risk-adjusted, it becomes 
value-maximising for stockholders to increase plan risk, so as to maximise the 
difference between the value and the cost of the PBGC put option (Sharpe, 1976). 
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The pension guarantee thus intensifies stockholders’ ability and incentive to 
engage in risk shifting with pension plans. 
Despite the strong theoretical prediction of risk shifting, previous empirical 
evidence supporting this prediction is quite weak and mixed. Bodie et al. (1985) 
and Coronado and Liang (2005) find that firms close to distress have lower 
pension funding, consistent with risk shifting, while Friedman (1983), Francis and 
Reiter (1987) and Petersen (1996) find the opposite. In addition, Friedman 
(1983), Amir and Benartzi (1999) and Rauh (2009) find strong evidence indicating 
an association between firm risk and pension asset allocation. This suggests that 
plan sponsors under poor financial conditions reduce allocations to riskier asset 
classes such as equities, consistent with risk management rather than risk-
shifting behaviour. As risk-shifting theory is often cited as a main driver of pension 
risk taking, the lack of empirical evidence to support it is puzzling. 
Recent research by Anantharaman and Lee (2014) provides one explanation: 
managerial risk aversion. They argue that, while diversified stockholders have 
incentives to increase firm risk at the expense of debt-holders, most corporate 
decision making is in the hands of managers, who prefer less risk than 
stockholders, out of concern for their reputation, undiversifiable human capital, or 
the private benefits of control. Stockholder–manager conflict on risk may thus 
offset the risk-shifting incentives arising from stockholder–debt-holder conflict. In 
order to solve the puzzle, Anantharaman and Lee (2014) examine compensation 
contracting as a primary means of altering managerial incentives. They propose 
that equity-based compensation increases the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to 
stock price performance (delta), and so aligns managers closer with stockholders, 
but may also lead managers who are under-diversified in firm-specific wealth to 
avoid risk. On the other hand, options add convexity to managers’ payoffs and, 
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by increasing the sensitivity of managerial wealth to firm risk (vega), may offset 
the risk-avoidance tendencies introduced by delta and by reputation or human 
capital concerns. Therefore, they hypothesise that risk shifting may be more 
pronounced in firms in which top managers have high vega. They examine 
pension funding (asset allocation) for a sample of 5,748 (4,398) firm-years 
spanning 1999 to 2010. Cross-sectional tests show that firms approaching 
distress tend to under-fund plans, after controlling for operating cash flows. In 
addition, they find that the association between firm risk and under-funding is 
stronger for firms whose CFOs have high vega and low option delta, suggesting 
that risk-shifting behaviour is more intense when compensation structures 
provide risk-taking incentives for managers. The findings are stronger throughout 
for CFO than for CEO incentives. Furthermore, tests of asset allocations show 
that allocations to risky assets increase when firms are not only close to distress 
but also have poorly funded plans, suggesting risk-shifting behaviour. 
Examination of the effect of managerial incentives in cross-sectional tests reveals 
that the association between firm risk and allocation to risky asset classes is 
again more pronounced for CFOs (but not CEOs) with high vega and low option 
delta. These effects persist but are only marginally significant within firms and 
within managers over time. These findings are also robustly tested using 
instrumental variables to establish the causal effect of compensation incentives 
on pension risk shifting. However, in using the accounting rule mandating stock 
option expensing on income statements as an exogenous shock on delta and 
vega, the asset allocation results are inconclusive. The test only supports the 
causal effect of CFO equity incentives on pension under-funding. Overall, the 
results indicate that CFO vega incentives strongly intensify risk shifting through 
pension under-funding. They also intensify risk shifting through pension asset 
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allocation to risky assets, but these effects are modest and less consistently 
robust. 
In addition to Anantharaman and Lee’s (2014) recent research, Cocco and Volpin 
(2005) also provide evidence of manager incentives for involvement in risk-
shifting activities. From examination of DB plans in the UK, they find that the 
pension plans of indebted companies with more “insiders” (i.e. who were also 
executive directors of the sponsoring company) on the trustee board invested 
more in equities, contributed less to the pension fund and had a higher dividend 
pay-out ratio. They conclude that when finances get tough, conflicts of interest 
may arise and impartial trustees are needed on the board to make governance 
work. They suggest a governance system of pension plan boards where the 
power to make decisions is balanced between representatives of both the 
sponsoring firm and beneficiaries of the pension plan. The next section will 
describe in more detail the role of beneficiary representatives in investment 
decision making for DB pension plans. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
In 2011, the IASB published an amendment of IAS19 (IAS19R) that significantly 
changed the accounting and reporting of DB plans across EU-listed companies 
by eliminating the “corridor method” and the application of ERR in the income 
statement.  
The elimination of the “corridor method” had substantial impact on a large number 
of EU companies’ financial statement that used to apply this method to recognize 
their pension AGL27. In particular, it had severe one-time effect on these firms’ 
equity and significantly increase their balance sheet volatility in subsequent 
period (PWC, 2011). As a result, it raised the likelihood of debt- and equity-based 
covenant violations. In order to mitigate the effect of IAS19R adoption, the 
sponsor firms were expected to shift pension assets from high risk asset class to 
lower risk asset class (Amit et. al. 2010). 
The first part of the chapter focus on the sample of the EU data to examine the 
overall effect of IAS19R adoption on EU-listed firms. Firstly, a sample of 1,953 
firms from 21 European countries was collected for the period 2005 to 2014 and 
test for the mean and median difference on equity investment levels between 
three different periods: (1) from 2005 to 2009 when IAS19R was not draft, (2) 
from 2010 to 2012 when the ED of IAS19R was made to publish and IAS19R was 
published and (3) from 2013 to 2014 when IAS19R was mandatory. The outcome 
shows that there was a reduction in equity investment levels over time and 
following the adoption of IAS19R in 2013. 
                                            
27 According to Morais (2008), the “corridor method” was popular across EU-listed companies 
compared to the other two methods: the OCI method and the IS method. 
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Furthermore, using Amir et al.’s (2010) cross-sectional model for the periods 
2012 and 2014, with 253 firms across 9 EU countries, the outcomes reveal that 
the decrease in equity investment between 2012 and 2014 was significantly 
associated with the change of shareholders’ equity exposed to the volatility of 
pension asset and pension liability. These associations suggest that the way a 
firm report pension accounting information might have impact on investment 
strategy of pension plan. Therefore, the change in pension accounting standard 
would also have effect on asset allocation of pension plan. 
In addition, the results also show a significant positive relationship between 
changes in equity investment and changes in pension expenses relative to net 
income. This result indicates that the larger the pension expense in relation with 
net income, the more equity investment decrease from year 2012 thought the 
year 2014. In the other words, the bigger the pension plan, the more sponsor firm 
reduce the risk in pension plan portfolio following the adoption of IAS19R. 
In addition to the elimination of “corridor method”, the abolition of ERR in income 
statement removed the asymmetric recognition of benefits and risks in risk-taking 
investment strategies for pension asset plan. That is, a sponsor firm is no longer 
allowed to recognise the high premium of return in their income statement when 
they invest their pension plan portfolio in high-risk asset class such as equity. 
Thus, by removing this asymmetry, IAS19R also removed managerial incentives 
over invest on high-risk asset class than the optimal level in their pension plan 
assets. Therefore, both the amendments of IAS19 on balance sheet and income 
statement were expected to drive the asset allocation of pension asset portfolio 
toward lower risk asset class such as bonds.  
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Prior to the adoption of IAS19R, the majority of UK sponsor firms applied the OCI 
method to recognize their AGL on the balance sheet (Morais, 2008). Therefore, 
in the context of the UK firms, the elimination of the “corridor method” had little 
impact on their balance sheets. However, the elimination of the ERR has led to a 
situation where UK sponsor firms are no longer able to take credit for anticipated 
equity investments out-performing AA corporate bonds. As a result, nearly all UK 
companies have seen an increase in pension expenses reported in their P&L 
accounts (PwC, 2011). The second part of the chapter focuses on the UK context 
to shed light on the impact of IAS19R on asset allocation via the “income 
statement channel”. Although, this part aims to highlight the “income statement 
channel” by relying on the UK sample in which majority of the firms used the OCI 
method, there are still small number of firms in the sample that might apply the 
“corridor method” in the period before the adoption of IAS19R.  Due to the 
limitation of data base, this limitation is currently not fixed and might affect the 
conclusion of this research. 
Using a sample of 123 UK firms for the period 2010 to 2013, a DID research 
design was used to compare UK sponsor firms’ levels of equity investment with 
a group of US firms matched using propensity score matching. The matching 
process is performed by running a probit model to calculate the propensity score 
of the UK and US firms using both their pension plan characteristic, firm 
characteristic and their industries. Then, for each of the UK firms in the sample, 
a US firm is appointed as a control firm if that firm has closest value of propensity 
score to the one of the UK firm, but not outside the range of plus and minus 3% 
of the UK firm’s score. 
The findings of DID test reveal that, following the adoption of IAS19R, UK sponsor 
firms, on average, reduced the levels of equity investment in their pension plans 
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more than the US sponsor firms in the control group. These results suggest that 
the abolition of ERR would have impact on asset allocation of sponsor pension 
plans. In turn, this implies the incentive of manager to boost net income using the 
pension plan asset to invest in high-risk asset class such as equity. 
In addition to the main test, this outcome is robustly examined by conducting the 
sensitivity analysis with different treatment events, including the publication of 
IAS19R in 2011 and the mandatory of IAS19R in 2013, with the 4 years’ length 
of examining window surrounding the chosen events date. The study also sought 
to rule out any confounding factors that might explain deviations in equity 
investment levels by narrowing the window of examination from four years to two 
years (one year before and one year after the events). The results of 4 years’ 
examining window tests show no significant on variable of interest in the year of 
event in 2011 but significant for the year of event 2013. The IAS19R was made 
to publish in June 2011 but was not mandated until January 2013. This outcome 
might due to the time lag that manager response to the publication of IAS19R 
since the sponsor firms had almost 2 years to prepare for the IAS19R mandatory 
in 2013. Additionally, the results of the 2 years’ examining window tests report no 
significant on variable of interest. One reason that might explain these outcomes. 
That is, manager might reallocate their asset in pension plan gradually in order 
to avoid the expensive transaction costs.  
Furthermore, on these tests, a positive relationship was also found between 
equity investment levels and firms’ leverage and cash flow risk. This supports the 
“risk-shifting” hypotheses documented in the previous literature (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Leland, 1998; Cocco and Volpin, 2007). However, 
any direct tests of this hypothesis are outside the scope of this research, leaving 
opportunities for further research. 
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In addition to examining the impact of IAS19R adoption, the research also sought 
to shed light on how the regulation of pension plans may affect equity investment 
levels, and thus changes in equity investment levels, follow adoption of the new 
accounting standard. 
In particular, the study focused on two aspects of pension regulation. The first 
was regulation of the number of employee representatives on pension plan 
boards. This may ensure better alignment of the interests of the governing board 
with those of pension plan beneficiaries, thus mitigating conflicts of interest and 
preventing sponsor firms from over-investing in high-risk securities in order to 
shift the risk from shareholders to employees. The second was regulation of the 
licensing process. Licensing may be defined as the process by which an authority 
grants permission to a pension entity to operate and/or to have the right to benefit 
from a specific tax treatment. It includes a range of actions, involving assessment 
of compliance with specific requirements prior to granting permission to operate 
or granting tax benefits, as well as the status of compliance with such 
requirements. The more rigid the steps that firms must satisfy in order to qualify 
for pension plans, the better the quality and competence of pension plan board 
members. 
Based on the argument above, it was expected that equity investment levels and 
decreases in equity investment levels as a result of adoption of IAS19R would be 
lower for firms in countries that require more member representatives and for 
firms in countries with more rigid pension plan licensing processes. 
The results of univariate and multivariate tests suggest that firms in countries that 
require more employee representatives and have more rigid pension licensing 
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invest less in equities. However, the results for changes in equity investment 
levels following IAS19R adoption using these variables were insignificant and 
less clear owing to insufficient data. Further research might extend the sample 
and collect more data in other countries in order to enhance the tests. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion   
5.1 Key findings and Discussion 
In June 2011, the IASB published an amendment of IAS19 that marked some 
significant requirement changes in recognitions, presentations and disclosures of 
defined benefit pension plan. Arguably, these changes have had effects on 
investment strategies of pension plan portfolio. Collectively, this thesis extends 
the previous literature on the “economic consequences” of accounting standards 
in the context of pension accounting and provide evidence on the causal effects 
of IAS19R adoption on asset allocation of pension plans. 
The chapter 2 of the thesis discusses the economic and regulatory context of the 
research in which it focuses on international accounting standard IAS19 and 
provide comparison among three most popular accounting standards for pension: 
IAS19, FRS 17 and SFAS 158. This chapter also provides a comprehensive 
literature reviews on previous empirical research relate to pension accounting. 
Firstly, this literature review shows that the majority of previous research focused 
on value relevance and earnings management relate to pension accounting. 
Secondly, most of these researches were performed using US data and in the 
context of US market. Since there is institutional different between US market 
and non-US market, this study is motivated to examine the economic 
consequence of the international accounting standard in the context of the UK 
market and EU companies. 
In the light of Positive Accounting Theory developed by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), the chapter 3 of the thesis provides a comprehensive analysis on how 
firms would lobby in relation to the proposals for IAS19R. By carefully examine 
the comment letters sent by the respondents to the IASB’s Exposure Draft, this 
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chapter provides the suggested implication of lobbying behaviour during the due 
process in the development of the revised pension accounting standard. The 
findings suggest that industry firms would use some dubious arguments and 
information to persuade the IASB to abandon or change its proposals in the final 
version of IAS19R. In this respect. The sponsor firms that have negative effect 
by the new pension accounting standard, decided to submit a comment letter with 
the consideration of the impact of the proposal changes on reported accounting 
numbers. And in turn, how these change in accounting numbers would influence 
the decision making of various stakeholders. The manual analysis of the 
comment letters as the instrument for the sponsor firms to take part in the due 
process of accounting standard, documents several argument raised by these 
firms. Most of the opposed arguments were cluster around the elimination of the 
“corridor method”, abolition of ERR and new disclosure requirement in the ED. 
Interestingly, these proposals were arguable as the one which have the most 
significant impact on the sponsor firms financial reporting. Furthermore, when 
compared to the firm characteristic and economic context of the firms, these 
arguments were quite disingenuous. This finding suggests the lobbying effort of 
the sponsor firms to prevent the negative impact of new proposal adoption to the 
firms which is consistent with “Positive Accounting Theory” (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986)   
The next chapter performs an empirical research that focus on the causal effect 
of IAS19R adoption on asset allocation of pension plan using both UK data and 
EU data. The amendment of IAS19 had two significant changes. The first change 
related to elimination of the “corridor method” that has significant effect on the 
balance sheets of sponsor firms (“balance sheet channel”) and the second one 
regarded to the abolition of ERR that has significant effect on income statement 
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of sponsor firms (“income statement channel”). The first part of this chapter 
examines the change of asset allocation of EU-listed firm following the adoption 
of IAS19R through both “income statement channel” and “balance sheet 
channel”. This part is based on the data of 253 EU-listed firms in 9 countries and 
examines the association between the equity investment level changes and the 
changes in pension accounting number reported in financial statements. The 
study applies a cross-sectional model developed by Amir et al. (2010). The 
regression results reveal that the decrease in equity investment between 2012 
and 2014 was significantly associated with the change of shareholders’ equity 
exposed to the volatility of pension asset and pension liability. These associations 
suggest that the way a firm reports pension accounting information might impact 
on the investment strategy of its pension plan(s). Therefore, the change in the 
pension accounting standard would also have affect pension plan asset 
allocation. Additionally, the results also show a significant positive relationship 
between changes in equity investment and changes in pension expenses relative 
to net income. This result indicates that the larger the pension expense in relation 
to net income, the more equity investment decreased from 2012 through 2014. 
In the other words, the bigger the pension plan in relative terms, the more the 
sponsor firm seeks to reduce the risk in the pension plan portfolio following the 
adoption of IAS19R.  
Furthermore, the evidence shows a positive relationship between equity 
investment levels and firms’ leverage and cash flow risk. This supports the “risk-
shifting” hypotheses documented in the previous literature (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977; Leland, 1998; Cocco and Volpin, 2007).  
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The next section of the chapter focuses on isolating the impact of IAS19R 
adoption through the “income statement channel” on pension plan asset 
allocation by studying UK sponsor firms. The UK setting provides a unique 
opportunity to highlight the “income statement channel” since the majority of UK 
sponsor firms were not affected by the elimination of the “corridor method” 
requirement. Based on a sample consisting of 123 UK firms and 123 US firms, 
this part provides evidence on the causal effects of IAS 19R adoption on asset 
allocation of pension plan by applying difference-in-differences research design 
with propensity score matching. The results suggest that, on average, UK 
sponsor firms reduced the equity investment level in responding to the IAS19R 
adoption, relative to the US sponsor firms. Although the UK sample is selected to 
highlight the effect of ERR abolition, among 123 UK sponsor firms, there might 
be small number of firms that used the “corridor method” to recognise AGL before 
the adoption of IAS19R. Due to the limitation of database, these firms were 
unable to separate from the sample. This limitation might affect the reliability of 
the conclusion in this test. 
The findings of chapter 4 offers rational explanations on how reporting the 
accounting information might have significant effects on management behaviours 
and decisions. In particular, pension expense calculation and thus net income 
reporting is an important driving factor for managers to alter investment strategies 
for their pension plan assets, changes which are not necessarily for the best 
interest of beneficiaries. The outcomes suggest these investment strategies are 
consistent with the hypothesis of “risk shifting” from the shareholders to the 
beneficiaries of firm pension plan. However, any direct tests of this hypothesis 
are outside the scope of this research, leaving opportunities for further research. 
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The final part of the chapter examine how macro-institutional context would drive 
the asset allocation of pension plan. In particular, whether the number of member 
represented for the beneficiaries in the pension Board and the competency of 
these member measured by the licencing factor, would improve the governance 
of the Board. The results show a negative association between these factors and 
equity investment level but there are no significant association between these 
factors with the change of equity investment level following the adoption of 
IAS19R. These outcomes might contribute to the limitation of data collected and 
the misspecification regression model used to examine this research. This 
suggests an opportunity for future research. 
This study provides evidence that may be beneficial to standard setters, 
investors, and regulatory agencies. It provides reliable evidence on the causal 
effect of IAS19R adoption on asset allocation of pension plans, as well as a 
comprehensive view on the “economic effects” of this adoption, and the lobbying 
efforts of impacted entities.  This study would be useful for standard setters and 
regulatory agencies for their future projects related to pension accounting and 
other standards. 
5.2 Limitation and further research suggestion 
The manual content analysis in chapter 3 is subject to certain limitations related 
to the content analysis methodology used. According to Krippendorf (1980), the 
potential unreliability of self-applied investigator-developed recording instructions 
must be considered and controlled in content analysis, especially manual textual 
analysis.  
Furthermore, the process of comparing arguments raised in comment letters with 
firms’ specific characteristics and their business context would only suggest the 
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suspected lobbying attempts of the sponsor firms. It offers little insight on the 
perception of the respondent on making the decision to take part in the due 
process of accounting standard making (e.g. whether respondents believe they 
would affect the final versions of accounting standards). 
Additionally, at the conceptual level, this analysis is based on “positive accounting 
theory” and other theories, such as “the economic theory of democracy” and the 
“theory of coalition and influence”, have not provided a basis for the analysis. 
Finally, the analysis is based solely on a sample of 63 industrial firms, all of them 
sponsors of defined benefit pension scheme at that time, and constituting the 
majority group among preparers of financial statements. However, these are not 
necessarily representative of financial statement preparers more widely. 
Following this limitation, another potentially interesting area to investigate is the 
motivation and behaviour of financial statement users in the due process stage 
of accounting standard setting. 
Further research might be conducted to extend and improve on the current 
research in chapter 3. Interview-based research could improve and strengthen 
understanding of the lobbying efforts of sponsor firms, and also shed light on their 
motivations and perceptions when taking part in the due process. The sample of 
interviews could be extended to other stakeholders, especially to users, given 
that there is very little research focused on this group in the standard setting due 
process participation literature and standard lobbying literature. Moreover, the 
conceptual level of the research would be extended to look into different angles 
by considering different set of literature. Apart from “positive accounting theory”, 
the other two set of the theories mentioned above might be interesting to apply. 
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Chapter 4 has attempted to identify the causal effects of IAS19R adoption on the 
asset allocation of pension plans. Firstly, a cross sectional model directly 
examined the association between the change of equity investment level and the 
change of pension accounting numbers in the period of one year before and one 
year after the mandatory of IAS19R. Although the results show the expected 
significant sign of their association and several control variable have been 
included in the model, the results need to be viewed with caution. There was a 
trending decrease in equity investment levels from the year 2005 to 2014, and 
the effects of financial crisis might be a particularly significant factor in driving this 
shift in asset allocation. The decrease in equity investment levels following the 
adoption of IAS19R could therefore simply be a drifting effect arising from 
financial crisis and other macro-economic events. 
In order to isolate the impact of the new requirements of IAS19R a sample of UK 
sponsor firms was examined, since the full recognition requirement of IAS19R 
did not have a severe impact on this sample (as explained in sub-section 4.3.2.1). 
The DID design incorporating sensitivity analysis has provided a reliable 
conclusion on the causal effect of IAS19R adoption on the asset allocation of 
sponsor firms through the “income statement” channel. However, there are 
several limitations that need to be addressed in future research. Firstly, the 
interpretation of the result as a causal effect of IAS19R on asset allocation due 
to the income statement incentive relies heavily on the quality of the sample 
examined. The sample is defined as high quality if all of the firms in the sample 
had voluntarily adopted “full recognition” before IAS19R was published and 
mandated. However, in this sample only the majority of the firms met this 
definition. This limitation would reduce the reliability of the outcome and its 
conclusion.  
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Furthermore, the sample size of 123 firms is relatively small compared to the 
population of more than 300 sponsor firms in the database (Capital IQ). This 
reduces the generalized interpretation of the test results.  
In order to strengthen the outcome of this research, it is necessary to take 
additional step to extend the sample and improve the quality of the sample. 
Alternatively, it might be interesting to apply an interview-based analysis to 
directly investigate the impact of IAS19R adoption on decision making of 
sponsoring firms. 
In regard to the analysis of Pension Board Characteristics on asset allocation and 
impact of IAS19R on the asset allocation of DB pension plans, the complexity of 
governance factors needs to be re-emphasized and more work needs to be done 
in analysing the deeper governance context at firm level (or even at the plan 
level). This would add several benefits to the research. Firstly, this would extend 
the sample size and improve the sample data (at the moment, the data are very 
sticky in regard to governance factors because they are collected and measured 
at the country level). Secondly, this would add to our understanding of the 
mechanisms which affect pension plan decision making and how the corporate 
governance of pension plans contributes to these decision-making processes. 
The study of defined benefit pension plans in relation to accounting standard 
setting and corporate governance of pension boards across countries is very 
complicated research that needs to take more precautions in choosing research 
designs and interpreting the results, especially when one focuses on causal 
relationships and economic consequences. Taking into account the limitations 
above, the suggested further research has the potential to significantly improve 
on the outcomes of this study.
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Appendix A 
Pension Accounting between IFRS and US. GAAP 
 
 IFRS pension accounting in pre-IAS19R (based on 
IAS19, revised December 2004) 
Current US. 
GAAP (SFAS 
158) 
 Option 1 (OCI 
method) which 
is similar under 
FRS 17. 
Option2 
(Corridor 
method) 
Option 3 
(Income 
Statement 
method) 
 
Pension 
Accounting 
Treatment 
Recognize all 
actuarial gains 
and losses as 
they occur in 
each period 
through OCI 
Recognize 
actuarial gains 
and losses in 
the Income 
Statement when 
they exceed 
10% of the 
larger of PBO 
and fair value of 
pension assets, 
by amortizing 
over remaining 
expected 
service life of 
beneficiaries. 
Recognize 
actuarial gains 
and losses as 
they occur in 
each period 
through Income 
Statement 
Recognize all 
actuarial gains 
and losses as 
they occur, in 
each period 
through OCI, but 
using corridor to 
recycle these 
amounts 
through Income 
Statement 
subsequence 
period) 
What does it 
imply for the 
balance sheet 
Balance sheet 
reflects the true 
funded status of 
the plan 
Balance sheet 
does not reflect 
the true funded 
status of the 
plan as the 
accumulated 
unrecognized 
actuarial gains 
and losses are 
off-balance 
sheet 
Balance sheet 
reflects the true 
funded status of 
the plan 
Balance sheet 
reflects the true 
funded status of 
the plan 
What does it 
imply for the 
income 
statement? 
Income 
statement only 
reflects 
smoothed 
pension 
expense. 
Pension 
expense 
calculation 
requires 
expected rate of 
return on plan 
assets. 
Income 
Statement only 
reflects 
smoothed 
pension 
expense. 
Pension 
expense 
calculation 
requires 
expected rate of 
return on plan 
assets. 
Income 
statement is 
“unsmoothed” 
with respect to 
actual returns 
on plan assets. 
Pension 
expense 
calculation does 
not require 
expected rate of 
return on plan 
assets. 
Income 
statement only 
reflects 
smoothed 
pension 
expense. 
Pension 
expense 
calculation 
requires 
expected rate of 
return on plan 
assets. 
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Appendix C 
Motivation General Themes Responding Firms IASB response 
Based on Positive 
Accounting Theory by 
Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978): when decide to 
submit the comment 
letter, submitter 
consider the impact of 
the proposed changes 
on reported accounting 
numbers. In turn, this 
impact on accounting 
number would have 
effect on decision-
making behaviour of 
business, government, 
union, investors and 
creditors. Thus those 
who have a vested 
interest in how this 
decision-making 
behaviourt is 
conducted will place 
pressure on the 
standard-setter not to 
approve the standard 
containing an 
objectionable feature 
(Zeff, 1978, 2012 
   
Example Panel A: Recognition   
 Question 1: Full 
recognition of all 
changes in PA and 
PBO 
 The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
Air France KLM: in 
between 2009 and 
2010, the average 
discount rate 
decreased by about 
0.75 point involved an 
increase of the DBO 
amounting to €1.5 
billion 
British Airway: 
claimed that the 
abolition of the 
“corridor method” 
would add to the 
confusion surrounding 
accounting for defined 
benefit scheme, 
contradict with what 
reported by academic.  
Long-term nature of 
pension plans would 
not be faithfully 
reported using point-
in-time reporting 
principle. This would 
cause volatility on 
balance sheets and 
in income 
statements. 
Altria Group, Air 
France-KLM, 
AngloAmerican, 
British Airways, BAT, 
Hoffmann–La Roche, 
Shell, Telefonos de 
Mexico 
 
 Revision of the 
concept in IAS1: 
Financial Statements 
on performance 
reporting before 
Air France–KLM, BAT, 
Constellation Energy, 
ING 
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Motivation General Themes Responding Firms IASB response 
revision of IAS19: 
Employee Benefits. 
Altria Group: their 
investment strategy 
has been invested in 
well diversified mix of 
equities, fixed income 
and other securities 
that is claimed to be 
optimal according to 
market context 
Impact of proposals 
in ED: management 
of funding driven by 
accounting rules 
rather than 
management rules. 
Air France–KLM, Altria 
Group, AMX, BAT, 
Deutsche Post DHL 
 
 Concerns about 
interim reporting. 
Chevron, CIGNA, 
Entergy, Exxon Mobil, 
Goodyear, IBM, 
PepsiCo, Pfizer, PPL, 
Rayonier, Raytheon, 
Telefonos de Mexico, 
US Steel, United 
Technologies, Verizon 
 
 Question 5: 
Elimination of the 
ERR 
 The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
CIGNA: the ERR on 
plan assets has 
changed twice since 
the implementation of 
the DB pension plan. 
Opposition to the 
Board’s argument 
that ERR is 
susceptible to 
management 
manipulation. 
Alcoa, 
AngloAmerican, BP, 
BAT, Canada Poster 
Corporation, CIGNA, 
Deutsche Post DHL, 
Eli Lilly, Exxon Mobil, 
Ford, Hydro-Québec, 
Jardine Matheson, 
Kesa Electricals, 
Pfizer, Nestlé, PPL, 
Progress Energy, 
Sanofi–Aventis, Shell, 
Siemens 
 
Norsk Hydro: 
Company is based in 
Norway where they 
have to use 
government bonds as 
basis for determining 
the discount rate, this 
will result in a lower 
value of the effect of 
passage of time than 
for entities that can 
determine the discount 
rate with reference to 
the market yield on 
high quality corporate 
bonds 
 
Opposition to the 
Board’s view that 
changes in the value 
of any assets can be 
divided between 
amounts arising from 
the passage of time 
and other changes. 
Alcoa, Altria, BAT, 
Canada Poster 
Corporation, CIGNA, 
Entergy, Norsk Hydro, 
Raytheon, Sanofi–
Aventis, Shell 
 
Altria Group: their 
long –term rate of 
return on plan assets 
historically exceeds 
bonds discount rates 
and is targeted to 
Concerns about the 
“true and fair view” of 
pension accounting. 
Alcoa, Altria, AMX, 
AngloAmerican, 
Balfour Beatty, BASF, 
British Airways, BP, 
BAT, BT, Canada 
Poster Corporation, 
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achieve long-term 
management of cash 
funding requirement. 
 
Entergy Corporation: 
the company’s pension 
plan assets at that time 
comprised of 
approximately 68% 
equity and 32% fixed 
income securities with 
long term ERR of 
approximately 8% to 
9%. The discount rate 
they applied was much 
lower than the ERR (3-
4%) 
 
CIGNA, Eli Lilly, 
Entergy, Exxon Mobil, 
FirstEnergy, Fletcher 
Building, Ford, Hydro-
Québec, Infosys, ING, 
Jardine Matheson, 
Kesa Electricals, 
Nestlé, Norsk Hydro, 
PepsiCo, Pfizer, PPL, 
Progress Energy, 
Rayonier, Raytheon, 
Sanofi–Aventis, Shell, 
Siemens 
Ford: allocate and 
invest plan assets 
based on a long-term 
performance and risk-
oriented approach. 
The ERR assumption 
is developed by 
considering various 
inputs and 
assumptions, including 
those regarding capital 
market returns. They 
argued that “such 
approach would 
increase reported 
pension costs, 
regardless of the level 
of funding, particularly 
in cases where plan 
assets include a high 
equity component”. 
Their equity 
investment in 2009 is 
at about 68% 
Concerns about 
using a “spot” 
discount rate for 
long-term items such 
as pension plans. 
Altria, Balfour Beatty, 
British Airways, Eli 
Lilly, Entergy, Fletcher 
Building, Ford, Infosys, 
Jardine Matheson, 
Kesa Electricals, 
Norsk Hydro, Pfizer, 
Progress Energy, 
Raytheon, Sanofi–
Aventis, Siemens 
 
Deutsche Post DHL: 
According to their 
financial statement, 
the new requirement 
would increase the 
pension costs for the 
group from €298 to 
€310 in 2009 (by 
roundly 4%) 
Concerns about the 
economic 
consequences of 
ERR elimination. 
Altria, AMX, BASF 
(counter view), BAT, 
Deutsche Post DHL, 
Jardine Matheson, 
Nestlé, PPL, Shell 
 
 Panel B: 
Presentation 
  
 Question 6: 
Presentation of 
pension expense 
components 
 The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
Shell International 
PV: they suggested to 
present finance cost 
Presentation of net 
interest costs 
AMX, Canada Poster 
Corporation, Fletcher 
Building, Hydro-
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and service cost in the 
same line because 
they think it is 
consistent with 
presenting a net 
position of pension in 
the balance sheet. And 
they also admit that “it 
also be a significant 
effort for companies 
such as ourselves, 
who present the cost of 
DB plans on a net 
basis and expenses by 
function in the income 
statement, to then 
have to differentiate 
between these 
components in order to 
exclude the finance 
cost from each line 
item” 
together with service 
costs. 
Québec, Infosys, 
Jardine Matheson, 
Shell, SKF 
Exxon Mobil: 
supported the recycled 
from OCI to net income 
over the average 
remaining service 
period of the active 
participants because in 
doing so, the net 
income reflects the 
total benefit cost over 
time. They also believe 
the financial statement 
users place more 
weight on net income 
number. 
Re-measurement 
amounts should be 
recycled back to P&L 
statements since part 
of these amounts 
reflect management 
operational 
decisions. The 
proposal also does 
not reflect the “true 
and fair view” of the 
cost of DB plans. 
Altria, Canada Poster 
Corporation, Bayer, 
BAT, Entergy, Exxon 
Mobil, Progress 
Energy 
 
 Recurring activities 
should be presented 
in net income and 
non-recurring 
activities in OCI. 
Bayer, Constellation 
Energy, Larsen & 
Toubro 
 
First Energy: rather 
than gave a direct 
answer for this 
question, they used 
this response to 
mention their opposed 
opinion about the 
abolition of ERR again. 
Lobbying activities 
against abolition of 
the “corridor method” 
and ERR. 
Altria, AMX, Canada 
Poster Corporation, 
FirstEnergy 
 
 Question 3: 
Disaggregation of 
pension expenses 
 The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
 Simplify accounting 
for pensions by 
presenting net 
periodic pension 
costs as a global item 
Air France–KLM, ING, 
Nestlé, Progress 
Energy, Rayonier, 
Sappi, Stagecoach 
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under a single 
caption. 
 Question 7: 
Settlements and 
curtailments 
 The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
PPL Corporation: 
believe that “non-
routine” settlement 
gains/losses is similar 
to curtailments, and 
are triggered by a 
company action. Thus 
they should be 
considered as part of 
operating income. 
Settlement 
transaction 
outcomes are not 
necessarily the result 
of re-measurement; 
non-routine 
settlements are more 
likely to arise from 
direct action of the 
reporting entity, and 
share many 
similarities with 
curtailment. 
AstraZeneca, BASF, 
Deutsche Post DHL, 
Eli Lilly, Hoffmann–La 
Roche, Nestlé, PPL 
 
Deutsche Post DHL: 
“In practice there are 
cases where it is 
debateable whether a 
certain transaction is a 
curtailment or a 
settlement or both (and 
whether it is first a 
curtailment or a 
settlement). For this 
pragmatic reason but 
also conceptually, we 
do believe that it is 
reasonable to treat 
plan amendments, 
curtailments and 
settlements in the 
same way, i.e. via 
P&L” 
Distinguishing 
between curtailments 
and settlements is 
sometimes very 
complex. 
BASF, BT, Deutsche 
Post DHL, Ford, Shell 
 
British Airways: No, 
we do not agree that 
curtailments should be 
treated in the same 
way as plan 
amendments. It is 
more appropriate for 
the gains and losses 
as a result of a 
curtailment to be 
recognised in other 
comprehensive 
income.” 
Are curtailment 
transactions 
decisions made by 
management or 
significant events 
requiring re-
measurement? 
British Airways  
 Both curtailment and 
settlement should be 
taken out of P&L 
since they are 
significant events 
that require re-
measurement. 
FirstEnergy, Ford, 
PepsiCo, Stagecoach, 
URS 
 
 Panel C: Disclosure   
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Fletcher Building: “In 
particular the 
sensitivity analysis 
would be extremely 
complex for a group 
such as ours where we 
have a number of 
plans across a number 
of countries.  As they 
all have different 
corporate 
bond/government 
bond rates, different 
salary growth 
projections and 
different mortality rates 
we do not see how we 
could provide any 
meaningful sensitive 
analysis on these 
plans” 
Sensitivity analysis 
might be impractical 
due to the non-linear 
nature of some 
factors, and 
extremely complex 
for groups with 
several plans in 
different countries. 
Altria, BASF, Fletcher 
Building, Nestlé, 
PepsiCo, Shell, Telstra 
The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
 Sensitivity analysis 
should be limited to 
key assumptions. 
Air France–KLM, 
AngloAmerican, 
Chevron, Deutsche 
Post DHL, 
FirstEnergy, Unilever 
 
Hydro-Québec: We 
find it hard to 
understand how 
sensitivity analyses for 
the obligation alone 
could be useful for 
users of financial 
statements because 
such analyses are not 
required for the net 
defined benefit liability 
(asset) presented on 
the balance sheet 
given the difficulties 
involved with plan 
assts. Moreover, since 
the defined benefit 
obligation is 
determined based on 
management’s best 
estimates, it seems to 
us that the use of any 
other assumptions 
would rather have the 
effect of discrediting 
the calculations based 
on management’s best 
estimates.” 
Sensitivity tests for 
PBO and service 
costs are 
inappropriate. 
Goodyear, Hydro-
Québec 
The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
Anglo American:” We 
do not consider that 
disclosing the process 
used to determine 
actuarial assumptions 
will add significant 
value to the users of 
the financial 
Disclosure relating to 
processes used to 
determine actuarial 
assumptions are 
impractical, and 
would lead to 
boilerplate lists in 
financial statements 
AngloAmerican, 
BASF, BP, Chevron, 
Hoffmann–La Roche, 
Pfizer, PPL, Shell, 
Telstra, Unilever 
The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
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statements. There is a 
significant element of 
this process which will 
be generic across 
many companies and 
this disclosure 
requirement is not 
likely to present any 
information which is 
beneficial. Further, its 
inclusion may result in 
significant generic 
information being 
included which may 
result in key 
information being 
difficult to identify”. 
because the process 
would be generic 
across many entities. 
AstraZeneca: “We do 
not believe the 
requirements of 
paragraph 125H is 
appropriate for 
financial statements 
prepared on a going 
concern basis…We 
believe that the 
benefits of such 
disclosure will be 
outweighed by the 
downsides of 
additional disclosure 
and create a 
dangerous precedent 
for all other values 
disclosed in the 
statement of financial 
position” 
Disclosure of ABO 
would not provide 
any decision-useful 
information and 
might cause 
confusion. 
AngloAmerican, 
AstraZeneca, Balfour 
Beatty, Deutsche Post 
DHL, BASF, BP, 
E.ON, Hoffmann–La 
Roche, Hydro-
Québec, Kesa 
Electricals, National 
Grid, Shell, Telstra 
The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
A very generic and 
vague argument from 
Telstra: “We do not 
agree - The additional 
disclosures on 
information about 
asset-liability matching 
would not be practical 
to obtain.  In addition 
the majority of users 
would not know what 
to do with the 
information.” 
Disclosures of asset 
liability matching 
strategies might be 
highly technical and 
might mislead 
financial statement 
users. Such 
disclosures might 
also be generic. 
AngloAmerican, 
AstraZeneca, E.ON, 
Eli Lilly, FirstEnergy, 
Goodyear, Hydro-
Québec, Shell, Telstra 
The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
E.ON: “we consider it 
redundant in many 
cases to require 
entities to disclose, as 
proposed in ED IAS19. 
125K, factors that 
could lead to 
significant differences 
between contributions 
and service cost over 
the next five years. For 
one thing, this is 
Disclosure 
requirements for 
factors that might 
cause contributions 
to differ from service 
costs are too broad 
and might lead to a 
boilerplate list of 
risks. 
AstraZeneca, Balfour 
Beatty, BASF, BP, 
Deutsche Post DHL, 
E.ON, Eli Lilly, Exxon 
Mobil, Goodyear, 
Hydro-Québec, 
Nestlé, PPL, Shell, 
Telstra, Unilever 
The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
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Motivation General Themes Responding Firms IASB response 
because decisions on 
the amount of 
contribution to external 
funds are often 
dependent on the 
results and financial 
position of an entity. 
But the factors 
essentially influencing 
results and financial 
position are already 
discussed in detail in 
the annual reports. For 
another, there is in 
many countries no 
obligation to fully 
finance the service 
cost in the context of 
corporate pensions, 
which means that in 
these jurisdictions, a 
divergence of service 
cost from contributions 
is likely to be 
commonplace” 
E.ON: We do not 
support the Board’s 
proposal to combine 
the existing “post-
employment benefits” 
and “other long-term 
employee benefits” 
categories into a 
common “long-term 
employee benefits” 
category and the 
associated changes in 
the accounting for 
such other long-term 
employee benefits. We 
believe that obligations 
classified as “other 
long-term employee 
benefits”, such as 
anniversary bonus 
obligations or 
obligations under early 
retirement 
arrangements, differ 
markedly from 
obligations classified 
as “post-employment 
benefits” both in term 
of their maturities and 
in terms of their 
inherent actuarial and 
financial risks”. 
Concern about 
requirement to 
combine disclosures 
under “old” post-
employment benefits 
(pensions) and other 
employee benefits 
(jubilee payments). 
Deutsche Post DHL, 
E.ON, Hoffmann–La 
Roche, Nestlé 
The IASB retained 
this proposal in the 
same form in the 
final version of 
IAS19R published 
in 2011. 
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